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Soekor signed an exclusive offshore oil exploration accord with Pioneer Natural 
Resources USA giving the company a one year exclusive right to study and negotiate a 
petroleum exploration sublease with Soekor over an area that covers approximately 2.5 
million acres offshore Port Elizabeth. The map on page 5 provides further information on 
the status of the concession areas offshore South Africa. 
1.2 Characteristics of a legal regime 
Before looking at South Africa's specific regime, it is necessary to first look at what the 
characteristics of a desirable regime would be, and then how these are applied in South 
Africa. 
a) Respect for international law 
An offshore oil regime should respect international law. This is desirable because it 
avoids conflict. For South Africa, this means meeting international conventions to which 
South Africa is a party e.g. dumping conventions, the Geneva conventions and 
Continental Shelf doctrines. The regime should also meet international customary law 
which, for example, imposes the due regard principal for sea users. There must also be 
compliance with the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 in particular. Even if the 
convention is not ratified, most of it is customary law anyway and therefore must be 
respected. South Africa has ratified the Law of the Sea Convention. 
b) Balance 
There must be a balance between the various users of the sea e.g. living resources should 
be conserved, there should be adequate navigation warnings on installations for vessels. 
c) Respect for the environment 
The environment should be respected i.e. there should be no pollution of offshore or 
onshore areas, of living resources and of recreational facilities. As an example, Soekor' s 
activities in the Mossel Bay area have resulted in complaints from fisherman who allege 
that Soekor is damaging ''The Blues" fishing area. They are saying Soekor should remove 
the sealed up wells while Soekor maintains that they are not legally responsible for doing 
so, as the wells were drilled by foreign companies. 
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One would have to consult international law in terms of abandonment to see whether 
Soekor are responsible for their sub-lessees. Fisherman have tried to get a guarantee that 
Soekor will clean up after its activities have finished, but Soekor maintains that no clean-
up will be necessary because they are operating in such an efficient manner. 
Another example is the assertion that the Phillips sub-lease will inconvenience the shrimp 
trawling industry to the north and east of Durban. Phillips have undertaken to leave the 
sea bed free of any obstructions and if this is not possible, to inform the industry of the 
precise location, nature and extent of the obstruction. 
d) Physical security of the operators 
(i) Physical security from adverse effects of others is important and this is achieved by 
creating safety,.zones around installations. In South Africa the Maritime Zones Act 15/94 
creates a 500 meter safety zone around installations: 
"'installation means any of the following situated within internal waters, territorial waters or the 
exclusive economic zone or on or above the continental shelf ..... any area situated within a 
distance of 500 meters measured from any point on the exterior side of an installation referred to 
in paragraph (a) or (b) other than a pipeline". 
The authority to create this safety zone originates in article 60(5) - 60(7) of the Law of 
the Sea Conventions: 
"5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be detennined by the coastal State, taking into account 
applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they are reasonably 
related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or structures, and shall not 
exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, 
except as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the 
competent international organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones. 
6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted international 
standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and 
safety zones. 
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be 
established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to 
international navigation." 
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Within this zone, rules are introduced for example with respect to navigation by the 
General Law Amendment Act 38/1993. There are also, inter alia, provisions with respect 
to warnings. 
(ii) Physical security from the environment is also important and so properly constructed 
installations, capable of withstanding the elements and provisions for safety of employees 
on or in the vicinity of the installations, are very important. The South African Maritime 
Safety Authority Act 5/98 provides for the establishment of the South African Maritime 
Safety Authority (SAMSA) and other incidental matters. SAMSA's objectives are to 
ensure the safety of life and property at sea, to prevent and combat pollution of the 
marine environment by ships and to promote the Republic's maritime interests. 
e) Legal security of the operator 
Installations are usually used extraterritorially and therefore cannot necessarily rely on 
the State's legal system. Installations are also of enormous economic value, so the status 
in law must be clear. In South Africa this is the case where the Maritime Zones Act 15/94 
applies the entire body of South Africa law to installations in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (200nm) and on the continental shelf (approximately 350nm): 
"(l) Any law in force in the Republic, including the common law, shall also apply on and in 
respect of an installation. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) an installation shall be deemed to be within the district, as 
defined in section 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944), designated by the 
Minister of Justice. 
(3) In the absence of a designation contemplated in subsection (2) an installation shall be deemed 
to be within the district nearest to that installation. 
f) A legal regime should be created 
Because most installations occur extraterritorially there needs to be a regime to apply to 
personnel (e.g. civil, criminal, social, fiscal). In South Africa, the Maritime Zones Act 
applies as in (f). Note that installations may have a tax regime which differs from that on 
land. 
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g)Incentives for developers 
Technical know-how is with the big United States companies and they are looking for 
opportunities. South Africa therefore needs a measure of technical feasibility to attract 
serious investors. Political stability is also important, as are favourable contract terms. 
Competition exists to attract investors and so a favourable tax regime is also needed. A 
good example of this is the Phillips lease regime - tax only comes into effect on discovery 
of oil / gas, and the rate of tax is fixed at 35% (usually 72%) to align with the generally 
prevalent international percentage. No foreign exchange controls apply and only a small 
royalty is payable to Soekor. 
h) Incentives for fast development 
If licence fees are too low, the developer might not feel an urgency to develop. Therefore 
it is important to put a time limit on development. In South Africa, Phillips pay $US 150 
000 I year during the exploration lease, with their total capital investment being estimated 
at about $US 20 2000 000. The lease expires on 6 May 2001, but can be renewed twice 
for a further period of 3 years. There is also a work programme in which Phillips are 
undertaking to do 1500 km of seismic surveying during the 4 years and drill at least one 
exploration well. If the lease is renewed, there will be undertakings to drill other wells as 
well. 
i) Orderly and gradual development 
The state will try to ensure that there is a gradual flow of oil/ gas over a long period of 
time. This is done by putting up blocks for tender piece by piece. In South Africa, Soekor 
has rounds of invitations to tender. 
j) Economic interest of State 
In themselves, oil and gas are great economic assets which can be increased by bringing 
them ashore before exporting. Many states require oil and gas to be landed. In South 
Africa, this is the case with Mossgas and so it has the necessary infrastructure in Mossel 
Bay. Phillips has no restriction on international marketing but does have to process an oil 
and gas discovered at Sasol or in Durban. 
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k) Strategic interests of State 
Oil / gas are strategic resources, which is why many states require onshore landing. States 
also create state oil companies e.g. British National Oil Company (BNOC) and Norway's 
State Oil Company (STATOIL) which take up holdings in other companies. The rationale 
behind this is so that the state can act in an emergency to get hold of oil. In South Africa 
there is no problem with Soekor because it is parastatal. The Phillips contract stipulates 
that Soekor has the option to take 10% equity in the consortium for no consideration (i.e. 
for no financial remuneration). 
2. OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS 
Most oil and gas occurs on the continental shelf. With the technology available today, it 
is only technically feasible to prospect and exploit on the South African continental shelf 
within the 200 nautical mile limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone (given jurisdiction by 
the Law of the Sea Convention and claimed in the Maritime Zones Act). However, it may 
in the future be possible to exploit on areas of the continental shelf beyond 200nm. In 
such cases, South Africa would still have jurisdiction, given by special rules of art 76 
(paragraphs 4-6) of the Law of the Seas Convention: 
"4. (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish t11e outer edge of the 
continental margin wherever t11e margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at 
each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from 
such point to the foot of the continental slope; or (ii) a line delineated in accordance with 
paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the 
continental slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined 
as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the sea-bed, 
drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 
nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of the 
continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
Coastal Zone Law PBL603E 1999 
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the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are 
natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs." 
3. DEFINITIONS 
Since the purpose of this essay is concerned with a legal regime governing resources, 
activities and structures, it is necessary to define these in the legal sense. As an example, 
the word installation in technical terms may conjure up images of only traditional 
platforms. The legal definition, however, has further implications, as shall be seen later. 
3.1 Oil and gas 
According to the Minerals Act 50/91 (l)(xiv), mineral means 
"any substance, whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, occurring naturally in or on the earth, in 
or under water or in tailings and having been formed by or subject to a geological process, 
excluding water, but including sand, stone, rock, gravel and clay, as well as soil, other than 
topsoil'' 
This definition would thus include natural oil and gas. 
3.2 Prospecting and mining 
The Minerals Act 50/91 (l)(xiii)(b) defines mine (used as a verb) as 
"the making of any excavation or borehole referred to in paragraph (a)(I) to the exploitation of any 
mineral deposit in any manner, for the purpose of winning a mineral, including any prospecting in 
connection with the winning of such mineral;(xx)" 
It can thus be inferred that both exploring and exploiting (prospec_ting and mining) of 
natural oil and gas are covered in the definition of "mine" in the Minerals Act 50/91. 
3.3 Installation 
As mentioned earlier, the technical and legal definitions of installation are different. 
While the word installation may imply a fixed structure, such as in figure 2, the Maritime 
Zones Act 15/94 (1) defines installation as: 
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" any of the following situated within internal waters, territorial waters or the exclusive economic 
zone or on or above the continental shelf: 
(a) Any installation, including a pipeline, which is used for the transfer of any substance to or 
from- (i) a ship; (ii) a research, exploration or production platform; or (iii) the coast of the 
Republic. 
(b) Any exploration or production platform used in prospecting for or the mining of any substance. 
(c) Any exploration or production vessel used in prospecting for or the mining of any substance. 
[Para. (c) substituted bys. 3 of Act 82 of 1995.] 
(d) A telecommunications line as defined in section 1 of the Post Office Act, 1958 (Act 44 of 
1958). 
(e) Any vessel or appliance used for the exploration or exploitation of the seabed. 
(f) Any area situated within a distance of 500 metres measured from any point on the exterior side 
of an installation referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) other than a pipeline. 
(g) Any area situated under or above an installation referred to in paragraph (a) or (b); 
Thus it can be seen that legislation applying to "installations" will have further 
applications than might be obvious at first glance. 
A typical offshore installation 
4. LEGISLATION 
The main point to note here is the legislation with regards to oil and gas is not 
coordinated. Ad hoc pieces of law can be applied to various operations in the various 
zones offshore South Africa and these are identified below. Pollution laws are contained 
in a separate section. 
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4.1 Authority to mine 
As mentioned previously, Soekor obtained the right to prospect and mine under the old 
Mining Rights Act 20/67. Currently, sections 6 and 9 of the new Minerals Act 50/91 deal 
with the issuing of prospecting permits and mining authorisations respectively. Any new 
leases granted would be done so under the new act. 
4.2 Seashore, internal waters, territorial waters 
Because different legislation applies to different offshore zones, it is necessary to define 
the boundaries of these zones. 
a) The Seashore Act 21/35 defines the seashore as the area between the high and low 
water marks. The State President is deemed to be the owner of the seashore and is it's 
custodian on behalf of the citizens of South Africa. 
b) The Maritime Zones Act 15/94 defines internal waters as all waters landward of 
baselines established by the Act (two types of baselines occur in different areas viz. the 
low water mark and straight (man-made) baselines). 
c) The same Act also defines territorial waters, these being 12nm from whichever 
baselines apply in a specific area. 
All South African statutes apply in these areas because of the Maritime Zones Act 15/94 
section 4(2), which says: 
"Any law in force in the Republic, including the common law, shall also apply in its territorial 
waters and the airspace above its territorial waters." 
All South African common law applies for the same reason i.e. there is no difference 
between the land and these sea areas. In summary, all South African statutes and common 
law apply up to the 12nm territorial waters limit. 
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4.3 Beyond territorial waters ( contiguous zone 24nm, EEZ 200nm, Continental 
Shelf 350nm, high seas, waters of other states) 
4.3.1 Applicable statutory law 
A good starting point would be to assume that South African legislation does not apply 
extra-territorially i.e. beyond the territorial waters. This was decided in Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union v Sopelog 1988. The issue was whether the Labour Relations 
Act 28/56 applied outside territorial waters. The courts assumed that the statutes didn't 
apply i.e. there was a presumption of non-application. It is necessary, therefore, to find a 
legislative intent to extend the act. This can be found in two places, either (i) in the act 
itself (expressed or implied) or (ii) in another act. 
i) Auto extension of statutes: 
Here a number of examples of statutes which extend themselves to be enforceable extra-
territorially are provided. This is not an exhaustive list, but is provided for illustrative 
purposes. 
a): The obvious example is the Maritime Zones Act 15/94, which creates a Contiguous 
Zone of 24nm, as well as an Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf and then 
applies all South African law to these areas. 
b) The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105/83 applies to collisions between ships, 
wherever they occur 
c) The Customs and Excise Act 91/64 applies to installations on the continental shelf. The 
installation is deemed to be part of the republic. 
d) The Labour Relations Act 28/56 was amended in 1991 to extend to all activities on the 
continental shelf 
e) The old Sea Fisheries Act 12/88 gave fisheries control officers power to act anywhere 
at sea. The act was of course replaced by the Marine Living Resources Act 18/98 which, 
in section 3(2), specifically makes the provisions of the act extraterritorial 
"This Act, including any applicable regulation, shall have extraterritorial application." 
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f) The Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act 6/81 created a 
prohibited zone of 50nm from the coast, within which it is considered an offence to 
discharge oil. This act now exists under two new names, the Marine Pollution (Control 
and Civil Liability) Act 6/81 and the definition of prohibited area has been amended to 
include the internal waters, territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. 
g) The Dumping at Sea Control Act 73/80 applies to South African ships anywhere (the 
Merchant Shipping Act 57 /51 will identify whether an installation is considered a ship for 
this purpose). 
h) The Intervention Act 2/86 applies to casualties at sea and entitles the authorities to 
intervene on the high seas to prevent pollution. 
i) The National Environmental Management Act 107/98 (section 2) lists national 
environment management principles which apply throughout the Republic to the actions 
of all organs of the state that may significantly affect the environment. These would 
obviously apply to all activities within internal waters and possibly territorial waters. 
NEMA does not, however, define the Republic and so it is assumed the Republic extends 
to the limit of the territorial waters. Thus it is debatable whether the NEMA principles 
would extend to the limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
j) The Environment Conservation Act 73/89 enables the Minister to identify and place 
certain restrictions on those activities which in his opinion may have a detrimental affect 
on the environment, including resource removal. These restrictions would obviously 
apply to the extent on the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
ii) Statutes extended by other statutes: 
Two examples are considered here: 
a) The Merchant Shipping Act 57/51 Section 327(1) deals· with criminal offences on 
South African ships wherever they are and therefore all criminal law statutes follow this. 
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b) The Maritime Zones Act 15/94 extends substantial bodies of legislation to extra-
territorial waters e.g. customs and excise acts, immigration laws (Admissions Act 59/72, 
Departure Act 34/35), health laws, fiscal laws to the contiguous zones. Also all statutes 
and common law extends to installations in the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental 
shelf and to a 500m pocket around the installations. 
4.3.2 Applicable common law 
Common law will apply in three cases: 
(i) When it is extended by a statute e.g. Merchant Shipping Act 57/51 Section 327(1) 
(ii) When a statute already applies, some common law could also apply if attached to the 
statute 
(iii) When the courts interpret the statutes as being applicable. 
4.3.3 Application of the constitution 
Certain statutes apply as well as the rules of common law. These can be tested 
constitutionally and therefore the constitution will follow these laws offshore. 
4.3.4 Contractual law 
Exploring / exploiting was taking place beyond the territorial waters and therefore most 
statutes did not apply before the Maritime Zones Act was in place. The mechanism to 
make the statutes applicable was contracts. 
Soekor had prospecting and mining leases (PL and ML). These two leases were simply 
contracts with two types of clauses: 
i) Clauses obliging Soekor to comply with certain legislation 
(ii) Clauses obliging Soekor to observe certain standards 
Type i) is of primary interest here. The relevant clauses in the contract are PL 33(2) and 
ML 32 and they oblige Soekor to respect all South African law in force on or before 
29/07177 and any additions / substitutions after 29/07 /77 provided that they had no 
adverse effects on Soekor's activities and that Soekor consented to the application of 
these laws. The net result is that Soekor cannot be prejudiced without its consent. 
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The provisions in the lease raise a number of questions: 
a) Is the contract binding on the State? 
Yes. The Mining Rights Act 14(3) says that the terms and conditions of the lease are 
binding on the State 
b) Is the contract binding on Parliament? 
No. A parliament cannot bind a future parliament and so the Mining Rights Act 14(3) 
could be repealed / amended by a future parliament 
c) Is the contract binding on the Government? 
Yes. The United Kingdom and Norway provide good comparisons. The United Kingdom 
has a similar approach to South Africa because it also imposes terms / conditions on 
concession holders via contracts. It is of the opinion that public power exists for public 
benefit and therefore cannot be limited by any particular contract i.e. the contract could 
be adversely affected. Norway draws distinction between the regulatory part of the 
contract (e.g. taxation) which can be changed by exercising public authority and the 
commercial part of the contract (e.g. licence fees, concession areas) which cannot be 
changed. South Africa law says that public power cannot be limited by a contract, but can 
be limited by legislation. 
The Mining Rights Act 14(3) says the state is bound by the contract and therefore the 
minister would not be able to alter the terms of the contract. 
d) What is the relevance to the constitution? 
If parliament amends the act adversely, sections 25(1)(2) of the South African 
constitution say that nobody shall be deprived of property unless it is in the public interest 
and then only on payment of just and equitable compensation. Section 25(4) says that 
property is not confined to land and therefore leases could constitute property. What 
would just and equitable compensation be in the case of Soekor? Nothing, because the 
state would be detrimentally affecting itself. The case would be different for sub-lessees 
and if a sub-lessee was foreign, there could be international implications as well. 
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e) What provisions are binding on the State? 
The state grants a prospecting lease. Attached to the prospecting lease is a draft / 
specimen mining lease. The Mining Rights Act said that when certain conditions are 
fulfilled, the mining lease proper will be issued and it will have the same terms and 
conditions as the draft I specimen version. Therefore, the provisions of both leases are 
binding on the state. What provisions applied before the mining lease was granted? The 
provisions of the specimen mining lease were initially binding as well. 
f) What are the remedies for breach of contract? 
Prosecution: Prosecution in terms of criminal law is possible because the Mining Rights 
Act section 186 says breaking the terms of the lease is a criminal offence 
Civil action: The state may sue, but there is a provision that if the breach of contract 
arises out of circumstance beyond Soekor' s control, then Soekor is not liable (Mining 
Lease clause 27(1) and Prospecting Lease clause 31(1)). 
Termination: If Soekor breaks the lease, action to terminate the lease could be taken. 
Ejectment: Soekor could be ejected from the concession if the lease is broken. 
g) Who has locus standi ( ability to bring action)? 
The state has the ability to prosecute, both the State and Soekor have the ability to bring 
civil action against the other party, both have the right to terminate the contract and the 
State can eject Soekor. 
h) What about third party remedies? 
Does an injured person have locus standi if the injury was caused by a breach of contract? 
No. Only parties to the contract can enforce it and therefore no direct action can be taken. 
Action can only be taken by a third party if any of three cases are evident: 
a) Stipulatio Alteri: This applies if the contract between A and B intends to confer 
benefits onto a third party C. Do the government and Soekor intend stipulatio alteri? An 
LLM thesis concluded that stipulatio alteri was not intended in the lease. 
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b) The individual has a contract of employment with Soekor. If the contract is broken, he 
third party may be able to bring action. 
c) Delict (wrongful act unconnected with the contract): If a person is injured on an 
installation due to the delict of Soekor, then action can be brought. If injury occurs > 500 
m from the installation (e.g. as a result of an explosion on the installation), could the 
injured person bring a claim? The indications are yes because the event occurred on the 
installation. 
4.4 Pollution prevention and control 
The main pollution threat from offshore installations is obviously from oil and so some of 
the more important international and national legislation pertaining to oil pollution is 
examined. 
4.4.1 International Conventions 
a) The Law of the Sea Convention is a logical place to start this discussion. Part 12 is 
dedicated to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and contains 
provisions regarding marine pollution from specific sources as well as on their 
enforcement. These include provisions on marine pollution from vessels. The LOSC 
defines marine pollution as: 
"The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as 
harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, 
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of seawater 
and reduction of amenities". 
b) The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
1954 (OILPOL) was the forerunner of contemporary marine pollution conventions in that 
it was aimed at controlling only one substance, namely oil. It was not limited to 
operational discharges but emphasised operational discharge by prohibiting the discharge 
of oil and oily mixture having an oil content of more than 100 parts per million within 50 
miles from land and in certain special areas. 
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c) The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 
('MARPOL') deals much more specifically with pollution from vessels, its main aim is to 
prevent or regulate deliberate operational discharges rather than to deal with its 
consequences. It covers various technical aspects of pollution from ships at sea. 
d) The International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 (the 'Intervention Convention') allows coastal states to take 
such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave 
or threatened danger to their coastline of related interests from pollution or threat of 
pollution from oil as a result of a maritime casualty. 
e) The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation, 1990 (the 'OPRC' Convention') obliges parties to take all appropriate 
measures to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident. It applies not only to 
ships but also to 'offshore units' and 'sea ports and oil handling facilities'. 
t) The object of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1969 is to establish a uniform regime allowing victims of oil pollution damage 
to seek compensation against owners of vessels which caused the harm. It does so by 
imposing strict liability for oil pollution damage subject to certain exceptions. The 
convention limits liability to certain stipulated amounts provided the owner constitutes a 
fund for the total sum representing the limit of his or her liability. The liability of a ship 
owner is limited to an amount of 210 million francs (roughly equal to US$ 210 million) if 
the ship owner carries insurance. Claims can only be made if the damage occurs on the 
territory of a state up to the extent of the territorial sea. The convention defines pollution 
damage as: 
"loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or 
discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the 
costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures". 
The question arises whether the definition includes only physical damage or whether pure 
economic loss would also be recoverable. A second problem arises; that of quantifying 
"environmental damage", but these are not within the scope of this essay. 
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g) The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter, 1972 (the "London Convention") defines dumping as the deliberate 
disposal of land-based wastes from ships and aircraft, but excludes the disposal of waste 
from the normal operation of ships and aircraft which is covered by MARPOL as seen 
above. Under the London Convention, the dumping of oil is prohibited altogether. 
4.4.2 National Legislation 
a) Section 10 of the Maritime Zones Act, 15 of 1994 provides that the Republic may 
take whatever measures are necessary in the sea or airspace above it which may be 
necessary to protect the coastline "from pollution or threat from pollution". As mentioned 
the Act stipulates that all the laws of the Republic, including the common law. applies to 
offshore installations. These would include those applying to marine pollution. 
b) According to the Marine Traffic Act, 2 of 1981, the Minister is empowered to declare 
safety zones in respect of off-shore installations which also have relevance to pollution. 
c) The Sea-Shore Act, 21 of 1935 is indirectly relevant to marine pollution as it lays 
down the legal status of the sea and sea-shore as well as providing for administration of 
the area. It provides the Minister with the authority to make regulations ''for the 
prevention or the regulation of the depositing or the discharging upon the sea-shore or on 
the sea of offal, rubbish or anything liable to be a nuisance or danger to health". 
d) The Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act, 2 of 1986 (the 
"MARPOL Act") was previously titled the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships Act. and incorporates the MARPOL Convention into South African 
law. 
e) The Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act 64 of gives domestic effect to both the 
Intervention Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties as well as the Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in 
cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil, 1973. 
f) The Marine Pollution (Control and Liability) Act 6 of 1981 was previously titled the 
Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea By Oil Act. It by and large deals with 
criminal an civil liability after a 'discharge' causing pollution of the sea has occurred. 
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The Act is not limited to discharges of oil, nor is it limited to discharges from vessels as 
discharges from offshore installations are also included. Moreover the wide definition of 
'discharge' includes operational discharges as well from accidents. "Discharge" is 
defined as: 
"in relation to harmful substance, means any release, howsoever caused, from a ship, a tanker or 
an offshore installation into a part of the sea which is a prohibited area, and includes any escape, 
disposal, spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting or emptying; and 'discharge' being used as a verb, 
has a corresponding meaning" 
'Oil' is defined as follows " ... in relation to-
(a) a discharge of oil from a ship, a tanker or an offshore installation, means oil as defined in 
regulation 1 of Annex I to MARPOL 1973/78 and includes an oily mixture as defined in that 
regulation; and 
(b) loss or dan1age caused as contemplated in section 9(1)(a) where the discharge in question took 
place from a tanker, and for the purposes of section 13 (1), means oil as defined in paragraph 5 
of Article 1 of the Convention. 
The definition of 'discharge' also refers to 'prohibited area' which in tum is defined as: 
'' ... the internal waters, the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone and in relation to 
offshore installation, includes the sea within the lin1its of the continental shelf'. 
The Act holds the owner criminally liable if any oil is discharged from a ship, tanker or off-
shore installation, barring three specified exceptions. The same section provides that: 
"If in any prosecution for an offence under subsection (1) it is proved that a mixture containing oil 
was discharged from a ship tanker of off-shore installation in the part of the prohibited area which 
adjoins the prohibited area of the Republic to the seaward side thereof, it shall be deemed unless the 
contrary is proved, that such mixture contained one hundred parts or more of oil in a million parts of 
the mixture" 
In essence this requires the accused to prove that evidentiary samples taken by the state are 
not representative of the discharge, rather than the state proving that they are (the 
constitutionality of this can be challenged). 
The Act also provides for civil liability by providing for liability for loss, damage or costs 
caused by discharge of oil into the sea. Such liability is also strict and applies not only to 
vessels but also to off-shore installations. The relevant section provides: 
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" ... the owner of any ship, tanker or off-shore installation ... shall be liable for-
(a) any loss or damage caused elsewhere than on such ship, tanker, ship or offshore installation in the 
. area of the Republic by pollution resulting from the discharge of oil from such ship .... " 
" ... (b) the costs of any measures taken or caused to be taken by the Minister in terms of this Act 
after an incident has occurred ... for the purposes of reducing loss or damage caused as contemplated 
in paragraph (a) ... or for the purposes of preventing such loss or damage being caused ... " 
" ... (c) any loss or damage caused in the area of the Republic by any measures so taken or caused to 
be taken after discharge as contemplated in paragraph (a) has occurred". 
g) The Dumping at Sea Control Act, 73 of 1985 is more or less modeled in its totality 
on the London Dumping convention described above. The applicable areas include the 
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The legal regime governing the exploration and exploitation of natural oil and gas in 
South Africa's offshore zone, has as its foundation, the Maritime Zones Act, which 
applies the entire body of South African legislation to installations. Other national acts 
also have extra-territorial applications, either by an auto extension of their statutes, or by 
being extended via the provisions of other statutes. International law allows South Africa 
to make provisions for this extra-territorial jurisdiction. Pollution prevention and control 
is governed by numerous international conventions to which South Africa is a party, as 
well as numerous national acts. While is not the intention of this essay to deal with 
enforcement issues, it can be noted that the fragmented nature of the legislation 
governing the oil & gas regime, as well as the difficulty in proving contravention in 
certain instances (see definition of oil in Act 6 of 1981), does lend itself to enforcement 
problems. 
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.L Introduction 
There appears to be a unique fascination with fish in captivity. This is borne out. by 
the aquarists hobby. The fascination seems to span the Ancient Roman festivities 
associated with holding parties to watch the physiological effects of death on Red 
Mullet1 and extends to the "fish cam" an Internet site consisting merely of a camera 
pointing at a goldfish bowl. There are other ostensibly more constructive uses of 
aquatic biota in captivity. 
The advances in technology have lead to more efficient fishing techniques which 
among other factors has lead to severe depletion of fish stocks. This has prompted 
investigation into methods. to remedy excessive exploitation and to find alternative 
sources to the traditional harvest. 
Mariculture is seen to provide that alternative source of fish but its role 1s more 
extensive. 
Mariculture has a unique role to play in development it can provide employment and 
food to underdeveloped regions 
I will consider in broad terms the regulation of mariculture under South African Law 
and pay particular concern to some of the unique problems posed by mariculture. 
1.1 Mariculture in South Africa 
Peter Cook::. in provides an overview of the types of aquaculture currently ~eing 
conducted in South Africa. He mentions a variet'J of maricuiture operations including: 
1 Mediterranean Seafood 
2 Aquaculture in South Africa ·'.:urrent Status Jnd Re;;icnai Pntemial. 
1. 1. 1 mussels 
Here ropes are suspended from rafts moored in sheltered estuaries or bays. Mussel 
larvae attach to the ropes and are harvested at maturity. The harvest of farmed mussel 
is estimated to have been in the region of 1892 tons in 1993. 
Rafts of this type require a situation where they are safe from the extreme wave action 
to which much of the South African coast is exposed. The principle mussel farm is 
located near Saldanha in the Langebaan Lagoon. 
1 . 1 . 2 Pacific oysters 
These are raised in the Knysna area from spat. and a variety of techniques are 
employed. Cook3 points out that the Pacific oyster has not shown signs of becoming 
invasive. Cook estimates the oyster industry produced in the region of 4,5 million 
oysters in I 9934 
1. 1 . 3 Perlemoen 
As will be more fully considered below, the nature of the periemoen mariculture 
operations challenges the definitions of aquaculture. The perlemeon are grown in 
tanks with water pumped in trom the sea. They are fed kelp which is harvested from 
the sea Cook provides a rough estimate of production at an :imount of about 500 tons. 
'1.1.4 Sea Weed 
Cook describes the sea weeds production as being either in tanks or rafts as 'Nlth 
mussels. He alludes to a successful giacilaria farming tnte-:-prise in ~b.mibia '-vhic:-: is 
based on the raft method. 
"\ . 
. Op Cit 
1.2 Definitions 
There does not appear to be a legal definition of Mariculture. Fuggle and Rabie in 
"Environmental management in South Africa" provide only the most cursory of 
definitions of aquaculture. They describe it at page 652 as follows 
"aquaculture consists of the commercial cultivation and harvesting of aquatic 
organisms. " 
This is not an overly useful definition in that it seeks to include only the commercial 
operator and excludes those involved in mariculture exclusively for research purposes 
There is also a difficulty in distinguishing mariculture from aquaculture. Aquaculture 
implies the raising of aquatic biota in captivity. Mariculture carries with it the 
implication that the activity is conducted in or around the sea. Both these attempts at 
definition are problematised by the nature of the activity. Some Mariculture takes 
place in a closed tank with sea water piped some distance. This is the case with 
perlemoen (haliotis midae) farming near Port Elizabeth. ls this activity mariculture 
because it is a marine species, even though there is no direct contact between the 
biota and the sea? The corollary is posed in certain types of salmon farming which 
can take place vast distances inshore in mountain streams where the fish farmer 
releases his or her anadromous charges into spawning streams to travel to the sea. The 
fish later return to breed and are captured by the fish farmer. 
The fact that the salmon are released further challenges the component of captivity. A 
more encompassing definition would require merely control and the spawning instinct 
would establish sufficient control to confonn to the definition. A possible solution is 
to look at the type and degree of control with the wild animal to cstabiish whether 
control is in place. 
4 op cit at 470 
The absence of an exhaustive definition of mariculture perhaps speaks to the variety 
of types of operation and the extent of human enterprise in the field. 
1.3 Concerns and focus areas 
Mariculture provides unique challenges in many regards. A very fundamental concern 
is the ability of a person to appropriate a public area such as parts of the sea and 
conduct mariculture to the exclusion of third parties. The problem could be crisply 
stated as follows. The sea is (subject to the Sea Shore Act5) a res publicis and not 
readily capable of private appropriation. The robustness of the old authorities and 
their ability to address this concern is discussed below in an "historical note" 
A further key concern is the demands and effects of aquaculture on its immediate 
environment. This would entail elements such as water quality and inter -species 
Competition. Mariculture operations are reliant on an environment which will sustain 
maximum productivity. Pollutants could visit ruin on an mariculture and at the same 
time mariculture is capable of being a polluter. 
The operations are reliant on pesticides and piscicides as well as other veterinary 
applications. 
1.3.1 Competing uses of the resource 
The mussel rafts at Saldanha are located a few hundred metered from the iron ore 
terminal which is the port through which iron ore from the Northern Cape interior is 
exported. The Langebaan Lagoon is also an important tourist area and the wetland 
~njoys Ramsar proclamation. The shaliow muct1:its provide a "waystation'' for the 
aquatic birds ,.vhich gather there on annual mi6rration routes to feed on fish molluscs 
arid worms. The mussei farming operations may pose a threat to these sea birds if the 
operation is allowed to use pesticides which restrict the types of biota which attach to 
the ropes. The iron ore terminal poses a threat from pollution and through possible 
damage through navigational error and collision. Mariculture rafts are a fairly crude 
affair and are not necessarily aesthetically pleasing. The wave free environments of 
estuaries and lagoons so suited to mariculture operations are also favourite tourist 
destinations where unspoilt seascapes are placed at a premium. 
A particular concern not confined to mariculture but common to any enterprise where 
a species is raised in captivity and then released into the wild is that a particular 
genetic strain might be chosen and propagated to the exclusion of others. This can 
have the effect of weakening genetic diversity which in tum reduces a species ability 
to cope with disaster. 
The question of scale of the operation should also be noted. The larger the scale of the 
operation the greater the extent of the consumption of freely occurring food ( such as 
in the mussel industry). A greater scale would involve more chemicals to treat disease 
or to fertilise the operation. 
1.4 Historical Note 
It would be amiss to attempt to consider the current regime governing mariculture 
without a short excursus into the way maricuiture was viewed under Roman Dutch 
Law. This is particularly true in view of the statutory interpretation which asks that a 
statute be interpreted to cause as littie disturbance to the common law as possible. 
The approach of the old authorities appears to be satisfying!y robust and common 
person conducting !Tiariculture activities in the marine. 
Grotius readily overcomes the difficulty posed by huvmg uniquely private_ rights in 
·.vhat is a pubiic domain. Grotius suggests that the private- public cnntradiction is ''10t 
6 see generally :it page 87 
insurmountable and that private rights could accrue to a person engaged m 
mariculture : 
" ... The same principle which applies to navigation also applies to fishing 
namely that it remains open to all. Nevertheless there shall be no prejudice if 
anyone shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea, make a fish pond 
for himself and so establish a private reserve ... " 
He continues that: 
·'fl anyone had prevented Lucullus or Appollinaris from fishing in private jzsh 
pond'> which they had made by enclosing a small portion of the sea. according 
lo Paulus the,v would have the right of bringing an injunction (interdictum). 
not mere(v an action.for damages based on private ownership.·• 
Indeed if I have staked off an enclosure in an inlet of the sea just as in a 
branch of a river. and have fished there, especially if by doing so jrJr man_v 
years I shall have given proof ofm_v intention to establish private ownership. I 
shall certainly prevent an_vone else from enjoying the same rights. I gather 
from i'v!arcianus that this case is identical to ownership of a lake and is true as 
long as Occupatoin lusts. " 
2. Regulation by Statute 
There has been extensive statutory intervention into the realm of mariculture. Unlike 
the mar:culture operawr in the time of Grotius vJhn ,:ouid content himself to stake vff 
his or her little iniet, the modern operator would face a suite oflegislation which 
demands comoiiance 
2.1 The Mar1ne Living Resources Act 
The mam area of regulation of Mariculture is governed by the Marine Living 
resources Act (MLA). This act provides for both the granting of rights and the 
conditions under which those rights can be exercised 
2. 1. 1 Granting of Rights 
Section 18 of :tvILA provides that "no person shall ... engage in mariculture ... unless a 
right to engage in such activity ... has been granted by the minister. The same section 
also deals with the rights of the various classes of fishers as well. 
The minister is empowered to grant leases over rights in Mariculture. In section 22 
'•'The Minister may prescribe the method of allocation and payment in" in respect of 
such leases 
The value of the lease construction lies perhaps in its ability to grant to the tenant 
those rights of the landlord which the landlord enjoys against Third Parties7 . This 
should perhaps be seen against the provisions of the Sea Shore Act3. Where rights in 
the Sea Bed are held by the President. 
The iease construction provides locus standi to a person conducting mariculture to 
seek protection from harm visited or threatened by a third party. !t manages to import 
the "Objective reasonableness principle., which is used to determine competing 
rights.9 The lease construction provides a well developed body of Law to govern the 
reguiat1on of what is in fact an unusual constrnction. 
See Generaily Coopers "Landlord and Tenant" Panicularly at 
., ~ee generally the discussion of the principie of Neighbour Law provided by V d Merwe in the Law of 
Things 
2.1.2 Empowering provisions 
The mam source of regulation . is by regulations created under the act. The 
empowering section is section 77(2 )(cc) Pursuant to this section the minister may 
promulgate regulations "to ensure the orderly development and control of mariculture 
in the Republic''. 
As will be more fully discussed below the regulations provide for a regime involving 
a pennit system where applications for permits can be considered and possible 
environmental impacts evaluated. Permits may be granted subject to conditions and 
the mariculture operator is obliged to furnish information surrounding the operation, 
on demand to the State. 
2.2 The regulations 
2.2. 1 Areas covered. 
The regulations begin by pointing out that it applies to '"mariculture undertaken for 
commercial, experimental or research purposes" 10 This is si!:p1ificant in that it casts 
such a wide net. This broad scope is perhaps to discourage a commercial mariculture 
practitioner from purporting to be conducting a mariculture operation under the guise 
of research 11 . 
the absence of a legal definition is compounded oy the provision in the reguiations for 
other fish :-aising activities. 
·:o s60 
11 Concerns in the area of whaling regulation could perhaps be referenced where whaiing nations 
harvested '.!Xtensively under the banner of research and the objects uf ~he research were rumoured to 
!1:ive found ~heir way onto the floor of:he Tokyo fish :narkct. 
S24 of the regulations provides for "Marine Aquarium Fish". The regulations that 
"Except on the Authority of a Permit no person shall ... engage in fishing or collecting 
any marine aquarium fish, or keep in any aquarium any fish for any purpose." 
This can lead to some confusion in that certain types of mariculture closely resemble 
aquaria. (As was mentioned in the discussion of perlemoen) 
2.2.2 Permits and Appiications 
The Regulations proceed to detail the requirements that an Applicant for a 
mariculture a pennit is obliged to provide. It is quite extensive and bears cataloguing. 
As regards the biota which is to be raised the applicant is required to state the name of 
the species 12, its origin and in the case of imported species the applicant must state 
the steps that would be taken to "avoid the introduction of exotic commensals, 
parasites and pathogens" 13 
The applicant must provide details both of "'method of cultivation" as well as 
"'mitigating against potential environmental impacts" 1 .. 
The prospective operator must further provide details as to the "chemicals such as 
antifoulants, fertilisers, disinfectants, therapeutants, pesticides. herbicides. honnones 
and anaesthetics" and their methods of application '5 
'. 1-
site where the oceration is to occ~r 1'' to!l:ether wnh a mark:!ting stratel!v" and the 
~ ..... ~ .._,..; 
~xtent of the ·"facilities and -::moiovment opcortunities that ·•;vii 1 ;Je <.:,~ared ... : :, 
" ,J - • 
·: :i6; 1.1 ', 
:_; s6li;:) 
14 ;.;oi(d) 




2.2.3 Environmental Impact assessment. 
The applicant is required to provide an Environmental impact assessment (EIA). The 
report of any body reviewing the EIA is to accompany the Application. The Minister 
has the further power under section 69 to serve notice on the permit holder or 
potential permit holder which requires the applicant or permit holder to provide that 
an EIA to be done within a certain time by an independent party. A possible exception 
are mariculture development areas where EIAs have already been performed. 
Section 69 continues to provide for follow up testing of water quality and other tests 
if the EIA suggests such a monitoring regime. 
The provision in the Regulations of such a developed EIA procedure would suggest 
that parallel provisions elsewhere in the Law might be ousted. Section 61(2) provides 
that should a report be prepared under the Act or any other law the report is to be 
provided to the minister. 
2.2.4 Granting cf permits and conditions 
Should the permit be granted then the minister is empowered to impose conditions on 
the conduct of the operator. ,,i These inciude aspects of production and marketing and 
the provision of information reiating to the operation to ivlinister concerning -·the 
mass, size and number of mariculture products harvested" and ·'details iegarding 
~f\ 
price, sales and purchasers"-" 
These provisions clearly correspond tc the Ministers empowering provisions in that 
~he",! "l ... ~ ::;P'1fC!id ;-{\,,·~ar,..,; J.f' ;"-1·...;er-h; ,.;e":';::loLf"'\rrr.,.,,.,r· \-f1'.'("' 1m--r:,-~nt! .... ,- ~:.._~,: ~-r.~,·~·~e ~t~~ :.. •• _- ...LJ...., ::,·..-J. ....,, .. _.._,.,v ,.. .. 4 ~-~ 1.._ . . .,. .,_ • ...,':"'. •~•·. ~1 ,.,~~ ... .1..•~-...... -.i .. , __ ,_....,_( , ...... v,.l.;. .It .... 
'.'v[inister with :in opportunity for long ter:n moniwr!n~. 
2.2.5 Mitigaticn of pcssibie harm 
T'.1e operator has a duty ~o conduct the operation in 1 :nanner which :auses the 
minimum of harm as i:ar as both water quality :ind :mer spe~ies competition 1s 
concerned. The main pans of the reguiations which provide for this ;ire rn be found in 
I" '] .,., , general y :it s6-'-
so . . op Cit 
s 63 where it is stated quite clearly that "a mariculture permit holder shall take all 
reasonable measures to avoid or minimise any harmful environmental impacts" this is 
extended to include "the discharge of effluent and the disposal of sludge" "effluent" 
is defined as "liquid waste produced by mariculture" and "sludge" is defined as "solid 
or semi solid organic waste" 
An important section21 deals with the release of fish and provides that "Except for 
indigenous wild fish caught in the Republic, no person shall release into South 
African waters any fish without the written permission of the Minister." This is an 
important section and addresses a vital concern in mariculture that local populations 
should be protected against alien species imported for reasons such as their 
adaptability to a wide spectrum of conditions and perhaps that they are prolific 
breeders. 
Consistent with the threat of other species is the spectre of the genetically altered fish 
or marine organism. S 70 provides that the Ministers permission is required to use 
genetically altered organism in a mariculture operation. 
Section 72 addresses the problem of the use of pharmaceuticals in the operation. It 
provides that "any person intending to use any chemical, piscicide, pharmaceutical, 
bio remediation product or its derivative" is to give the Minister advance notice and 
any extra information that the minister may require. The permit holder is to cease to 
use or modify his or her use of the chemical if ordered to do so by the Minister. 
2.2.6 Consumer Protection 
Section 73 prohibits the establishment of a mariculture operation in a contaminated 
site be the contamination through "toxic substances, faecal matter human pathogens 
or marine bio toxins." Harvesting may also be restricted during temporary 
degeneration of water quality "such as marine bio toxin events, oil spills and sewage 
contamination." 
2.3 The Sea Shore Act22 
One of the k~v contributions of this Act is that it crovides 1 framewor:< in te~s oi ., . 
which iights in the marine environment can be delegated to a pri-iate individual. 
Under the Act the president is the owner of the shore below· the high water mark and 
the Sea Bed as well as the column of water above it. s..:. of the Act provides the 
empowering provision to allow the minister to enter into leases in respect of the se~ 
shore. The purposes for which a lease may be entered into do not specifically inciude 
11 s68 
22 '.21 of 1°35 
mariculture but do not exclude it The purpose of the lease could include "The 
construction of structures23 . As well as the erection of whaling stations or fish canning 
or other factories24 or the catch all provision provided in subsection o provides for 
"the carrying on of any work which in the opinion of the minister serves a necessary 
and useful purpose" 
2.4 The Health Act 
Although this does not deal specifically with mariculture. The Minister of Health is 
empowered to make regulations dealing with food related activities which might have 
taken place in polluted water. 25 
3. Common Law Aspects 
An exhaustive examination of the Common Law and its regulation of mariculture is 
beyond the scope of this paper. A more realistic exercise would be to examine a 
particular problem and see how it would be dealt with in South Africa. 
3.1 Mull Shellfish v Golden Sea Produce Ltd26 
The facts can be summarised as follows27 . The pursuers were l\ilull Sheilfish (Mull). 
They carried on the business of farming Mussels by growing on rafts with ropes 
aLLached. The mussei lar.;ae wouid attach to the rope, marure and ce har.'ested. 
Golden Sea Products (Golden) rnn a salmon farm in the same !och as :\foil. They 
raised salmon in cages. Goiden treated their cages with ami fouiant. to stop marine 
23 s3(g) 
24 s3(i.) ..... ' , 
•· s37A 
16 1992 SLT 703 
'7 • See 3enerally at 704 D to F 
organisms from attaching to the cages. As mentioned above Mull' s whole business 
required the attachment of marine biota to structures. 
Two types of damage appeared to have been caused to Mull the first being the disease 
and malfonnation of mussels attached to the ropes. The second was that free 
swimming larvae did not attach to the ropes as they ordinarily did. 28 
Golden challenged t-..foll' s locus standi to claim for unattached larvae. Lord Murray 
examined the origin of Mulls rights to conduct their fann and found that they had 
been granted a lease from the crown to conduct their operation. The court found that 
the states right to have larvae attach to objects at sea was passed on to Mull under the 
"' lease-'. 
The case would have been decided similarly under South African Law. The problem 
of locus would not necessarily have proved an obstacle. The lease construction would 
function similarly in conferring on the mariculture operator the ability to act in his 
own name. 
The south African approach to neighbour Law differs from the English approach and 
a strongly analogous exampie of competing interests of land (water?) users bears 
ccnsider:2tion. 
3.2 Ragai v Afr;can SwpersJate30 
-:-:ie ,;-vv~er l)f rhe :roper::: :Jer°or:: Sucersiate had 11lowed an 1ccumuiation of Slate 
:~ :;ee 3eneraily at 70~ : :o ;,c 
:'.• :Jo •::it at 706 G to ; :md ~ff7 :::: :o C:. 
io '. ~.1t;3 i i-. S /l. ·_ 0: ._- . .'..\~) 
The Court on appeal considered a series of issues. The first is the law to be applied .. It 
was held that the English approach did not form part of South African Law and the 
reasonableness of one land users use of his property with regard to another had to be 
considered separately. 
The other finding of the Court was that the English Law approach which appeared to 
allow a claim for damages in the nuisance context was inappropriate. It was held that 
any claim for damages was to be brought with the Aquilian Action where fault in the 
form of negligence and intention had to be proved. The other requirements in the 
form of causation, harm or loss manifesting itself as damages, and a wrongful act are 
all necessary. 
4. International Aspects 
Many of the concerns alluded to above can be applied at an international level. Ocean 
currents could carry harmful pollutants or introduced exotic species to neighbouring 
states. An extensive examination will not be undertaken but the principles set out in 
the Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1938 and 1941 have a bearing. A state should conduct 
itself to cause the minimum of harm to another state. 
in the Trail Smelter Arbitration the harm complained of was the emissions from a 
smelter which carried across the border from the USA and into Canada where they 
caused harm. A direct analogy couid be drawn with any of the emissions from a 
mariculture operation or any escaped or released exotic species. 
?aragr:iph l2 ;ind 13 of the Law or' rhe Sc:a Comention aiso r~guiate poiiution of t;;e 
sea. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
I have sought to conduct a brief overview of some of the issues which might face a 
mariculture operator. The South African regime as it now stands appears to address 
the needs of the operator by not being overly draconian and yet allow for efficient 
management and controls through the permit system. 
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Much has been written about the importance of historic wrecks as 'time-capsules', providing a 
glimpse of a former period, kept unchanging by immersion. Whereas previously only a minority 
of wrecks were accessible, advances in technology are allowing access to increasing numbers of 
them, with the consequent danger of uncontrolled exploitation and loss of historically and 
archaeologically important material. 
South Africa's rich maritime history has left our coasts littered with the remains of some 1500-
1700 wrecks. Most are found in traditional anchoring spots -Table Bays boasts some 200 and 
Algoa 150. These were largely 'outward' and 'inward-bound' East Indiamen carrying a variety of 
goods, including money, war and building materials, spices, porcelain, silk, slaves, and (due to 
the increase in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries of the carriage of raw materials and 
manufactured goods), manganese ore and motor car spares or railway lines. 1 
The need to protect underwater sites of an historic or archaeological nature has been recognised 
both in International law and the laws of various countries, including South Africa. The 
international law on the subject has imposed a duty on states to conserve this heritage without 
adversely affecting the rights of identifiable owners. National legislation has similar effect. But 
neither kinds of law give an indication of how this owner should be identified. General notions of 
. Property law need to be reconsidered in light of this duty to protect, because serious inroads into 
owners' rights are often envisaged by legislation. The arrival of the National Heritage Resources 
Act (No. 25 of 1999), has thrown this debate into focus due to the significant impact certain 
provisions of the Act have on these rights. 
This essay will investigate the determination of the rights of owners of historic wreck under the 
South African common law; and consider these in light of the law of other countries, international 
law (prevailing and draft), and prevailing, draft and defunct South African legislation. 
1 Pugh, L. W. G., The Protection of Historic Wrecks in South African Waters, Department of Marine Law, 
UCT, Cape Town, 1996, at p 9 
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1. WHO OWNS HISTORIC WRECK? 
1.1 SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW 
1.1.1 OCCUPATJO 
In theory, if the owner of a historic wreck can be identified, problems of protection and 
preservation of the wreck can more easily be resolved. In practice, of course, the nature and 
location of many South African wrecks makes them a very difficult resource to police. The 
unscrupulous gathering of artefacts by collectors and others makes clarity of ownership a priority 
but, " ... even clear title does not protect the owner from piracy. "2 In spite of this it is still 
· necessary to seek such owner, and the proper place to start, it is submitted, is in the common law. 
Perhaps the first consideration is whether the notion of a movable accruing to an immovable, to 
which it becomes attached, is relevant in a discussion of wreck. "Movable things are such as can 
be moved from one place to another without injury to themselves, while immovable things are 
those which cannot be moved."3 While it is possible for a movable to become an immovable (for 
example by becoming affixed to such immovable by natural or artificial means4), where this takes 
place the new status of the movable must be determined by considering: " ... objectively, the 
nature of the thing and the manner of its annexation and, subjectively, ... the intention of the 
owner of the movable at the time of its annexation. "5 It is submitted that, on both these tests, a 
wreck can never become an immovable. The manner of annexation of wreck is fortuitous, its 
nature militates against it acceding to the ocean floor, and it " .. was never intended to be regarded 
as an immovable, however difficult the removal from its base may factually prove to be. "6 Thus, 
even though parts of a wreck may become 'physically' attached to the seabed, they never become 
so in a 'legal' sense. 
From the Roman law South Africa has inherited the notion of 'res nullius' - something which 
does not belong to anyone, but which can be owned though 'occupatio.' There are two main 
classes of 'res nullius' - wild animals not in captivity and things abandoned by their owners ('res 
derelictae'). Joubert JA made a succinct statement of the Roman law when he said: "Volgens die 
Romeinse reg indien A n wilde dier jag en verwond maar B slaag daarin om dit te vang word B 
deur occupatio eienaar daarvan ....... Die rede is omdat B fisieke beheer oor die wilde dier verkry 
met die bedoeling om eienaar daarvan te word. "7 This principle was also enunciated in Roman-
. Dutch Law, but B (in the above example), would have found himself fined in terms of hunting 
laws. Despite this, Joubert JA says that: "Van der Kessel stel dit onomwonde dat die vanger 
eienaar word. "8 
2 Scheepers, G. P. J., 'The South African Law of Shipwreck: Contemporary and International Law. 
Perspective', Sea Changes, 10 (1989), 41 at 44. The writer also speaks about the "buccaneering-mentality" 
of sports divers. 
3 Wilie's Principles of South African Law, (8th ed.), Juta, Cape Town, 1991 at 251. 
4 As in MacDonald v Radin and Potchefstroom Dairies 1915 AD 454. 
5 Silberberg and Shoeman, The Law of Property. Kleyn and Boraine (eds.), Butterworths, Durban, 1992, at 
32. 
6 Van Meurs, L. H., Legal Aspects of Marine Archaeological Research, Institute of Marine Law, UCT, 
1985, at 40. 
7 Reck v Mills en n Ander 1990 (1) SA 751 at 758F. 
8 ibid. 785G. 
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Reck' s case was an appeal on a judgement granting one Mills an interdict against R's working on 
the wreck of the Antipolis. Initially Rand M had been doing salvage work together but R had 
become dissatisfied with M and had begun an independent operation. At the point the application 
was made neither side had removed any part of the wreck, but both " ... had made cuts with a view 
to separating the condenser in order to salvage the copper pipes it contained. "9 M sought to 
restrain R from interfering further with the condenser. 
A previous case in point was that of Bell 10 in which B removed from the seabed, next to the 
wreck of the Hypatia, two of the four bronze propellers originally attached to the ship. All four 
had been removed from the wreck by the Underwater Construction Company, which had taken 
two to the surface, leaving the other two for their return, marked with a float-line, where B had 
found them. The court held that removal of the propellers from the wreck established sufficient 
control over them and consequently Underwater Construction had become the owner. The 
obvious difference between the two cases, as Lewis points out, is the element of separation. 
The court a quo in Reck's case found a preferential right for M based on a reference of the 
Roman jurist Gaius to the view of Trebatius " ... to the effect that if a hunter wounds an animal it 
at once becomes the property of the hunter, and remains his for so long as he follows it. If, 
therefore, while the hunter is pursuing the animal another person takes it, the latter will be guilty 
of theft. "11 
Lewis criticises the decision on the grounds that occupatio demands "taking control"12 of a thing 
and that " ... the grant of protection to a person who has not even managed to acquire possession 
of the thing defeats the object of the rules of occupatio."13 The criticism is vindicated in the 
appeal court decision quoted above where Joubert JA held that the correct test would have been to 
decide if M had physical control ("fisieke beheer") over the condenser. The learned judge quotes 
the German jurist Von Savigny in the following terms on this topic: 
''The factum must be such as to place the person who desires to obtain possession in a 
position which shall enable him, and only him, to deal with the subject at pleasure; ... " 
and " ... viz, the physical power of dealing with the subject immediately, and of excluding 
any foreign agency over it ... "14 
Joubert JA found that M had not come to exercise the requisite control and amended the decision 
of the lower court. 
9 Lewis, C., 'How Reck lost the Wreck', (1988) 18 Businessman's Law, 16 at 16. 
10 Underwater Construction & Salvage Co. (Pty) Ltd. V Bell 1968 (4) SA 190. 
11 Lewis, supra, 17. Burgher Jin the lower court ofReck's case ( Mills v Reck 1988 (3) 92 (C) at 98D-E) 
says: "There is a competition between the original possessor and the person intervening and in the absence 
of regulation by the court the situation could give rise to 'quarrels and brawls'. By analogy the original 
salvor or hunter should be given preference over the person intervening or gate-crashing." In the appeal 
court decision Joubert JA makes of this statement the remark (at 759A): "Dit is verkeerd an ongegrond." It 
has been suggested that the a quo decision is better in terms of the English law concept of equity. It is 
submitted that it would be quite possible for a South African court to inteipret the Roman law more loosely, 
with regard to the concept of 'sufficient' control, to give voice to modem notions of what is equitable. 
12 Lewis, at p. 18. 
13 ibid. 
14 Reck v Mills, supra, 759 C and D. 
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1.1.2 ABANDONMENT 
It seems obvious that wreck would fall into the category of 'res derelictae,' (i.e. things abandoned 
by their owners), and become capable of ownership through occupatio. Van Meurs, in approving 
an American law principle as applying to South Africa, says: "Marine antiquities are probably 
best described as abandoned property."15 Although this may well be the case in many 
circumstances, it is submitted that a clear idea of what constitutes 'abandonment' is necessary to 
judge whether a wreck is truly abandoned by the owner. 
Silberberg and Shoeman define ownership as an "absolute and individualistic"16 right. This notion 
implies an unrestricted and exclusive control over the thing owned: It includes (not exhaustively) 
the right to use, consume, destroy, alienate, possess, to claim from an unlawful possessor and to 
resist unlawful invasion. 17 "Ownership is unlimited in duration and is not subject to a time 
limit."18 Most significantly for a discussion of historic wreck, Silberberg and Shoeman go on to 
say that: "ownership is lost when the owner abandons his property with the intention that it 
should become a res nullius."19 But mere loss of physical control does not does not result in loss 
of ownership except in the case of captured wild animals. "A thing that has merely been lost does 
not thereby become a res nullius and neither is ownership ipso facto lost in a thing which is 
abandoned in an emergency. "20 
This means that although a ship ceases to be a ship on sinking, it does not become a res nullius by 
the simple fact of its sinking and moving[2~~ the physical control of the owner .. Thi. ·s common 
law principle has been approved in case law21 and by commentators such as Bamford who, in . 
•J, 
supporting the importance of the owner's· ention in determining whether a wreck is abandoned 
or not, says: "Abandonment will not lightly be presumed."22 Willes 23 adds the principle of value 
to the test of £handonmeiifhy1he~statementtlrat:'Irthe*p"foperty has any value the intention of 
the owner to abandon is not presumed." Van Meurs states, correctly it is submitted, that this 
" ... presumption of non-abandonment would certainly diminish with the increased age of the 
shipwreck. "24 
During the Second Reading Debate on the National Monuments Act Amendment Bill (No. 35 of 
1979), a speaker pointed out that for some wrecks the identity of the owner was " ... lost in the 
mists of time." It is significant that he went on to say that where the owner was still identifiable 
" ... the exploitation of the shipwreck ... can only take place with the approval of the owner."25 26 
15 Van Meurs, supra, 3 7 
16 Silberberg and Shoeman, supra, 162. 
17 ibid. p. 162. 
18 ibid. p. 163. 
19 ibid. p. 315. 
20 ibid. See infra: 1.2 - the judicial opinion in the British case of the Lusitania. 
21 Salvage Association of London v SA Salvage Syndicate Ltd. (1906) 23 SC 169. 
22 Bamford, The Law of Shipping and Carriage in South Africa - Third Edition, Juta, Cape Town, 1983, at 
p 85. See infra (2.3.2) on the suggestion in South African draft legislation to reverse this presumption of the 
common law, and the effect of S 35(2) of the National Heritage Resources Act. 
23 Supra, at 284. 
24 Van Meurs, supra, 39. 
25 Mr. P. J. Clase, quoted in the House of Assembly Debates, 1 March, 1979, col: 1640 and by Van Meurs, 
ibid. 39 , . . . .. 
26 Historical note: In Lighton, AW., 'A Question of Abandonment', (27) THRHR, 1964, 138, the author 
discusses a policy of the D~partmentof Customs and Excise, in terms of S 294 of the Merchant Shipping 
Act, No. 57 of 1951, which' purported to allow for 'automatic abandonment'. Under this policy the owner 
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1.2 AMERICAN AND BRITISH CASE LAW 
Both Britain and the United States have similar common law roots to South Africa. A brief 
consideration of pertinent court rulings in these jurisdictions is instructive. 
Larsen, 27 enunciates the American law principle that abandonment demands two requirements -
intention to abandon and actual abandonment - and is of the opinion that US case law shows: 
" ... the mere passage of time does not conclusively establish abandonment; however, a significant 
passage of time does raise the inference of abandonment. "28 The learned author suggests US 
courts regard sixty years as the minimum for abandonment to be presumed. 
In a case involving one Zych29, Z claimed ownership - by occupatio of an abandoned res nullius -
of a wreck he found on the bed of Lake Michigan. The successor-in-title, which had gained title 
from the successor to the original underwriters, (who had paid out on the claim in 1860, thus 
gaining title from the owner), asserted that the wreck was not abandoned. the court found that the 
wreck could not have been located before the arrival of late-1980' s technology, and that letters 
written by the original insurers showed there was no intention to abandon. Accordingly it was 
held" ... that Zych had failed to show more than a mere passage of time, which was insufficient 
for a finding of abandonment. "30 
In the English case of Pierce v Bemis 31, which involved a claim for property lost when the 
Lusitania was torpedoed, it was held that ownership of contents of the wreck had been lost where 
the owners had done nothing about the property for a significant period of time. This case is 
interesting because there were two categories of goods under discussion - the hull and fixtures of 
the ship, and privately owned, personal goods. Ownership of the hull and fixtures was found to 
have passed onto the underwriters when they paid out on the claim - this action being regarded as 
sufficient interest taken in the goods. 
It was common cause that the owners of the other category had not shown interest in their goods 
prior to this action. In this regard, Sheen J found that " ... when the master and crew ... abandoned 
the Lusitania, they did so in order to save their own lives and without any hope or intention of 
returning to her ... , "32 and accordingly held: " ... it is a necessary inference from the agreed facts 
and from the lapse of 67 years before any attempt was made to salve the contents that the owners 
of the contents abandoned their property ... ,m. 
of a wreck, who failed to take steps to salvage, lost his right of ownership to the state after a period of one 
year and six weeks. The author challenges the policy, supposedly based on a statement of Grotius, and 
concludes that ownership rights were not lost, but the wreck went into the custody of the state, from where 
it could be reclaimed by the owner. S 294 was repealed in 1996. 
27 Larsen, D. P., 'Ownership of Historic Ship Wrecks in US Law', (1994) 10, TIJMCL, 31 
28 ibid., p. 39. 
29 Zych v Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel 755 F Supp. 213 (N.D. Ill. 1990), cited in Larsen, 
supra. 
30 Larsen, supra, 41 
31 1986 (1) AER 1011 QBD 
32 ibid at 1015 C 
33 ibid at 1015 D 
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It is submitted that, in determining abandonment of a wreck, the following principles can be 
extracted from these cases: (1) the need for the elapse of a significant time; (2) during which the 
owners had not displayed sufficient interest in their goods. In both cases the element of 'interest 
shown' is an important one. Indeed in Pierce's case, interest taken in the first category of goods 
was enough to safeguard ownership - whereas being neglectful of showing interest in the second 
was detrimental to ownership. This is similar to the 'need to show more than a mere passage of 
time' test, enunciated in Zych's case.34 It is submitted that these decisions in foreign jurisdictions 
are in line with the South African common law and may well be regarded as persuasive by a court 
in this country in determining whether abandonment had taken place. 
1.3 INTERNATIONAL LAW ON UNDERWATER ANTIQUITIES 
In terms of international law: "States have a duty to protect objects of an archaeological and 
historical nature found at sea. ,,35 Attendant is the injunction to respect private law rights that may 
exist in these objects. 36 
The Law of the Seas Convention (hereafter LOSC) extends coastal state sovereignty to the extent 
of the Territorial Sea, described as 12 n.m. from baseline.37 Sovereignty is exercised subject to the 
LOSC itself and other rules of international law. 38 
Caflisch39 is of the opinion that LOSC art. 2(1)&(2) is clear on the sovereignty of the coastal state 
in its internal waters and territorial sea and " ... this means that activities connected with 
submarine antiquities conducted in these areas fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
state ... ,,40. In considering the limits of this sovereignty the learned author concludes that 
34 The Buenos Aires Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Article 1(2), 
deems underwater cultural heritage to have been abandoned: "(a) whenever technology would make 
exploration for research or recovery feasible but exploration for research or recovery has not been pursued 
by the owner of the heritage within 25 years after discovery of the technology; or, (b) whenever no 
technology would reasonably pennit exploration for research or recovery and at least 50 years have elapsed 
since the last assertion of interest by the owner in the underwater cultural heritage." 
The draft does not make clear what an "assertion of interest" would amount to. These provisions would, it 
is submitted, be valuable guidelines for a court to follow in a case involving detennination of abandonment. 
Article 2(2) makes the draft Convention non-applicable to public ships - thus these can never be 
abandoned under the treaty-regime. This is in line with the international practice that a 'mere passage of 
time' is not enough to show abandonment of a public ship. (This concept discussed in Roach, A, J., 
'Sunken Warships and Military Aircraft', (20) MP, 1996, 351). No such provision is found in the South 
African law. (Buenos Aires Draft text in: O'Keefe, P. J., 'Protecting the Underwater Cultural Heritage (The 
International Law Association Draft Convention)', (20), MP, 1996, 297 at 305). 
Devine and Glazewsky. Opinion on Suggested Legislation concerning the Conservation of Historic 
Shipwrecks, UCT, Institute of Marine Law, 1989, p. 1, disagree with this notion, and, after suggesting the 
law of the flag state as the best law to apply in detennining ownership issues, (see text associated with fu. 
46, infra), conclude: " ... in the matter of abandonment one should explicitly exclude a South African court 
from applying any presumption which might be applicable in that (flag) law to the effect that public ships 
have not been abandoned," (the authors' emphasis). 
35 Law of the Seas Convention, Art. 303( 1 ). It is submitted that historic wreck would be included under this 
article. The Buenos Aires Draft, supra, Art. 3, modifies this duty by stipulating: "State parties shall take all 
reasonable measures to preserve underwater cultural heritage for the benefit of mankind." 
36 LOSC, Art. 303(3). 
37 ibid, Art. 2(1) and Art. 3. 
38 ibid, Art. 2(3) 
39 Caflisch, L., 'Submarine Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea', NYIL, 1982, at p. 2 
40 ibid, p. 11. The learned author is reading Art. 2 and Art. 303 together to achieve this result. 
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Art. 303(3) - which subjects Art. 303 generally to owners' rights and the law of salvage or other 
rules of admiralty- retains the sovereignty of the coastal state intact as far as is possible in the 
territorial sea. Thus the 'admiralty rules' mentioned in this article mean those of the coastal state, 
and not of third states. 
On this subject of the extent of sovereignty Caflisch also mentions an informal proposal, made by 
the Soviet Union, to insert into the LOSC draft, a rule prescribing that ships sunk beyond the 
territorial sea should be salvaged only by the flag state or with the latter's consent. The proposal 
argued that a rule of International Customary Law had developed" ... whereby a flag state and the 
owner of a ship ... do not forfeit their rights to a ship ... sunk at sea ... ," because " ... such rights are 
absolute and are not subject to any time-limit, provided that the ship ... (sinks) ... beyond the 
territorial water of the state,"41 (my emphasis). 
It is submitted that this notion would serve further to emphasise coastal state sovereignty in the 
territorial sea because the corollary of this statement is that, within the limits of the territorial sea, 
owner and flag state rights are not absolute and are subject to a time limit. A circumspect 
acceptance of such limitation of owners' rights is found in the South African common and case 
law, and the British and American case law in that it is conceivable that such rights can be 
abrogated. Caflisch' s notion of the limits of sovereignty are important because the LOSC, while 
protecting owners' rights in submarine antiquities, does not give any indication of which legal 
regime should be consulted in identifying such owner. Whether the coastal state has such 
jurisdiction, it is submitted, depends on the extent of its powers in the geographical area in which 
the wreck is situated. 
Also in terms of LOSC coastal states enjoy limited control in a zone contiguous to its territorial 
sea which " ... may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
territorial sea is measured. "42 In this contiguous zone the coastal state is entitled " ... to apply its 
customs and fiscal laws and regulations to the removal of antiquities as if such removal had taken 
place in its territory or territorial sea.',43 It is submitted that this 'limited control' does not amount 
to sovereignty in this zone. 
1.4 THE PROBLEM OF HISTORIC WRECK 
As this essay is limited geographically by the South African legislation to be discussed, the 
situation up to the extent of control exercised by the Republic in terms of Articles 303 and 33, 
LOSC, only, will be considered; i.e. up to the seaward limit of the contiguous zone. (See fn. 54 
for discussion of the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act). 
A ship at sea is owned and operated under the law of its flag-state. It seems to follow that, in 
determining ownership issues when the ship has become a historic wreck, the flag state law 
41 ibid, p. 21&22, at fu. 71. The author regards it as doubtful whether this actually does reflect International 
Customary Law. It is submitted the rationale behind the proposal is good on the grounds that it seeks 
definitive rules in a situation where these are sadly lacking. 
42LOSC, Art. 33(2). Art 33(2)(a) and (b), define the control that can be exercised in the contiguous zone as 
being to: 
"(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or 
territorial sea." 
43 Caflisch, at p. 31, where the learned author is explaining LOSC, Art. 303(2) and Art 33(2), read 
together. 
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should be consulted. This is not the clear answer however. Depending on the location of sinking 
and the nature of the claimant, there are three legal systems that could potentially have 
jurisdiction - that of the flag state, the personal law of the finder of the wreck, or that of a coastal 
state if the wreck is sufficiently close to land. Ultimately the problem is that of a choice of laws. 
An attempt will be made below to seek clarity on this issue. 
1.4.1 THE CHOICE OF LAWS 
It goes, almost without saying, that many wrecks falling into the ambit of 'archaeological' and 
'historical' in the South African territorial sea and contiguous zone will be of vessels originally 
owned and operated under flags of foreign countries.44 If LOSC Art. 303(2) is to be respected, it 
must clearly be established if there is a bona fide owner of a wreck before any other claim can be 
brought to bear. As has been demonstrated above this is primarily a question of whether the 
owner at the time of sinking has abandoned his rights to ownership or not. Under which legal 
jurisdiction should this question of abandonment be decided - that of the original flag-state, South 
African, or some other? 
Von Glahn is of the opinion that, due to the link between the flag and the ship and because the 
owner operated under the law of the flag state, it is this law that should govern his decision to 
relinquish ownership.45 This solution has also been suggested by Devine and Glazewsky at S 2(3) 
of their draft Conservation of Historic Shipwrecks Act 46 where it states: 
''Whether a historic shipwreck has been abandoned or not shall be determined by the 
application of the law of the flag state of the wreck." 
While this is clearly sensible in terms of clarity, Caflisch' s notion of retaining coastal state 
sovereignty as fur as possible is also persuasive. In this regard attention should again be paid, it is 
submitted, to the distinction between movable and immovable property. Forsyth states clearly that 
" ... it is a well established rule that the fornm rei sitae, has exclusive jurisdiction in claims 
involving title to immovables. ,,47 
44 For example, by article 24 7 of the Constitution of the Batavian Republic ( l 798), the Netherlands, as the 
creator of the Dutch East India Company, became successor to the company in the wake of its bankruptcy. 
Holland's ownership ofDEIC wrecks has been recognised by the UK courts (in the case of De Liefde), and 
by an agreement between Australia and the Netherlands (1972) whereby the latter transferred its rights in 
specific wrecks to the State of Western Australia. There would thus be a strong argument for ownership of 
DEIC wrecks off the South African coast still to vest in the Dutch government. Indeed, if a dispute on this 
issue arose with the Netherlands, it is most likely the Dutch government would cite its assertion of 
ownership rights in DEIC wrecks in Australian and British waters, as support for such a claim in South 
African waters. Devine and Glazewsky (at p.9), are of the contraty opinion. In commenting on the 
Australia/Holland agreement they say: "There are no such parallel agreements in South Africa and hence 
we would suggest not following Australian legislation here ... ". See infra for the learned authors' solution 
to the issue of the choice of laws. The case of the The Birkenhead is an example of a British ship, sunk in 
South African waters, the ownership of whose wreck has been disputed. 
45 Von Glahn's opinion cited in Lewer Allen, B., Coastal State Control Over Historic Wrecks Situated on 
the Continental Shelf as Defined in Article 76 of the Law of the Sea Convention 1982, UCT, Institute of 
Marine Law, 1991, p. 16, fu 35. 
46 Draft Act contained in Devine and Glazews!(, supra. 
47 Forsyth, C. F., Private International Law, (3 ed.), Juta, Cape Town, 1996, at p. 202. 
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By analogy wj.th this rule the author argues that for movables the forum rei sitae would also apply 
because " ... it has, at least temporary, control over the property. ,,48 But the answer is not as clear 
as this statement would make it appear. Forsyth goes on to say that in Roman and Roman-Dutch 
Law the forum domici Iii res also had jurisdiction and that " ... this view was probably in part 
derived from the old notion that mobilia sepuuntur personam, i.e. that movables were considered 
to be where their owner was. ,,49 Despite this classical rule the learned author goes on to say that 
today the lex domici Iii is exceptional on the grounds of common sense and the expectation of the 
parties of the application of the lex situs. He cites Corbett JA as accepting that " ... the lex situs 
governed in disputes concerning the ownership of movables ... "50 
Pistorius is in agreement with the above but adds that the forum rei sitae was at first unknown in 
Roman law and thus concludes that: "If. .. the movable property ... is situate in the Republic, there 
seems no reason why the forum domicilii should not also have jurisdiction to determine the title to 
property in a claim where the defendant is an incola. ,,si Again the element of control exercised by 
the court is present, and the choice between the two systems is recognised. The situation is 
different if the property is outside the Republic. 
Pistorius uses an early case52 in which the Transvaal court decided it had no jurisdiction to 
determine title in immovables outside the Transvaal colony, where the defendant was an inco/a of 
its jurisdiction, for the proposition that, in similar circumstances, a South African court has no 
power over movables outside the Republic. In terms of the LOSC, South African socereignty 
extends up to the extent of the territorial sea thus, it is submitted, this principle would apply to 
movables beyond this limit. 
1.4.2 SUBMISSIONS 
The following submissions are made to provide means of determining which legal system to use, 
in light of the confusion that appears from the above discussion of the South African authorities, 
and international law and commentary: 
1. For the purposes of the determination ofa claim for ownership of historic wreck found 
under waters over which South African has full or limited control, in terms of LOSC, 
the lex rei sitae should mean the law of the Republic. 
2. In such a claim the lex domicilii rei should mean the law of the plaintiff. This could be 
that of the flag state where the claimant purports to derive title from the original 
owner, or the personal law of the finder of the wreck. 
48 ibid, 207. A similar conclusion is reached in Pistorius, D., Pollack on Jurisdiction, (2nd ed.), Juta, Cape 
Town, 1993 at 101 where it says: "A state in which movable property is situate has control over such 
property and can therefore properly authorize its courts to determine the title to movable property within its 
borders." 
49 Forsyth, supra, 207. 
50 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc. 1983(1) SA 276(A) at 294D, quoted by 
Forsyth, supra, at p. 322. This case involved shares held in South Africa by a former Rhodesian. The cause 
of action was held to be "analogous to the rei vindicatio in terms of property situated within the jurisdiction 
and that, in that event, the lex situs (i.e. South African law) would be the correct lex." (from headnotes, p. 
277) 
51 Pistorius, supra, 102. 
52 Rosa's Heirs v Inhambane Sugar Estates Ltd. 1907 TH 11, quoted by Pistorius, supra, at 102. 
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3. Where the historic wreck that is the subject of such claim is within the limits of the 
territorial sea of the Republic, the lex rei sitae should apply. This is because the 
movable property is in the control of the South African court by virtue of the 
sovereignty bestowed upon a coastal state in the territorial sea and internal waters by 
LOSC. In terms of the National Heritage Resources Act53 the defendant will always be 
the South African state and thus the defendant would be an incola. - a notion that adds 
strength to this solution. In terms of this arrangement coastal state sovereignty, as 
argued for by Caflisch, would be further retained. Indeed anything other than this 
arrangement would, it is submitted, amount to a subtraction from sovereignty. This 
notion removes the common law choice between the lex rei sitae and the lex domicilii 
rei, but would, it is submitted, bring clarity to this question .. 
4. In areas where the Republic does not have sovereignty, the benefit of the doubt 
should, it is submitted, weigh in favour of the lex domiclii rei. In terms of LOSC, 
coastal state jurisdiction beyond the limit of the territorial sea is something less than 
sovereignty. Thus, strictly speaking, outside of the territorial sea, and up to the limit of 
the contiguous zone, a South African court would not have control over the historic 
wreck except to the degree stipulated in LOSC Art. 33(2), mentioned supra. Clearly 
this limited authority in the contiguous zone does not translate into court jurisdiction · 
to determine so fundamental a question as ownership. It is submitted that the legal 
jurisdiction of a South African court in these matters must end at the geographical 
limit of the territorial sea, unless extended by statute. Such extension should be clear 
in its intention to allow a South African court the power to determine ownership and 
not merely limited control of the property. 54 In this way the prominence given to 
owners' rights by LOSC and South African legislation will be interfered with as little 
as possible. 
53 Heritage Resources Act S 35(2), it is submitted, removes the common law notion of res nullius wrecks 
by vesting ownership in the state. The South African state is obviously an incola in a South African court. 
(See infra 2.3.2). 
54 In fact the Maritime Zones Act (No. 15 of 1994), at S 6(1), does seek to apply South African law outside 
of the territorial sea. This act creates a Maritime Cultural Zone extending to 24 n.m. from baseline, 
( * - see end of this footnote). In terms of S 6(2) the Republic has the same jurisdiction over objects of an 
archaeological or historical nature in the new zone as it has in the territorial sea. This jurisdiction in the 
territorial sea is that found in the National Monuments Act (No. 28 of 1969). Devine, (Devine, D., '1994 
South African Maritime Zones Legislation: Principles Inherent in the Act and their Implementation', (10), 
TIJMCL, 1995, at p.556), is of the opinion that " ... the net effect of MZA is the extension of the 1969 Act 
to the zone." 
It is submitted the rights asserted by the National Monuments Act are in the nature of 'control of property' 
and not those needed for a 'determination of ownership'. The basis for this submission is S 10 of this act, 
"Declaration of national monuments by the Minister", where, at S 10(3 )(a), it reads: 
"(3) The Minister shall not give effect to any recommendation made under subsection (1) or (2) in 
respect of any property belonging to any person other than the State or the council, without the 
consent of such person ... " (my emphasis) 
The act presumes, therefore, that it is possible for an identifiable, non-state, owner of property likely to be 
declared a monument, to exist; but does not give an indication of how such owner's title should be 
established. It is submitted that the suggestions outlined supra would contribute to the smoothness of such a 
determination. The National Heritage Resources Act (No. 25 of 1999), at S 60 and S 58, repeals and 
replaces the National Monuments Act The new Act, while making mention of owners' rights in heritage 
resources, does not stipulate how such rights are to be determined. Thus, it is submitted, the same situation 
as for the National Monuments Act will continue to prevail in these questions, and the value of the present 
investigation continues to be relevant under the new regime. 
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1.5 SUMMATION 
The South African common law envisages a situation where an owner can abandon a wreck, thus 
forfeiting his rights. Ownership of such wreck can be gained by another through occupatio. In the 
event of a dispute a court must consider whether the owner· had the intention to abandon. 
Abandonment is not easily presumed. If the wreck is very old, the elapse of significant time, 
during which the owner did not assert interest, will weigh against him. Depending on the 
geographical location of the wreck, the flag under which it sailed as a ship and the local law of 
the finder, there may be a dispute as to the legal system to employ in deciding ownership issues. 
Both South African legislation and the Law of the Seas Convention recognise the priority of 
owners' rights in underwater historical and archaeological resources, but neither provides a guide 
on how to determine ownership of such resource. Outlined above (1.4.2) are certain submissions 
intended to provide guidelines for such a determination. The rest of this essay will identify 
provisions of the National Heritage Resources Bill with regards to the rights of such an owner 
once identification has occurred. 
*(The Buenos Aires Draft, supra, at Art. 5 ( 1 ), allows a State to establish a 'Cultural Heritage Zone', within 
which it has jurisdiction over activities affecting underwater cultural heritage. Art. 1 (3) extends this zone 
up to the extent of the Continental Shelf These provisions are in light of a UNESCO feasibility study of a 
previous version of the Draft Convention which approves such extension, in keeping with the practice of 
various states of broadening, by national legislation, their jurisdiction to zones contiguous to the territorial 
sea. [UNESCO study found in: Clement, E., 'Current Developments at UNESCO concerning the Protection 
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage', (20), MP, 1996, 309 at 315.] In Brown E. D., 'Protection of the 
underwater cultural heritage. Draft principles and guidelines for the implementation of Article 303 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982', (20) MP, 1996, at 325, the writer (at 329), 
mentions that in 'UNGA Guidelines and Principles for hnplementation of Article 303 ', intended to promote 
swift acceptance of the Buenos Aires~ no mention is made ofa 'Cultural Heritage Zone' due to 
concerns of governments about the "creeping impact" of such a zone. This international opinion illustrates 
the continued debate on the subject of extending coastal state jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed by 
LOSC, and speaks for a limitation on this right beyond the territorial sea). Devine and Glazewsky, at 
S l(iv)(b) of their proposed legislation, are in favour of a zone, in essence that created by the Maritime 
Zones Act. 
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2. THE NATIONAL HERITAGE RESOURCES ACT (No. 25 of 1999) 
The appearance of the bill preceding this act (B 24 - 99), lead to criticism on the grounds of 
inroads it makes into private ownership rights in heritage resources, such resources being very 
widely defined. Rule of Law concerns, in light of broad powers of delegation ofresponsibility, 
were also raised55• A second version of the bill (B 24B - 99) only partially addressed some of 
these issues. The draft is characterised by inconsistencies, repetition and only slight adjustment to 
the provisions affecting ownership of heritage resources - under which banner can be included 
historic wreck. The Act, not appearing to deviate substantially from this second text , was 
accepted into law by the State President on 28 April 1999. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (No. 108 of 1996), provides a scale against 
which to measure new legislation, and mechanisms whereby matters not meeting constitutional 
requirements can be dealt with. Perhaps the most broadly stated provision, for the purposes ofthis 
essay, is S 36(2), 'Limitation of Rights', which provides that " ... except as provided in subsection 
(I) or in any other provisions of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the 
Bill ofRights."56 'Rights to Property' and 'Just Administrative Action' are both entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights. 57 It is submitted that it is against these sections the National Heritage Resources 
Act ,(hereafter the Act), must be tested in the present enquiry into how its provisions affect the 
rights of an owner of historic wreck. At the same time, prevailing legislation, in the form of the 
National Monuments Act 58, and suggested legislation, (Devine and Glazewsky' s draft 
Conservation of Historic Shipwrecks Act), will be considered.59 
2.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The new Act repeals the National Monuments Act and S 41(2) of the Environment Conservation 
Act (No. 73 of 1989).60 This section of the ECA excludes the jurisdiction of that act "in respect of 
any matter to which the provisions of the National Monuments Act .... apply." Thus it appears that 
the ECA is no longer subordinate to heritage resource legislation. At S 58(8) the new Act 
stipulates: " ... any reference in any law, document or register, to the National Monuments Council 
must be construed as a reference to SAHRA .... "~ thereby placing national authority in heritage 
resources in the hands of this new body.61 
55 Peter Leon, 'Planned bill fails to consider property rights', Business Day, 4 -3-99 
56 S 36(1) provides for the limitation of rights only by laws of general application and " ... to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable .. ," and goes on to list factors that should be considered in 
deciding 'reasonable and justifiable'. 
57 Sections 25 & 33 respectively. 
58 S 61 of the new Act provides that it will only come into operation on a date fixed by the State President 
in the gazette. 
59 For the purposes of the rest of this essay the National Monuments Act (No. 28 of 1969) and the proposed 
Conservation of Historic Shipwrecks Act will be referred to as the NMA and CHSA respectively. 
60 S60 
61 "'SARRA' means the South African Heritage Resources Agency ... " (S 2(xil)). S 11 establishes the 
agency, S 12 states its object, S 13 details its powers, functions and duties. The agency is run by the 
SARRA Council, established in tenns of S 14, which is responsible for these functions, powers and duties, 
and advises the Minister on heritage resources management, (S 16). Decisions of the Council are taken by 
majority of members present at a meeting, with the person presiding having a casting as well as a 
deliberative vote, (S 17). 
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Heritage resources are categorised into Grades I, II and III, each grade being subject to national, 
provincial and local authority, respectively. 62 Archaeological resources fall within the 
responsibility of a provincial authority. However, while one of the definitions of historic wreck is 
as an 'archaeological' resource (see infra 2.3.1), it is specifically placed under the protection of 
the nationally constituted SAHRA, and all archaeological objects are made the property of the 
State. 63 The national agency must compile and maintain an inventory of the national estate to 
which any person should be allowed access. Information may be withheld under various 
circumstances. 64 
2.2 PRINCIPLES OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
In keeping with other recent legislation, (for example S 2 of the National Environment 
Management Act, No. 107 of 1998), the new Heritage Resources Act prescribes certain general 
principles to be followed in the management of heritage resources. 65 The capacity of heritage to 
promote reconciliation and its value, both intrinsically and as evidence of the orifins of South 
African society, is enumerated.66 Criteria for assessing a resource are laid down6 and SAHRA is 
charged with the task of determining specific principles for management.68 Decisions under the 
Act must be consistent with S5&6 principles and policy. 69 
2.3 THE PRIVATE OWNER AND THE ACT 
The notion of ownership as a 'bundle of servitudes' opens the way to derogation from this right in 
a variety of ways other than through mere deprivation of title. Among others the new Act 
interferes with the right of the private owner to use, damage, alter, excavate, move and alienate 
his property. In order to limit such rights in historic wreck, the Act creates a broad definition of 
this resource. 
2.3.1 DEFINITIONS OF HISTORIC WRECK 
Clearly the wider the definition of historic wreck the greater the number of wrecks that will fall 
under the ambit of the Act. In fact this new legislation goes further than any previous law in 
defining the parameters for the inclusion of a resource as 'heritage'. The definition of historic 
wreck is demonstrative of a tendency within the Act to conceive, very broadly, of what 
constitutes a 'heritage resource'. 
62 S 7(l)(a)(b)&(c) and S 8(1)(2)(3)&(4). Provincial authorities are established in tenns ofS 23. 
63 s 35(1)&(2). 
64 S 39(1)&(6). It is submitted that this provision could well see challenge under S 32 of the Constitution, 
'Access to Information'. Devine and Glazewsky (S 14, CHSA) stipulate that a Register of Historic 
Shipwrecks be kept, and that it be open for inspection by any person. Pugh (supra, p. 31) suggests that only 
persons affiliated to museums should be allowed to inspect the register in order to afford wrecks better 
protection. The NMA stipulates that no person may disturb or remove wreck older than 50 years except by 
virtue of a permit. Such permit can only be issued to a person providing written proof of affiliation to a 
museum approved by the NMC, after notice in the Gazette has afforded opportunity for submissions and 
these have been considered, and in which the location of the wreck is not disclosed, (S 12 (2C)(a)(b)(c )). 
65 Generally S5&6. 
66 S 5(l)(a)&(c ). 
67 s 5(7). 
68 s 6. 
69 S 10(2)(a). 
16 
The Act defines 'archaeological' as including: "wrecks, being any vessel or aircraft, or any part 
thereof, which was wrecked in South Africa ... ," up to the extent of the Maritime Cultural Zone, 
" ... and any cargo, debris or artefacts found or associated therewith, which is older than 60 years 
or which SABRA considers to be worthy of conservation ... "70, (my emphasis). It is submitted 
that the discretion granted to the SABRA by the last phrase opens the way for the inclusion of 
'any' wreck within these waters, whether it be of advanced age or not, to be subject to the Act. 
This is wider than both the CHSA and the NMA which define 'historical wreck' in terms of 
geographical and age criteria only71 • The proposed CHSA regards historic wreck as any ship or 
aircraft, at least fifty years old, situated in the Republic within 24 n.m from low-water mark; 
while the NMA holds " ... any wreck in the Republic, including the 'sea', as defined in section 1 
of the Sea-shore Act, 1935 (Act No. 21 of 1935), which is fifty years old or older or which the 
council upon reasonable grounds believes to be fifty years old or older ... " as subject to the 
provisions of that act.72 
While the new Act's definition of historic wreck is already very broad, other provisions could 
also bring a wreck into its ambit. 'Archaeological' is further defined as: " ... material remains 
resulting from human activity which are in a state of disuse and are in or on land and which are 
older than 100 years, including artefacts, ... and artificial features and structures;"73 and, 
"features, structures and artefacts associated with military history which are older than 75 years 
and the sites on which they are found."74 
A 'site' means " ... any area of land, including land covered by water, and including any structures 
or objects thereon. "75 An 'object' means " ... any movable property of cultural significance," 
. 1 di " hae 1 .cal fa "76 77 me u ng any arc o og1 arte ct. 
70 S 2(ii)(c ). See fn. 54, supra, for a discussion of the Maritime Cultural Zone. 
71 Devine and Glazewsky favour the age criterion, as opposed to stipulating a particular date prior to which 
a wreck is regarded as historic, because age " ... has the advantage of flexibility in that as time progresses 
younger wrecks would attain the necessary age and thus automatically qualify for protection," supra, p. 3. 
The Buenos Aires Drnft, at Art. 2(1 ), makes the convention applicable to cultural heritage that has " ... been 
lost or abandoned and is submerged underwater for at least 100 years." The way is left open, however for a 
state to protect underwater heritage submerged for less than 100 years. Larsen (supra, at p. 34, fn. 31) notes 
that the American Abandoned Shipwreck Act, does not include an age criterion, but that there is mention, 
in 'Criteria Considerations for National Registry', of a 'site' being eligible for inclusion under this act, "if it 
has achieved significance within the last 50 years". Age is used as a criterion in Finland, the Netherlands, 
Greece and Sweden; but not in Australia and France, where wrecks are protected by declaration. (Devine 
and Glazewsky, supra, p. 3) 
72 CHSA S l(iv)(a)&b), and NMA S lOA(l). The NMAdefines 'wreck' by referring to S 112 of the 
Customs and Excise Act (No. 91 of 1964) which reads so as to mean any ship or aircraft, abandoned or 
stranded, including flotsam, jetsam and laggan. 
73 S 2(ii)(a). Land "includes land covered by water." (S 2 (xx)). 
74 S 2(ii)(d) 
75 S 2(xiil). A 'place' includes a 'site' and "in relation to the management of a place, includes the 
immediate surroundings of a place", (S 2(xxxii). Devine and Glazewsky give a specific measurement to 
'site' by defining the term as meaning an area where a historic wreck is found, not exceeding 100 hectares 
in extent, (CHSA, S l(v)(a)&(d)). The NMA (S 1) says:" 'historical site' means any identifiable building 
or part thereof, marker, milestone, gravestone, landmarlc or tell older than 50 years." This would not 
include 'wreck', it is submitted. 
76 S 2(xxix)(a) 
77 It is submitted that graves would not be included within the notion of historic wreck under this Act 
because 'grave' is defined as" ... a place of interment ... " (S 2(xiii)). 'Interment' has a dictionary definition 
referring to 'burial' which is further defined as 'burying of a corpse', or 'funeral', (The Oxford Dictionary 
and Thesaurus). The implication is of a preconceived process, not the fortuitous occurrence in which a 
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In addition, the notion of the 'National Estate' as being " ... those heritage resources of South 
Africa which are of cultural significance or other special value for the present community and for 
future generations ... , "78 casts the net even wider. Section 3(2), without limiting the generality of 
S 3(1), provides a non-exhaustive list of things that "may" be included in the national estate. Here 
is found reference to, among others, archaeological sites 79, movable objects80 (including "objects 
recovered from the soil or waters of South Africa, including archaeological objects ... and 
material"81), military objects 82, and objects of scientific interest83. The Act introduces the concept 
of "sites of significance relating to the history of slavery in South Africa, "84 as a criterion for 
acceptance as culturally important. 
These broadly stated principles are further widened by S 3(3) which says: ''Without limiting the 
generality of subsections ( 1) and (2), a place or object is to be considered part of the national 
estate if it has cultural significance or other special value because of, its importance in the pattern 
of the country's history85; "its possession of uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South 
Africa's ... cultural heritage," and its potential to reveal information relating to this cultural 
heritage86; "its strong or special association with ... [a] group or organisation of importance in the 
history of South Africa"87; or because of its significance in the history of slavery in South 
Afri 88 ca. · 
It is submitted that a case could be made for the inclusion of historic wreck under any of the 
above-mentioned criteria. In consequence a great many wrecks, that may not have been regarded 
as historic under the NMA, will fall under the new Act. Thus the ownership of a larger body of 
wrecks is thrown into doubt. 
2.3.2 RES NULL/US 
S 35(2) of the Act, it is submitted, removes the common law notion of res nullius wrecks by 
vesting ownership of all "archaeological" material in the State. However the Act is clear, by its 
frequent reference to such, that there can be an owner of a heritage resource that is not the state. 
Thus there are, in terms of the Act, only two kinds of historic wreck in waters under South 
African control; i.e., wreck with a pre-existing, identifiable owner, and wreck owned by the State 
itself. This disallows, it is submitted, occupatio of a res nullius wreck because there can no longer 
be an unowned (abandoned) wreck. 
wreck would become a tomb. Victims of conflict covered by the Commonwealth War Graves Act (No. 8 of 
1992), are excluded from the ambit of the Act generally by S 2(xviil)(a). 
78 s 3(1) 
79 s 3(2)(f) 
80 s 3(2){i) 
81 s 3(2){i)(i) 
82 S 3(2)(i)(iv) 
83 s 3(2)(i)(vi) 
84 S 3(2)(h). Although the major slave-routes from Africa were across the Atlantic from North Africa to the 
Americas, wrecks of ships carrying indentured labourers or slaves from India or Malaysia to South Africa 
across the Indian Ocean would fall under this standard, (if such exist). 
85 S 3(3)(a) 
86 S 3(3)(b) & (c) 
87 s 3(3)(h) 
88 s 3(3)(i) 
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In effect the common law presumption of non-abandonment is reversed. Although stated 
differently, this is precisely the effect of Devine and Glazewsky's CHSA. Their proposal 
determines all historic wreck and artefacts to be presumed abandoned until the contrary is shown, 
and all such to be owned by the State, 89 - a solution that would also do away with res nullius 
wrecks, because all historic wreck would have an identifiable owner.90 
2.3.3 POWERS AND DELEGATION 
A heritage resources authority is enjoined to educate the public with regard to heritage, maintain a 
list of conservation bodies who have registered their interest in heritage, protect and inspect 
heritage resources and assist bodies or persons with established interest in a resource to gain 
access thereto.91 However an authority "may" also inspect and document a site which it has 
reason to believe has the potential to become protected, or which it wishes to document for 
research purposes. 92 In doing so it may erect beacons on the site. 93The authority is granted the 
power to "lend anything under its control to a museum or public institution,"94 and may affix a 
notice or badge to a protected resource, indicating its status.95 
It is submitted that the Act allows an authority to exert control over a resource in a way that 
infringes on the rights of an owner. To take the actions mentioned above the authority does not 
have to seek the permission of the owner of the resource. Thus an owner can be deprived of 
control of his property, and then have no say in its being leant to a museum, or its having a notice 
affixed to it. Both of these actions restrict an owner's right to use his res. 
Extensive powers of delegation are contemplated. The Minister or MEC "may make regulations 
to enable a heritage resources authority to delegate in writing any of its functions or powers" to a 
wide range of individuals including "any employee, heritage inspector, volunteer, or other 
representative of the authority. "96 
89 CHSA, S 2(1)&(2). The learned authors' suggestion would shift the onus of proving non-abandonment 
onto the claimant, whereas at present, under the common law presumption, the respondent has to prove 
abandonment. Other suggestions are that rules should be introduced to detennine ownership issues (see 
supra, 1. 4 .1 }, and that the creation of new private law rights in abandoned wrecks and artefacts should be 
prevented. (Devine and Glazewsky, supra, generally at p. 7). 
90 Declaring the State as owner of historic wreck is not an unusual procedure internationally. Larsen 
(supra}, notes that the American Abandoned Shipwreck Act attempts to protect historic wreck in two ways. 
Firstly, title is deemed to vest in the federal government (S 2105(a)); and secondly, federal courts are 
expressly forbidden to apply the law of 'shipwreck' to historic wreck (S 2106(a)). This removes historic 
wrecks from the purview of the law of salvage, a solution also adopted by the Buenos Aires Draft (Art. 4 ). 
Devine and Glazewsky conclude that SA legislation referring to salvage makes no distinction between 
contemporary and historic wrecks, and argue that entirely excluding historic wrecks from salvage law goes 
too far, (p. 10 & 11 ). Where salvage rights do exist, therefore, they allow the holder to establish them 
within a year of the wreck being declared historic. These rights can only exist, however, if they pre-date the 
wreck first existing as historic, (CHSA S 3(1)). 
91 S 25(1) generally. 
92 S 25(2)(c ). 
93 S 25(2)(d)(i). 
94 s 25(2)(g). 
95 s 25(2)(j). 
96 S 26(l)(d). 
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Each member of the South African Police Services and each customs and excise officer is 
deemed to be a heritage inspector.97 Heritage inspectors are granted, subject to the provisions of 
any other law, and on that inspector's reasonable belief, or on reasonable grounds, powers to 
enter into premises, inspect, search, confiscate and detain a heritage resource, take action in order 
to prevent commission of an offence and order cessation of work being carried out in 
contravention of the Act. 98 The exercise of a delegated power is deemed to be exercised by the 
delegating authority, and those exercising delegated powers are responsible to the heritage 
resources authority concerned and not to an autonomous body.99 Thus someone as loosely 
connected to the authority as a 'volunteer' can take on 'any' of the powers of the authority and 
not be independently responsible. 100 A delegation by SARRA of any power to a provincial 
heritage authority, in terms of S 26(l)(f)), can only be revoked by SARRA after it has consulted 
with the authority, and only with the consent of the Minister. 101 If the authority has further 
delegated its delegated power, and this power is being misused (by, for example, a volunteer), 
this delegation is, therefore, not very easy to rescind. 
2.3.4 PROTECTION OF THE OWNER 
Significant changes were made to the first bill with regard to the appeal procedure. The Minister 
or MEC must make regulations providing for "a system of appeal to the SARRA Council or a 
provincial heritage resources council against a decision of a committee or other delegated 
representative of SARRA or a provincial heritage resources authority. "102 
If the appeal is against a decision of the SARRA council or a provincial heritage resource 
authority, the appellant must notify the Minister or MEC within 30 days. The Minister or MEC 
shall then appoint an independent tribunal of three experts who must consider the appeal in light 
of a list of criteria. 103 Meetings of competent authorities, involving decisions pertaining to 
management and administration of heritage resources, must be open to the public. However when 
the majority of members present consider there to be good reason for doing so, a matter may be 
declared confidential and removed from public scrutiny. 
97 S 50(2). 'Heritage inspectors' are appointed under S 50(1). Under the new Act there is a semantic 
distinction made between a 'heritage inspector' and a 'volunteer', but no indication is given of the 
difference in the powers they can assume. Indeed S 50 generally controls the exercise of powers granted to 
inspectors, but there is no equivalent section for powers delegated to the other categories of individual 
mentioned in S 26(1) generally. A limited list of powers that may not be delegated is provided at S 26(3). 
These are not such as would not impact on an owners' rights directly. Powers that do so, however, are 
among those delegated. 
98 s 50(7)(8)(9)(10). 
99 S 26(2). It is submitted that this provision could be challenged under S 33(3 )(a) of the Constitution which 
stipulates that national legislation must provide for a review of administrative action by a court or 
independent tribunal. 
100 Both the CHSA and the NMA, at S 13 and S 7&7 A respectively, allow for delegation, but only within 
clear limits. The CHSA, at S 20, lists the kinds of individuals that can be appointed as 'wreck inspectors'. 
These include naval officers, fishery control officers and police officers, and should they produce an 
identity card on request of a person affected by their inspection. 
IOI S 26(4). 
102 s 49(1). 
103 s 49(2)(3). 
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Persons who may be affected by these decisions have a right of appearance at such a meeting. 
Written reasons for decisions must be given. 104 The Act further provides that law, procedures and 
administrative practices must "give further content to the fundamental rights set out in the 
Constitution. "105 
The Minister is empowered to expropriate any property if this is in the public interest. 106 
However, the expropriation must be compensated according to S 25(3) of the Constitution and the 
owner of the property must be given a hearing before this action is taken. 107 Many provisions 
stipulate that an action taken by the authority must be done, 'with the consent of the owner', or 
'by agreement with the owner' .108 There is no indication of what this may mean, or of a method 
whereby such acquiescence can be achieved. The armoury of protections granted to the owner is 
limited. It is submitted that the sections outlined here provide the 'teeth' of the Act, and, given the 
context of other, broadly conceived, sections affecting rights of owners, these sections, offering a 
modicum of protection will see much use during the Act's life-span. 109 
2.3.5 DECLARATION OF HISTORIC WRECK 110 
It is in regard to the broad prerogatives granted to a heritage resources authority to declare a 
resource as a heritage resource protected under the Act, that the most important inroads into 
private ownership rights can occur. Clearly a historic wreck, brought into the ambit of the Act 
under any of the plethora of definitions mentioned above, would be a heritage resource. 
It is submitted that a historic wreck could be included under the Act in the context of a heritage 
site, heritage area, heritage object, or archaeology. 111 Thus there are a myriad, overlapping 
controls on use of a historic wreck that may apply under this legislation. 
2.3.5.1 HERITAGE SITES 
SAHRA may, by notice in the Gazette, and a provincial authority by notice in the Provincial 
Gazette, declare a place to be a national heritage site. 112 It may also amend or withdraw any such 
notice. 113 
104 S 10(2) generally. This is in line with S 33(2) of the Constitution. 
105 S 5(3)(c ). 
106 s 46(1). 
107 s 46(3). 
108 For example S 42(1)(a), which allows a heritage authority to enter into a heritage agreement to provide 
for the protection of a heritage resource with a variety of interest groups. These agreements are made 
subject to the consent of the owner of the resource. 
109 The owner of a place under guardianship of the Act, continues to enjoy, subject to the express 
prohibitions of the legislation, the same "estate, right, title and interest in and to the place as before." 
(S 42(10)). In some cases, it is submitted, the owner will be hard put to find rights remaining that he can 
still enjoy. 
110 The CHSA and the NMA do not have the very broad heritage resource definitions contained in the new 
Act. Therefore, at S 8(l)(k) of the CHSA, the National Monuments Council is given the power to declare 
any property a historic wreck or wreck site; and the NMA, at S 10, allows the Minister, on recommendation 
of the NMC, and subject to the owner having one month prior warning of the impending recommendation, 
to declare property a national monument. 
111 Although this not their chronology in the Act, it is convenient to deal with these concepts in this order. 
112 S 27(1),(5)&(6). One of the inconsistencies of the legislation is the interchangeable use oftenns. The 
definitions section gives 'place' a specific meaning, which includes a 'site', (cf. fn. 73) -yet for the whole 
of S 27 the wording reads so as to mean a 'place' is not a 'heritage site' until it is declared as such. 
113 S 27(7)(a)&(b). 
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Before such declaration the owner of the place must be notified and given "reasonable 
opportunity for representations or submissions to be made in regard to the proposed 
notification."
114 
The authority must further notify all conservation bodies who have registered 
their interest in the geographical area in which the proposed heritage site is situated, "and give 
them at least 60 days to make submissions regarding the proposed declaration, amendment or 
withdrawal ... ," while allowing the owner the ability ''to propose conditions under which the 
action will be acceptable. 115 It is submitted that the owner appears to have different rights in terms 
of the different subsections. 
In the first he can make submissions and representations in regard to the proposed 
"notification"116, and in the second he may only suggest ways in which the "action" will become 
acceptable. A conservation body seems to be granted a greater say in the fate of the site than its 
owner. The conservation body gets 60 days to make submissions on the proposed "declaration", 
while the owner gets a 'reasonable' time; and, the conservation body can make submissions on 
the amendment or withdrawal of the notice of declaration, whereas the owner may only make the 
general submissions, representations and suggestions, mentioned above. The authority must 
"consider" all submissions before making a final decision. It is submitted that this does not mean 
it has to act on them. Once notice to the owner of the intention to declare his place as a heritage 
site has been served, or until it is withdrawn or the place is finally declared a heritage site, the 
place is protected as a heritage site for six months from service of the notice 11 7. If the owner 
objects to the proposed declaration, or proposes conditions which the heritage authority 
reasonably considers to be unacceptable, the authority may, prior to the expiry of the six month 
notice, re-notify the owner of the intention to declare his place a heritage site - which will have 
the affect of renewing the six month protection. If, after such renewal, there is still no agreement 
between the authority and the owner, the authority may declare the place to be a heritage site, 
without further reference to the owner. 118 
This last provision is extremely problematic in terms of the entrenchment of 'just administrative 
action' in the Constitution. It appears that if there is no agreement between the owner and the 
authority, there is no safeguard, other than those already enumerated, (supra, 2.3.4), against an 
owner's place being declared a heritage site. The S 49 appeal, it is submitted, will be time-
consuming and should be only a last resort. Its use could be limited by the institution of an 
114 S 27(8)(a)&(d). Under the NMA, the owner must be given one month's notice ofa mere 
'recommendation' to the Minister that he declare property a national monument. (fu. 110, supra). The 
CHSA permits the National Monuments Council "to allow a further period of time beyond one year from 
registration as a historic wreck for the institution of legal proceedings for the purpose of establishing 
ownership", (S 8(l)(p)). 
115 S 27(8)(c ). 
116 One presumes this means the 'notification' in the Gazette of the declaration of the place as a heritage 
site. The other alternative is the 'notification' to the owner, in terms ofS 27(8)(a), of the 'notification' in 
the Gazette of the place as a heritage site. This would make no sense because the owner would be granted 
the ability to make representations or submissions about the 'notice' to be served on him informing him of 
the 'notice' to declare his place a heritage site - whereas he needs only the ability to comment on this 
second, Gazette, notification. In fact, the different epithets used for the process on which the owner and the 
conservation body can make comments is confusing. The owner can make submissions about the 
'notification' and the 'action,' while the conservation body can make submissions about the proposed 
'declaration' (and its amendment or withdrawal). In the absence of clarity from the legislation itself, it is 
submitted that the better view is to consider all these to mean the proposed 'declaration' of a place as a 
heritage site. This confusion would be overcome by the addition of the words 'of the declaration of the 
place as a heritage site in the Gazette' at the end of S 27(8)(d), and using this nomenclature throughout. 
117 s 27(10). 
118 s 27(11). 
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independent, deadlock-breaking mechanism which would operate to create agreement between 
the owner and the authority at a point before the place is declared a heritage site. Such mechanism 
does not exist in the Act. 
The control exercised by a heritage authority over a place, once it has been declared a protected 
site under the Act, deprives the owner of some of the fundamental rights of ownership. 'With the 
consent of the owner," an authority may make regulations concerning safety, use, admission and 
payment for admission of the public_ n9 "By agreement with the owner," the authority may 
conserve or improve a site, construct walls, gates, access roads on or over a site and erect signs on 
or near a site.120 An authority may mark a site with a badge indicating its status.121 "No person 
may destroy, damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove from its original position, subdivide or 
change the planning status of any heritage site without a permit issued by the heritage resources 
authority responsible for the protection of such site. "122 
It should be noted that while much of this may appear reasonable in the context of protecting 
heritage, the problems inherent in the wording of S 27(8)&(1 l), indicated above, may lead to 
these limitations on the use of property occurring without the owner's consent. 
While, in respect of historic wreck, some of these provisions would be difficult to implement 
practically123, (for example, how does one erect a gate to a wreck), their effect is to intrude on the 
'bundle of rights' a wreck-owner may expect to hold in his property. S 27(18) poses the question 
of an owner's right to salvage his wreck if it should be brought under the authority of this 
legislation. 124 As pointed out, (2.3.1, supra - the discussion of S 2(ii)(c )), it is possible for quite a 
young wreck to be declared a heritage resource, thus raising the possibility of salvage of a 
heritage resource. 
2.3.5.2 PROTECTED AREAS 
A heritage authority may, with the consent of the owner of the area, designate a protected area 
which, in respect of historic wreck, is defined as "such area of land surrounding any wreck as is 
reasonably necessary to ensure its protection. 125 
1J
9 S 27(19). See 2.3.4, supra for discussion of 'consent of the owner'. 
120 s 27(21). 
121 s 27(17). 
122 S 27(18). 'No person', it is submitted, would include the owner. 'Excavate', 'alter' and 'remove' could 
refer to actions taken during a salvage operation. 
123 Reproduction rights "either in one or two dimensions" in respect of a heritage site, "subject to existing 
rights and the agreement of the owner'' belong to the State, and no person other than the owner can make 
reproductions of the site for gain without a permit issued by SAHRA, (S 27(23)(a)&(b)). Leon, supra, 
points out that, on this wording, "if Table Mountain were declared a national heritage site, no one would 
lawfully be able to photograph or paint it without the agency's express permission and the payment of a 
fee: a proposition that is as absurd as it is impracticable." 
124 Cf. fn. 90, supra, for a discussion of salvage in respect of historic wreck. 
125 S 28(1)(b). S 31 deals with 'heritage areas'. These, by virtue ofreference, at S 31(1), to such areas being 
investigated for inclusion under the Act on the initiative of planning and provincial heritage authorities, 
would not include historic wreck. A planning body would not deal with such issues, and historic wreck is a 
national competence, see 2.1, supra. 
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No person may "damage, disfigure, alter or subdivide or in any other way develop any part of a 
protected area", without consulting the authority on what procedures to follow, at least 60 days 
prior to the initiation of the changes. 126 The authority may make regulations " ... providing for 
specific protections for any protected area which it has designated, including the prohibition or 
control of specified activities by any person in the designated area. "127 
2.3.5.3 HERITAGE OBJECTS 
The section dealing with heritage objects is fraught with obstacles to clarity. From a close reading 
it appears that there are, in fact, two kinds of heritage objects contemplated. The Act does not 
specifically say this however. 
A) "An object or collection of objects, or a type of object or list of objects, whether specific or 
generic, that is part of the national estate and the export of which SAHRA deems it necessary to 
control, may be declared a heritage object, including -
(a) objects recovered from the soil or waters of South Africa, including archaeological. ... 
objects."128 
With regard to this first category: "an object within a type of objects declared to be a heritage 
object is deemed to be a heritage object."129 This provision further widens the very extensive 
definitions that could bring a wreck, or part of a wreck, into the ambit of the Act. Whereas in the 
first Bill preceding the Act, there was no provision made for an owner to make comment prior to 
this subsection coming into force, the final text does allow this. However, it is submitted that the 
wording is so weighted against the owner as to be almost useless as an instrument to protect his 
rights. This is because before declaring an object contemplated in S 32(1) as a heritage object, 
SARRA has only to give " ... prior opportunity for representations or submissions to be made in 
regard to the proposed declaration as may be practicable in the circumstances ... (and) ... nothing 
herein contained shall oblige SARRA to give such prior opportunity if the circumstances militate 
against this."130 
8) At this point the section seems to repeat itself: "SARRA with the approval of the Minister 
may, by notice in the Gazette - (a) declare an object, or a collection thereof, or a type of object or 
list of objects, whether specific or generic, to be a heritage object ... "131 • The next subsection then 
determines that such declaration cannot be made unless SARRA follows a set of detailed 
procedures. 
126 S 28(3). It is submitted that 'no person' would include the owner. 
127 S 28(5). It is submitted that 'any person' would include the owner. 
128 S 32(l)(a), my emphasis. The rest of the subsection continues with a list of other objects eligible for 
inclusion in this first category, e.g., visual arts (b) and military objects (c ), and objects of cultural, 
historical ( e) and scientific value (g). All of these could, it is submitted, involve some aspect of the 
ownership of historic wreck. 
129 S 32(2). Leon (supra) points out that a close reading of this wording could lead to the conclusion that, if 
a painting by an expatriate artist is declared a heritage object, all paintings by expatriate artists could be 
deemed to be heritage objects and subject to the control of the Act. 
130 S 32(3). It is submitted that this provision can be challenged under S 33(1) of the Constitution- the right 
to reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action. 
131 S 32(4)(a). 
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In the case of a specific object or collection SAHRA must serve on the owner "a notice of its 
intention and ... (give) him or her at least 60 days to lodge an objection or suggest reasonable 
conditions regarding the care and custody of such object under which such declaration is 
acceptable" .132 With regard to a type of objects a notice of provisional declaration must be 
published in the Gazette, the effect of the declaration must be publicised, and SAHRA must invite 
any person who may be adversely affected "to make submissions or to lodge objections with 
SAHRA within 60 days from the date of the notice."133 An object is deemed protected as a 
heritage object for six months from the time of service of the notice to the owner of the specific 
object or collection of objects, or the publication in the Gazette of the notice with regard to a type 
of object, or until the notice is withdrawn or the collection or type is declared to be a heritage 
object. 134 
The Act thus creates two categories of heritage object, the semantic distinction between which is 
the S 32(1) phrase: "the export of which SAHRA deems it necessary to control". Procedurally the 
differences are more marked, with ownership rights in objects liable to be exported being more 
severely curtailed. There are, however, other curtailments placed on the use of objects. "No 
person may destroy, damage, disfigure or alter any heritage object ... listed in Part II of the 
register, without a permit issued by SAHRA."135 The owner or custodian of the heritage object 
must keep it in good condition and in a safe place 136, and report loss or damage thereof to 
SAHRA. 137 No person may carry out work of repair or restoration, or export such object without 
a permit. 138 
SAHRA must maintain a register of heritage objects,139 a summary of which must be available to 
the public, subject to the provisions that " ... no information which may identify the location of the 
object must be accessible to any person except with the express consent of SAHRA, for so long 
as SAHRA may determine". 140 SAHRA must provide to the owner a badge or certificate 
indicating the status of the object. 141 
132 S 32(5)(a). 
133 s 32(5)(b). 
134 s 32(6). 
135 S 32(13). 'No person' would. it is submitted, include the owner. The NMA provides that no person shall 
destroy, damage, alter or export from the Republic, any object or group or collection of objects that are 
generally accepted to have been in the country for longer then 100 years, or wreck or any portion thereof or 
any object derived therefrom, known to have been in South African territorial waters for longer than 50 
years, (S 12(2B)(b)&(d)). 
136 s 32(15). 
137 S 32(16). 
138 S 32(17)&(19). Subsections 19 to 32 deal with the export of a heritage object from South Africa 
139 S 32(7). The register of heritage objects is divided into: Part L heritage objects listed by type; Part II A, 
specific objects on display in museums or in other secure conditions; Part II B, other specific objects. This 
register is in addition to the 'Inventory of the National Estate', which is defined as being one of"places and 
objects", (S 39(l)(a)(b)(c )(d)). 
140 S 32(8)&(9). This provision is in keeping with the submission made by Pugh, (supra, fn. 63), to limit the 
right of access to information on the register of historic shipwreck suggested by Devine and Glazewsky in 
CHSA. 
141 s 32(11). 
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The owner must notify SAHRA of the name and address of the new owner, and pass the 
certificate or badge onto the new owner. 142 Clearly, then, the Act contemplates the alienation of 
an object by the owner. To "disperse any collection", listed in the register, a permit is required 143, 
but there is no provision requiring permission to alienate an individual object that is not part of a 
collection, which seems, then, to be possible without such permission. 144 
2.3.5.4 ARCHAEOLOGY 145 
As mentioned previously (supra, 2.1 ), the Act defines historic wreck as 'archaeological, and "the 
protection of any wreck in the territorial sea and the maritime cultural zone shall be the 
responsibility of the SAHRA. ". 146 
The Act determines that all archaeological objects are the property of the state, subject to their 
remaining in the "ownership of the possessor" for the duration of his lifetime, and SAHRA being 
notified of the identity of the successor .147 Thus an archaeological object, which includes historic 
wreck, becomes the property of the State although the possessor, who now appears also to own it, 
retains custody. 148 However, this retention of custody does not amount to an owner's right to use 
the archaeological object. No person may, without permission, destroy, damage, excavate, 
remove from its original position, collect, own, trade in, sell for private gain, export or attempt to 
export any archaeological ... material or object, or any category of archaeological ... material or 
object. 149 In addition permission is needed to "bring onto or use at an archaeological ... site any 
excavation equipment or any equipment which assist(s) in the detection of ... archaeological 
material or objects ... ". 150 Thus an owner of a wreck brought under the protection of the Act under 
the wide range of definitions enumerated may not excavate the wreck site or search for 
archaeological objects with equipment. 
142 s 32(12). 
143 s 32(13). 
144 A problem of nomenclature arises in regard to S 41. While S 32 gives the notion of 'heritage object' a 
very particular meaning, outside of the more general concept of 'heritage resource', S 41, entitled 
'Restitution of Heritage Objects', does not mention 'objects', only 'resources.' 
145 Note that the definition of 'archaeological' under the Act includes wreck, and an 'object' is defined as 
'any movable property of cultural significance,' (cf. 4.1, supra), wreck is always a movable (cf. I.I. 1, 
supra). Historic wreck is therefore an archaeological object. 
146 s 35(1). 
147 S 35(2), S 35(8)(a). S 35(1) places the protection of "archaeological ... sites ... and material" in the hands 
ofa provincial authority, while S 35(2) says, "all archaeological objects ... are the property of the State." 
Thus, in regard to archaeology, there are three categories, viz. 'sites', 'material' and 'objects', and only 
'objects' are specifically made the property of the State. It is submitted that an 'object' could be considered 
to be 'material'. In this case at least part of 'material' is owned by the State. Clearly, however, a 'site' is 
not 'material' because these terms are named as distinct from each other in S 35(1). It appears, then, that 
the State does not own archaeological 'sites', but does own the 'objects' deriving from such a site. 
'Material' is not defined by the Act, but 'site' and 'object' are (cf. 2.3.1, fn. 74 & 75, supra). 
The Act does not provide a distinction between an 'archaeological object', under S 35(2), and a 'heritage 
object', (S 32, see supra, 2.3.5.3). S 32(1) provides that an 'object' which is part of the National Estate can 
be declared a 'heritage object'. It is submitted that an 'archaeological object', as contemplated by S 35(2), 
could be part of the National Estate and thus eligible, not only for State ownership, but also for declaration 
as a 'heritage object'. The Act is not clear on the relationship between these two types of' object'. 
As Leon, supra, points out, S 35(2) is tantamount to expropriation of all archaeological objects in private 
ownership. It is submitted that this is so, even though the subsection does not specifically name the vesting 
of ownership of archaeological objects in the State as such. S 46 of the Act, entitled 'Expropriation', allows 
for the purchase or, subject to compensation, expropriation, of any property for conservation, or for a 
purpose that is a public purpose, or is in the public interest. Such action may only be taken by the Minister 
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S 35(2) further provides that the heritage authority must, at its discretion, make sure that 
archaeological objects are lodged with a museum. 151 
With regard to an archaeological site - which, it is submitted, includes a historic wreck site - no 
person may destroy, damage, excavate, alter, deface or otherwise disturb such site without 
permission.152 If the heritage authority has reasonable cause to believe that any development 
which will destroy, damage or alter an archaeological site is being carried without permission 
having been sought, and no heritage management procedure in terms of the Act having been 
followed, it may serve on the owner or occupier of the site, or the person undertaking the 
development, a cessation order153. It may further carry out an investigation into whether or not an 
archaeological site exists and, if this is shown, may help the person on whom the order has been 
served to apply for the necessary permission. 154 If this application is not received within two 
weeks of the cessation order being issued the costs of the investigation can be recovered from the 
owner of the land on which the site is located, or from the person wishing to undertake the 
development. 155 The authority may, "after consultation with the owner of the land on which an 
archaeological .... site ... is situated, serve a notice on the owner ... , to prevent activities within a 
specified distance from such site. "156 
on the advice of SARRA and after consultation with the Minister of Finance, (S 46(1)). It is submitted that 
it is not clear whether these limiting provisions of S 46(1) will apply to S 35(2) as the Act seems to create a 
separate expropriation-regime for archaeological objects. However, it is further submitted that any change 
of ownership under S 35(2) will have to comply with the standards set out in S 25(2) of the Constitution 
which allows for expropriation, subject to compensation, for a public purpose or which is in the public 
interest. The amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be agreed to by those 
affected or approved by a court. 
148 An issue arises in relation to the words: "an object ... remains in the ownership of the possessor, and 
SARRA must be notified who the successor is", (S 35(8)(a) - my emphasis). From this it seems that the 
possessor, even ifhe is not the bona fide owner, is granted title in the object he possesses, and that this title 
can be passed onto his successor, as long as SAHR.A is notified. This is confusing because S 35(2) has 
already passed ownership onto the State, thus it is the owner of the object, and not the possessor. The actual 
owner of the object is not mentioned at all. It is submitted that some of this confusion could be removed if 
the words 'possession of the owner' were substituted for 'ownership of the possessor', and some device 
introduced to cover the situation where the de facto owner is not the possessor. 
149 S 35(4)(b)(c ). 
150 S 35(4)(d). 
151 In terms of the NMA all material recovered from a wreck must go to a museum (cf. fn. 64), which will 
decide on its disposal, in consultation with the NMC and the holder of a permit (who must already be 
affiliated to a museum) allowing such removal. Disputes as to disposal must be submitted to arbitration, (S 
12 (2C)(f)), There is no such dispute settlement provision in the new Act with regard to historic wreck. 
152 S 35(4)(a). 
153 S 35(5)(a). The cessation order may be for a period specified in the order. The NMA provides that no 
person shall destroy, damage, excavate, alter, remove from its original site or export any archaeological 
find, material or object, (S 12(2A)). 
154 S 35(5)(b)&(c ). 
155 S 35(5)(d). It is submitted that this provision would be better worded so as to allow two weeks from the 
outcome of the investigation being made known before the investigation costs are recovered. This would 
allow unforeseen delays in the investigation process to be catered for. 
156 s 35(6). 
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Within two years of the commencement of the Act any person in possession of any 
archaeological material or object, acquireq other than in terms ofthis Act, must lodge lists of such 
with the heritage authority concerned. Failure to do so will result in the deeming of the object or 
material to have been acquired after the date of the Act coming into force. 157 This provision may 
affect rights of an owner which he claims as a result of title established prior to the 
commencement of the Act. 
Whereas previously the Act has allowed for submissions or suggestions from the owner, or other 
interested parties, on actions taken under the Act that affect entitled rights, there is no such 
allowance made in this section dealing with 'Archaeology'. Thus it seems that the above actions, 
with regard to archaeological material, can be taken without the owner being able to make 
comment thereon. It is submitted that there would be clear grounds for challenge of this section 
under sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution. 158 
2.3.6 PROVISIONAL PROTECTION 
SAHRA may, subject to written notification of the owner, by notice in the Gazette, provisionally 
protect for up to two years, any protected area, or heritage resource which it considers to be 
threatened and which threat it believes can be alleviated by negotiation and consultation, or the 
protection of which it wishes to investigate in terms of the Act. 159 Historic wreck would, it is 
submitted, fall into these categories. A heritage resource is deemed to be provisionally protected 
for thirty days from the service of the notice on the owner, or until the notice is withdrawn or the 
resource is provisionally protected. 160 "No person may damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove 
from its original position, subdivide or change the planning status of a provisionally protected 
place or object without a permit ... "161 
Thus, to provisionally protect a heritage resource or protected area, SAHRA has merely to notify 
the owner of its intention. This simple notification is sufficient to effect immediate provisional 
protection and suspension of owner's rights, a situation that could endure for up to two years, 
during which time the property could become formally declared protected as a heritage resource. 
Depending on the definition of resource the property happens to fall under, this position may well 
lead to the variety of inroads into title described supra. 
Provisional protection under the new Act is in contrast to that under the NMA. Under that act, 
whenever a notice of proposed declaration or provisional declaration of monument has been 
served in respect of any property, such property shall, for the purposes of alienation, protection, 
removal or export, " ... in respect of any person who is aware of such notice, be deemed to be a 
monument from the date of service of such notice, for a period of six months ... " (my emphasis), 
or until the notice is cancelled or the property is declared a monument. 162 Provisional protection is 
therefore limited by the phrase "in respect of any person who is aware of such notice", and by the 
six month period of protection. 
157 S 35(7)(a). 
158 S 25 of the Constitution entrenches property rights and S 3 2 rights to just administrative action. 
159 S 29(1)(a)(i)(ii)(iii), S 29(4). A 'heritage resource' means any place or object of cultural significance, 
(S 2(xvi)), cf. 4.1, supra). 
160 s 29(5). 
161 S 29(10). The issue of nomenclature arises here. S 29(l)(a) permits provisional protection for 'protected 
areas' and 'heritage resources'. S 29(10) disallows certain actions with regard to 'protected places' or 
'objects', which are both lesser components of the S 29(l)(a) concepts. Thus it appears as if provisional 
orotection is extended to a greater range of concepts than are protected against specific activities. 
162 NMA, S 11(1). 
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2.3. 7 PENAL TIES 
The Act contains a general section and a Schedule prescribing sanctions for contravention of its 
provisions. Most notable, from the point of view of the private owner of historic wreck is S 51(9) 
which stipulates that if the owner of a place is convicted of an offence under the Act, involving 
the destruction or damage of the place, the Minister, on advice of SAHRA, may serve on the 
owner an order disallowing any development of the place, except making good the damage and 
maintaining the cultural value of the place, for a period of up to ten years.163 
A reasonable period must be given to "any person with a registered interest in the land"164,(which 
presumably would include the owner), to make submissions on whether the order should be made 
and for how long. In this circumstance if, after consideration of the submissions the order is 
made, owners' rights can effectively be frozen for the period of the notice. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The Preamble to the Act states as follows: 
"Our heritage is unique and precious and cannot be renewed. It helps us define our 
cultural identity and therefore lies at the heart of our spiritual well-being and has the 
power to build our nation." 
Such elevated sentiments are, it is submitted, valuable for the 'nation-building' exercise currently 
underway in this country. However, while the National Heritage Resources Act may have, at its 
core, the notion of the preservation of South Africa's cultural heritage, it goes about its stated aim 
in too rough-shod a manner. 
It is submitted that concerns of uncertain terminology, broadness of definition and the clear 
intention to deprive owners of their entitlement, raised in this essay, will mean certain challenge 
to the constitutionality of many provisions of the Act. Such action may result in the legislation 
becoming ham-strung. This is unfortunate, but is due to the fact that the purposes of the Act, 
although noble, have been pursued in an entirely inappropriate manner. 
163 S 51(9). Cf. 2.3.1, supra, for the definition of a 'place'. 
164 S 51(10). 'Land' includes land covered by water, (S 2(:xx)). 
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A LEGAL REGIME FOR PLANNING IN THE COASTAL REGION - CASE 
STUDY MUIZENBERG/ PELICAN -PARK GROWTH MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
Mark Twain : "Invest in land my boy, they ain 't making it anymore. " 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Planning is the application of scientific method -however crude- to policy making. 
What this means is that conscious effor1Sare made to increase the validity of policies in 
terms of the present and anticipated future of the built environment. 
"The practice of planning is fundamentally a matter of transaction and negotiation 
- between competing interests and that therefore the outcome of executive action relies 
not so much on the merits of a particular plan or scheme, but on the force, or power of 




The legal regime for planning in the coastal region provides no absolute protection of 
this environment. 
The aims of planning in general are idealistic, these include: 
The achievement of ends 
The exercise of choice 
An orientation towards the future 
Action and results 
Comprehensiveness 
However, in practice this is not often achieved. 
Spatial planning according to Claassen in Fuggle and Rabie2 in the form of laying out 
of rtew townships , housing estates , recreational amenities and industrial zones is 
continuing apace in the coastal zone. There are no laws specifically governing 
planning and development in the coastal zone. 
A feature of planning law until recently was that the pertinent legislation was found at 
Provincial government level rather than at National government. Therefore the key 
legislation governing planning were ordinances. One reason for this could be the 
influences of the British and American planning systems on the South African 
Planning system . 
The British Planning system is nominally devoted to the pursuit of the Public 
interest, but the concept of state control in the public interest , crucial to the definition 
1 Gordon E Cherry: Town and Regional Planning: University of Stellenbosch: No 4 April 1990 
~g 3 
Fuggle and Rabie Juta and Co Ltd Cape Town: 1990 
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of planning in Britain is absent in the united states . There the planning operations are 
designed in the interest of particular groups. The Americans talk of the need for 
coordinated planning unlike the British view, which is supposed to imply 
coordination. 
The British Central Government, holds the final policy responsibility and the final 
administrative authority, but local authorities are expected to take much of the 
initiative in carrying out policy 3 
South African Planning was strongly influenced by the British Planning system in 
terms of administrative land use law and introduced the concept of structure plans, 
however, the American system passed on the emphasis on zoning, based on the 
Euclidean model. Using the 1926 case of Euclid Vs Ambler Realty (272 US 365) the 
Supreme Court ruled that Local Government has the right to control the use of land . 
This ruling forms the basis for all subsequent land use zoning in the United States. 
Each class of area receives a single use designation such as agriculture, residential or 
commercial. 
South Africa was also influenced by regional planning schemes in the USA such as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority. This scheme was created during the depression of 
the 1930's to alleviate poverty through effective resource utilisation ( Fuggle and 
Rabie)4 
Therefore Town Planning developed as a control orientated physical planning system . 
For this reason it developed strongly at the Local Level, but long range policy 
formulation at National Level were never developed fully. 
Town Planning at the Local Level is primarily a problem solving arbitration system 
and seldom provides absolute control . Therefore other legislation is needed to 
provide protection for environmental issues such as protection of the coastal zone. 
2 PLANNING DEFINITION OF THE COASTAL ZONE 
The coastal zone as defined planning terms is wider than that described in the 
Seashore Act (21 of 1935). It includes the area between the high and low water mark 
and also includes, beaches, wetlands, water catchment areas and development from at 
least 1km to as much 20 kilometers from the high water mark. Planning usually deals 
with the effect of human activities on the environment. 
The problems occurring in this segment of the coastline cover a whole range of 
environmental problems that are not covered by planning law. There is often an 
overlap of environmental issues and hence laws in the planning sphere. 
3 Andreas Faludi: A Reader in Planning Theory: Pergamon Press: 1991 
4 Fuggle and Rabie: Chapter 28 
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3 OVERVIEW OF CURRENT AND FUTURE PLANNING LAWS 
The following is an overview of current and future planning legislation that does or 
can have an influence on planning in the coastal zone. However, the 
comprehensiveness of the current planning laws is shown to be inefficient in the next 
section of this report, which addresses an actual case study. 
The most important legislation is that which is provided at Provincial Level. 
3.1 Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 
The Land Use Planning Ordinance makes provision for the creation of structure plans 
the purpose of which is : 
"To lay down guidelines for the future spatial planning development of the area to 
which it relates (including urban renewal, urban design or the preparation of 
development plans) in such a way as will most effectively promote the order of the 
area as well as the general welfare of the community concerned" 
There are two levels of structure plans: 
• Section 4(6) Structure Plan-
A Local authority or joint local authorities Can submit a structure plan to the 
administrator , which is valid for 10 years. The structure usually comprises a report 
outlining the principles of the plan a well as a map indicating potential land use. 
• Or a section 4(10) Structure Plan: A town clerk or secretary may submit a structure 
plan to their local Council for approval of a structure plan within their area of 
jurisdiction or part thereof. 
Significantly, the structure plan neither confers nor takes away rights in respect of 
land. It is merely a means to guide development control decisions .made at the local 
level. 
The second method of land use control which allocates rights to a land owner in terms 
of use, building heights, bulk, floor area, coverage and setback lines is the zoning 
map. 
A zoning map is prepared in terms of section 10 of the Ordinance . This is 
accompanied by a zoning scheme. the purpose of the zoning scheme is to determine 
use rights and to provide for control over use rights and over the utilization of land in 
the area of jurisdiction of the Local Authority. 
Applications for departure from the rights on a particular zoning can be granted by a 
Local Authority in terms of section: 
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I 5 (IO An owner of land may apply in writing to the town clerk or secretary concerned 
as the case may be 
a) For an alteration of the land use restrictions applicable to a particular zone in 
terms of the scheme regulations concerned, or 
ii) to utilize land on a temporary basis for a purpose for which for which no provision 
has been made in said regulations. 
Similarly a rezoning from one form of zoning to another usually of a higher order can 
also be permitted in terms of section: 
17(1) An owner of land may apply in writing to the town clerk or secretary concerned 
as the case may be , for a rezoning of the land under section I 6 
2)The town clerk shall 
a) cause such application to be advertised 
b) where objections against the said applications are received, submit them to the 
said owners for comment; 
c) Obtain the relevant comment of any person of the council of the council and 
furnish the director with a copy thereof 
22 (I) No application for subdivision involving a change of zoning shall be 
considered unless the land concerned has been zoned in a manner permitting of 
subdivision (subdivisional area) 
If the new zoning is not exercised within two years of approval it will lapse and revert 
to the previous zoning. 
The refusal of an application shall be solely on the basis of a lack of desirability of the 
contemplated utilization of land concerned including the guideline proposals 
included in the relevant structure plan in so far as it relates to desirability or on 
the basis of its effect on existing rights concerned ( except any alleged right to protect 
against trade competition) 
Where an application .. is not refused by virtue of the above matters , .. regard shall be 
had, in considering relevant particulars , to only the safety and welfare of the 
members of the community concerned, the preservation of the natural and 
developed environment concerned or the effect of the application on existing rights 
concerned . ( except any alleged right to protect against trade competition) 
The applicant has the right of appeal to an appeal committee. The Appeal committee 
is a Provincial function. A Planning Advisory Board is established to advise the 
Minister on appeals. 
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3.2 Development Facilitation Act(67 of 1995) ~ 
Although the DF A has not been adopted by the Western Cape , its importance as a 
piece of legislation is significant in light of its influence on the New Western Cape 
Planning and Development Act (7 of 1999). 
The DF A was established at National government level to speed up development in 
the light of the government's RDP program. 
The DF A was the first coherent attempt to bring about uniformity in township 
establishment , land registration and planning systems , with special focus being 
placed on low-income development. It does not repeal any existing legislation in the 
different Provinces but allows developers a choice between LUPO, the less formal 
township development act or the DF A. It contains a provision that allows for low-
income housing projects to be given priority. 
The DF A establishes Development Tribunals in each province composed of experts 
appointed by the Premier. They consider all development applications arid can 
override certain legislation e.g. restrictive conditions of title and removal of 
servitudes and can deal with disputes resolution and mediation. 
In terms of section 
32 (2) In approving a land development application a tribunal may, either of its own accord or in 
response to that application, impose any condition of establishment relating to-
( d) the suspension of restrictive conditions or servitudes affecting the land on which a land development 
area is to be established; 
(!)(iv) any law requiring the approval of an authority for the subdivision of land; 
(n) the environment or environmental evaluations; 
One of the Principles of the DF A is the promotion of Sustainability. Therefore 
policies and practices should aim to promote land development that is fiscally, 
institutionally and administratively viable, that establishes communities and is 
environmentally sustainable. 
Although the DFA was adopted by the rest of South Africa, the Western Cape have 
created a new act to replace the Land Use Planning ordinance and the DF A . This act 
follows many of the principles of the DFA. 
3.3 Western Cape Planning and development Act 7 of 1999 
Part of the definition of this act is to provide for principles and lay down policies, 
guidelines and parameters for planning and sustainable development where 
provisional and regional interest require, including environmental protection and land 
development management. 






The new Planning and Development act makes provision for three levels of plans 
Chapter 1 (3) (1): 
(a)The Integrated Development Framework: implemented at Provincial level for the 
entire Province. 
"means a development framework which deals with the integration of various strategies and sectoral 
plans relating to development, such as economic, spatial, social, infrastructural, housing, institutional, 
fiscal, land reform, transport environmental and water plans, to obtain the optimal allocation of scarce 
resources in a particular geographic area, and includes an integrated development plan as defined in 
section JOB of the f:,ocal Government Transition Act, 1993 
(a)Sectoral plan - region (2 district councils or an area larger than the Metropolitan 
area) 
A sectoral plan means any written strategy or plan which deals mainly with one of the sectors or 
elements or particular subjects that form part of an integrated development framework and which may 
be a spatial, economic, land reform, environmental, housing, water or transport plan'. 
Local Government IDF- usually at Municipal level 
Any existing structure plan is to be reviewed by the year 2001 and every five years 
thereafter. 
5(1) The aim of the Integrated development Framework (IDF) is to lay down 
strategies, proposals and guidelines, including development objectives and an 
implementation plan by means of development planning so that the general principles 
of this act are promoted. 
This goes beyond spatial planning it looks at creating a vision for an area , promoting 
Land Development Objectives, local Economic Development- budgeting for 
coordinated planning that goes beyond spatial planning . This will relate to the coastal 
zone only insofar as the vision for the area is concerned which is mainly above the 
high tide. 
The act in section 9 (3) includes some additional functions of the zoning schemes. 
c) the imposition of development rules in respect of land uses, districts or zones, which 
may include development rules applicable to a specific type of natural 
environmentally sensitive , cultural, architectural , historic and developed 
environment. 
i) protective measures in respect of areas of the natural environment and 
environmentally sensitive areas such as wetlands, flood plains, dunes, steep slopes 
and the environment in general, 
These measures may provide for additional protection of sensitive environmental areas 
that are found in the coastal zone such as dunes and wetlands. 
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When applying for a departure in terms of section 15 ( 1) the process is slightly 
different from the previous Land Use Planning Ordinance, the council may refuse or 
approve the application based on the desirability in terms of an Integrated 
development framework or Sectoral plan. 
When applying for a rezoning the same is true and the rezoning will lapse after a 
period of three years if not taken up by the applicant , compared to the two years 
provided for in LUPO. 
Section 67 of the act describes additional motivation for environmental impact 
assessments. 
I )The Provincial Minister may identify activities, which require environmental 
impact assessments 
3) The Provincial Minister may require that certain prescribed activities shall not be -
undertaken except in accordance with a written authorization issued by the Provincial 
Minister or the council of a municipality. 
5) The Provincial Minister may declare any area in the Province as defined in a notice 
in the government gazette as an environmentally sensitive area and may prohibit any 
development or activities in such areas. 
It is difficult to foresee this section being applied widely in practice to the coastal zone 
unless the area in question is extremely controversial or under immediate threat, in 
light of similar legislation being passed under the Environmental Conservation Act (73 
of 1989) in which only one area has been identified as an environmentally sensitive 
area since its inception. 
3.4 Physical Planning Act 21 of 1991 
The Physical Planning Act is a piece of National Legislation that preserves 
guideplans that were drawn up during apartheid times in terms of the Physical 
Planning Act 88 of 1967. 
The aims of the act are: 
"To promote the orderly physical development of the Republic, and for that purpose to 
provide for the division of the Republic into regions, for the preparation of national 
development plans, regional development plans, regional structure plans and urban 
structure plans by the various authorities responsible for physical planning, and for 
matters connected therewith. " 
Section 1 (1) In order to achieve the objects of this Act, the Minister may by himself 
or in collaboration with or through any other Minister, any Administrator, any 
government, any regional or local authority or any other person do research or cause 
research to be done, institute any inquiry or cause any inquiry to be instituted or 
collect information or cause information to be collected, whether in the Republic or 
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elsewhere, in connection with any matter which has or is likely to have ~ effect on 
the physical development of any area in the Republic, including-
( a) the physical, social and economic characteristics of that area and, in so far as any 
neighboring area has or is likely to have any effect on the physical development of that 
area, the physical, social and economic characteristics of any such neighboring area; 
(b) the distribution, increase and movement and the urbanization of the population in that 
area; 
( c) the natural and other resources and the economic development potential of that 
area; 
(d) the existing and the planned infrastructure, such as water, electricity, communication 
networks and transport systems, in that area; 
( e) the general land utilization pattern; 
(f) the sensitivity of the natural environment. 
The Minister shall ensure that physical planning is promoted and co-ordinated on a 
national and regional basis. 
3.5 Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. 
The Local Government Transition Act was initiated as an interim measure to 
control local government during the transition phase from the commencement of 
the new government after the elections in 1994. 
The aim of the act is defined as: 
• To provide for revised interim measures with a view to promoting the restructuring of local 
government, and for that purpose 
• to provide for the establishment of Provincial Committees for Local Government in respect of the 
various provinces; 
• to provide for the recognition and establishment of forums for negotiating such restructuring of local 
government; 
• for the exemption of certain local government bodies from certain provisions of the Act; 
• for the establishment of appointed transitional councils in the pre-interim phase; 
• for the delimitation of areas ofjurisdiction and the election of transitional councils in the interim 
phase; for the establishment of transitional rural local government structures; for the issuing of 
proclamations by the MECs of the various provinces; 
• for the establishment of Local Government Demarcation Boards in respect of the various 
provinces; 
• and for the repeal of certain laws; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
• 
The Local Government Transition Act, 209 of 1993 makes provision for the creation of 
integrated development plans. These are defined as: 
"a plan aimed at the integrated development and management of the area of jurisdiction of the 
municipality concerned in terms of its powers and duties, and which has been compiled having regard 
to the general principles contained in Chapter I of the Development Facilitation Act 
The Local Government Transition Act will be replaced by The Municipal Structures 
act 117 of 1998 in about July 2001 with the creation of a uni-city in the Cape 
Metropolitan Area 
3.6 Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 
-
❖ The act was established to provide for the establishment of municipalities in 
accordance with the requirements relating to categories and types of municipality; 
❖ to establish criteria for determining the category of municipality to be established in 
an area; 
❖ to define the types of municipality that may be established within each category; 
❖ to provide for an appropriate division of functions and powers between categories of 
municipality; 
❖ to regulate the internal systems, structures and office-bearers of municipalities; 
❖ to provide for appropriate electoral systems; 
❖ and to provide for matters in connection therewith. 
The preamble to the act is interesting in that it defines the role of Local Government 
in terms of the constitution as a distinctive sphere of government, interdependent, and 
interrelated with national and provincial spheres of government. This elaborates on the 
role of local government as defined in the New Constitution (200 of 1994 ). 
There is agreement on the fundamental importance of local government to democracy, 
development and nation building ; 
Past policies have bequeathed a legacy of massive poverty, gross inequalities in 
municipal services, and disrupted spatial, social and economic environments in which 
people continue to live and work; 
Municipalities therefore need to embark on the final phase in the local government 
transition process to be transformed in line with the vision of a democratic and 
developmental local government; 
The MEC for local government in a province may assign powers to a Local Authority 
. The act makes provision for the establishment of Ward Councils that are nominated 
bodies and for an executive committee along with an executive mayor who will take 
over the old role of the EXCO chairperson. 
The executive mayor must-
(a) Identify the needs of the municipality; 
(b) Review an9 evaluate those needs in order of priority; 
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( c) Recommend to the municipal council strategies, programs and 
services to address priority needs through the integrated development plan, and the 
estimates of revenue and expenditure, taking into account any applicable national and 
provincial development plans; 
This act replaces Ordinance 15 of 1985, Cape Land Use Planning, Section 46 (1) in so 
far as it relates to sections 23 (1) and 39 (2) 
24(1) In order to give effect to the general objectives of integrated environmental 
management laid out in this chapter, the potential impact on -
a) the environment 
b) Socio economic conditions 
c) The cultural heritage 
of activities that require authorization or permission by law and which may 
significantly affect the environment, must be considered , investigated and assessed 
prior to their implementation and reported to the organ of state charged by law with 
authorizing permitting or otherwise allowing the implementation of the activity. This 
is also effective for the coastal zone although it is not specifically mentioned in the 
act. 
2) The Minister may with the concurrence of the MEC. 
a) identify activities, which may not be commenced without prior authorization from 
the Minister or MEC. V 
b) identify geographical areas in which specified activities may not be commenced 
without prior authorization from the Minister and specify such activities. 
( c )make regulations in accordance with subsections (3) and ( 4) in respect of such 
authorizations; 
( d) identify existing authorized and permitted activities which must be considered, 
assessed, evaluated and reported on; and 
prepare compilations of information and maps that specify the attributes of the 
environment in particular geographical areas, including the sensitivity, extent, 
interrelationship and significance of such attributes which must be taken into account 
by every organ of state charged by law with authorizing, permitting or otherwise 
allowing the implementation of a new activity, or with considering, assessing and 
evaluating an existing activity: 
4 APPLICATION OF PLANNING LEGISLATION TO MUIZENBERG 
PELICAN PARK GROWTH MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
An Explanation of the study area is necessary for a greater understanding of the plans 
governing it. Muizenberg Pelican Park growth management strategy covers an area 
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that stretches along the coastline from the Strandfontein Road that runs between 
Phillipi and Pelican Park and Muizenberg. (see figure 1) It incorporates two 
catchment areas namely Sandvlei catchment that inc.ludes the Langevlei and Keysers 
River canals as well as the Westlake wetlands and river. The other catchment area is 
Zeekoevlei of which the Lotus canals that run from the Cape Flats drain into the larger 
Zeekoevlei water body. 
Most urbanization in Cape Town has taken place in the catchment area of the Sand, 
Zeekoe, Salt , Black and Kuilsriver catchment areas. The remaining areas of Cape 
Town are dominated by agriculture and mountains.6 
95% of the informal housing populations are located in the False Bay Catchment area, 
which runs into the Zeekoevlei catchment system. 
6 AJR Quick:: Urban Growth in Metropolitan Cape Town: implications for inland and coastal 
waters: Town and Regional Planning: No 35 September 1993: pg 3 
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FIGURE 1: STUDY AREA 
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Virtually the entire metropolitan coastline is utilized for recreation. There are only 
four inland water bodies that are used for water contact recreation these include 
Sandvlei and Zeekoevlei. 
This paper describes the study area and its problems in geographical order from east to 
west in order to illustrate how different land uses and their location can create disputes 
or problems in a coastal planning area. 
4.1 Pelican Park 
The residential area of Pelican Park ·wm:cil was originally built as a former House of 
Representatives Indian settlement in terms of the Pelican Park Structure Plan (1977). 
This structure plan was proclaimed in terms of the old "Townships-Ordinance", 1934 
(Ordinance 33 of 1934 (Cape) (Figure 2). Of this structure plan phases 1 to 3 have 
already been built. Phases 4, 5 and 6 are the subject of a Provincial Housing Board 
Subsidized scheme. Phases 7 and 8 are proposed on a sensitive dune area that has been 
identified by an independent environmental consultant as containing 5 red data book 
species. That is species that are rare and endangered following internationally set 
criteria; and in this case found nowhere else in the world. Although the Structure Plan 
was produced in terms of the Ordinance 33 of 34 which has been repealed by the Land 
Use Planning Act 15 of 1985,and the Structure Plan is not valid any longer it has not 
yet been replaced by a new Structure Plan in terms of the Ordinance. Therefore in the 
absence of anything else , it provides guidance to the Local Authority on development 
in that area 
As noted previously, the Land Use Planning Ordinance makes provision for the 
creation of structure plans the purpose of which is : 
"To lay down guidelines for the future spatial planning development of the area to 
which it relates (including urban renewal, urban design or the preparation of 
development plans) in such a way as will most effectively promote the order of the 
area as well as the general welfare of the community concerned." 
The refusal of an application in terms of a structure plan, shall be solely on the basis of 
a lack of desirability of the contemplated utilization of land concerned or , .. regard 
shall be had, in considering relevant particulars, to only the safety and welfare of 
the members of the community concerned, the preservation of the natural and 
developed environment concerned or the effect of the application on existing rights 
concerned 
However, this act has no specific reference to the coastal zone or the protection thereof 
and there is no specific regulation aimed at protection of the coastal area. Where the 
safety and welfare of the members of the community conflict with the preservation of 
the natural and developed environment, no specific remedy is offered. 
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As the Structure Plan is over twenty years old, its relevance to current problems and 
issues is questionable, particularly with regard to environmental issues. It does not 
confer rights on the land , but it is supposed to help the Local Authority to guide 
development in the area. 
The part of the Land Use Planning Ordinance that allocates rights to land 
in terms of use is the zoning map.(see figure 3) 
The land is currently zoned as Rural in terms of the zoning scheme. This implies that 
the owner of the land cannot develop the land for housing as intended. It is first 
necessary to obtain a rezoning to Single or General Residential. 
A rezoning from one form of zoning to another usually of a higher order can be 
permitted in terms of section: 
17(1) An owner of land may apply in writing to the town clerk or secretary concerned 
as the case may be , for a rezoning of the land under section 16 
2)The town clerk shall 
a) cause such application to be advertised 
b) where objections against the said applications are received, submit them to the 
said owners for comment; 
c) Obtain the relevant comment of any person of the council of the council and 
furnish the director with a copy thereof 
22 (1) No application for subdivision involving a change of zoning shall be 
considered unless the land concerned has been zoned in a manner permitting of 
subdivision (subdivisional area) 
If the new zoning is not exercised within two years of approval it will lapse and revert 
to the previous zoning. 
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However in terms of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 107 1998 
~~Sensitive, vulnerable, highly dynamic or stressed ecosystems, such as coastal shores, 
estuaries, wetlands, and similar systems require specific attention in management and 
planning procedures, especially where they are subject to significant human resource 
✓, 
usage and development pressure. I' 
The regulations of NEMA Volume 1 provide a list of activities and environments tha! 
should be subject to an environmental impact assessment. 
Those relevant to the study area include: 
✓ The establishment of townships 
✓ Subdivisions 
✓ Rezoning 
Within the list of environments, the following are applicable: 
• Sites of conservation significance 
• Dunes 
• Landscapes 
• Biotic assemblages 
• Habitat of Red Data species 
• Aquifers and aquifer recharge areas 
• Bird migration sites 
• Areas with a high natural water table 
In terms of these criteria, the rezoning of this land to residential will first involve an 
Environmental Impact Assessment as the land in question complies with most of the 
above criteria. This is the only means of control in this regard. The Environmental 
Impact Assessments have been assessed by Cape Nature Conservation until now. 
However, there is a problem with capacity in this regard and many developers can 
apply for an exemption from an EIA if it is warranted by Cape Nature Conservation. 
The application for rezoning is then assessed directly by the Provincial Administration 
of the Western Cape. 
However, in January 2000, a new planning act will come into effect. The Western 
Cape Planning and Development Act 7 of 1999. The New act makes provision for 
accelerated development. 
In terms of Chapter 3 , land can be made urgently available for subsidized housing 
where human need , the restitution of land rights so require. The process for making 
land available is quicker than normally required . The municipality identifies the land 
for development, it is then advertised in the prescribed manner . The municipality 
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may ask that any legislative restriction or legal provision be removed and the 
Provincial minister can do so by a notice in the Government Gazette 
In terms of section 41 ( 4) Settlement on land allocated in terms of subsection ( 1) shall 
take place only after a surveyor with a view to preparation of the general plan has 
been approved or provisionally approved. 
A land unit may be allocated with or without the payment of compensation as the 
owner may determine. 
This has environmental implications in that the EIA r~gulation provisions can b_e 
removed in terms of this act. 
In a situation like Pelican Park where the land has historically been earmarked for 
subsidized housing and in anticipation thereof there is already squatting on part of the 
land , the application of this legislation will be destructive to the coastal environment. 
4.2 Zeekoevlei 
Simultaneously the land adjacent to Pelican Park comprises the Zeekoevlei 
Recreational area, which is currently in the process of being proclaimed as a Local 
Authority Nature Reserve in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 
1989(Part 3 section 16(1). This application has been advertised for comment to the 
public, has passed approval at local council level and is currently being processed by 
Provincial Government. This is not the only method that the Local Authority could 
have followed in order to provide protective status to the area. 
Although the Environmental Conservation Act (73 of 1989) has been replaced by the 
National Environmental management act, the following sections have not been 
repealed, these are all methods of controlling growth and I_Jrotecting environmentally 
sensitive areas: 
Part iii 
Protection of the natural environment 
16. 1) A competent authority may by notice in the Official gazette concerned declare 
any area defined by him, to be a protected natural environment and may allocate a 
name to such area. Provided that such protected natural environment may only be 
declared-
a) if in the opinion of the competent authority there are adequate grounds to presume 
that the declaration will substantially promote the preservation of specific ecological 
processes, natural systems, natural beauty or species of indigenous wildlife or the 
preservation of biotic diversity in general; 
In order to achieve the general policy and object of the act, the Administrator may 
issue directions relating to any land or water in a protected natural environment. 
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18). Special nature reserves-
]) The Minister may by notice in the Gazette declare any area defined by him and 
situated in the republic of South Africa, including the territorial waters as defined in 
section 4 ofThe Maritime Zones Act 1994(15/1994) to be a special nature reserve. 
The declaration of a special nature reserve may not be withdrawn or its boundaries 
altered except by resolution of parliament. The minister may assign the control of a 
special nature reserve to any local authority or government institution; the governing 
authority strictly controls Entry into a special nature reserve. 
The third category of protected environment in terms of the Environmentar 
Conservation Act section 23 is limited development areas-
]) A competent authority may by notice in the official gazette declare any area defined 
by him or her, as a limited development area. 
2) No person shall undertake in a limited development area any development or 
activity prohibited by the competent authority by notice in the official gazette, or cause 
such development or activity to be undertaken unless he or she has on application 
been authorized thereto by the competent m,thority. 
In considering an application for this authorization, the Minister of Local Authority 
may request the submission of a report concerning the influence of an activity on the 
environment. 
There are other options open to the Municipality to create a protected natural 
environment or park. 
Protected areas under international instruments 
The Minister can make provisions in terms of an international treaty or agreement 
relating to the protection of the environment which has been entered into or been 
ratified on behalf of the government of South Africa7• These regulations may relate 
for example to wetland areas or world heritage sites. In this case south of both 
Rondevlei and Zeekoevlei is the Cape Town Municipal Sewerage Treatment works. 
This area is an important habitat for many bird species and has been proclaimed as a 
RAMSAR site. In terms of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance Especially as Waterfowl habitats ( 1971) 
If the area was to be proclaimed as a protected natural environment by the Minister, 
any person that contravenes the provisions is guilty of an offence. 
National Parks Act (57 of 1976) 
Another method of protection of a natural environment is to declare an area a 
National Park in terms of the National Parks Act. 
The object of a park is defined in section 4 of the act as: 
7 Fuggle and Rabie : page 703 
Section 23 (1 ), (2) and (3) of act. 
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"the establishment, preservation and study therein of wild animals, marine and plant 
life and objects of geological, archeological, historical, ethnological, oceanographic, 
educational and other scientific interests and objects relating to the said life or the 
first-mentioned objects or to events in or the history of the park, in such a manner that 
the area which constitutes the park shall, as far as may be and for the benefit and 
enjoyment of visitors, be retained in its natural state. 
Section 5 of the act makes provision for a National Parks Board. 
(2) The board may within a park-
(a) subject to any conditions which may be determined by the Minister of Minerals 
and Energy and the Minister 0-f Public Works in respect of land declared to be a park 
or to be part of a park under section 2A (I) and section 2B (]); and 
(b) subject to the provisions of any agreement entered into in respect of land declared 
to be a park under section 2B (I) (b)-
i)construct and erect such roads, bridges, buildings, dams, fences, breakwaters, 
seawalls, boathouses, landing stages, mooring places, swimming pools, 
oceanariums and underwater tunnels and carry out such other works as it may 
consider necessary for the control, management or maintenance of the park; 
(ii) take such steps as will ensure the security of visitors, the animal and plant 
life in the park, and the preservation of the park and the animals and vegetation 
therein in a natural state; 
In terms of schedule 1 (b) , Scheduled parks are enumerated and their areas defined 
in schedule one of the act. The Minister of Environmental Affairs is authorized to 
declare by notice in the Government Gazette any other area to be a National Park. 
In terms of the act state land can be used for the establishment of a park. Alternatively 
land can be purchased from private owners for the purpose of establishing a park. 
4.3 Rondevlei Nature Area 
Abutting Zeekoevlei is the Rondevlei Local Authority Nature Reserve, which was 
proclaimed as such in 1952 . This park contains 16 red data species as well as several 
examples of indigenous flora and fauna including Cape Otters and Hippopotamus and 
therefore qualified as a Local Authority Nature Reserve in that "there (were) adequate 
grounds to presume that the declaration (would) substantially promote the 
preservation of specific ecological processes, natural systems, natural beauty or 
species of indigenous wildlife or the preservation of biotic diversity in general. 8 
8 16(1) Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989 
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4.4 Zeekoevlei Township 
Between Rondevlei and Zeekoevlei is the residential suburb of Zeekoevlei. Part of 
this township is undeveloped and it is the wish of the Local authority that this area be 
incorporated into Rondevlei reserve. To do so the land will have to be rezoned from 
single residential to nature area zoning in terms of the Land Use Planning ordinance 
15 of 1985. In order to get the owner of the township land to accede to this proposal, a 
land exchange is being negotiated. The land to be exchanged is currently zoned 
Educational and this will also have to be rezoned to Single Residential in order that the 
owner of the land should have the same rights in terms of the zoning that he had 
before. 
The establishment of Zeekoevlei Township in the first place is a contentious issue. 
The Township was established in a wetland area and this would have been considered 
to be under the one in fifty year floodline. In terms of the new National Water Act 
(36 of 1998) this development would probably not have been allowed to commence. 
The vlei also has experienced seasonal occurrences of blue green algae which is toxic 
to humans. The sewerage system, which is based on a system of septic tanks, 
periodically gets flooded and soaks into the vlei causing health hazards. 
Part 3 of the National Water Act requires certain information relating to floods, 
droughts and potential risks to be made available to the public. Township layout plans 
must indicate a specific floodline. Water management institutions must use the most 
appropriate means to inform the public about anticipated floods, droughts or risks 
posed by water quality, the failure of any dam or any other waterworks or any other 
related matter. The Minister may establish early warning systems to anticipate such 
events. 
• Floodlines on plans for establishment of townships 
For the purposes of ensuring that all persons who might be affected have access to 
information regarding potential flood hazards, no person may establish a township 
unless the layout plan shows, in a form acceptable to the local authority concerned, 
lines indicating the maximum level likely to be reached by floodwaters on average 
once in every 100 years. 
o Duty to make information available to public 
A water management institution must, at its own expense, make information at its 
disposal available to the public in an appropriate manner, in respect of-
(a) a flood which has occurred or which is likely to occur; 
(b) a drought which has occurred or which is likely to occur; 
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( c) a waterwork which might fail or has failed, if the failure might 
endanger life or property; 
(d) any risk posed by any dam; 
(e) levels likely to be reached by floodwaters from time to time; 
(f) any risk posed by the quality of any water to life, health or 
property; and 
(g) any matter connected with water or water resources, which the 
public needs to know. 
4.5 False Bay Coastal Park 
There is currently a proposal to create a False Bay Coastal Park that will incorporate 
Zeekoevlei, Rondevlei, the Sewerage works and phases 7 and 8 of Pelican Park. It 
will also incorporate the area from the high water mark along the coast from the 
development at Capricorn Science Park and create a link with Wolfgat Nature 
Reserve thus creating a continuous natural area along the coast. An attempt was made 
to proclaim the park as a National park in terms of the National Parks Act, however it 
was rejected by the National Parks Board of South Africa on the grounds that it did 
not constitute a natural undisturbed habitat of conservation importance. 
4.6 Baden Powell Drive 
Running right through the coastal link of the park and also along a natural foredune 1s 
Baden Powell Drive. This road was built with the authority of the Provincial Roads 
Engineer in terms of the overall transport planning at the time. No Environmental 
Impact Assessment was necessary at the time when this road was built. 
There is a plan to move a. this road higher up away from the foredune and to use a 
piece of the Municipal sewerage facility for this purpose. The road reserve will have 
to be deproclaimed as Road Reserve and rezoned as Nature Area. Similarly the new 
piece of road will have to advertised in the government gazette and advertised as road 
reserve in terms of LUPO. 
4.7 Capricorn Science Park 
Adjacent to the False Bay Coastal Park is the Capricorn Science Park. Which was 
hailed as the economic savior of an area characterized by high unemployment rates 
and huge socio economic problems. This park is an industrial area . The land on 
which it is located originally belonged to the South Peninsula Municipality and was 
zoned Public Open Space. To have this land rezoned in terms of the Land Use Planing 
Ordinance, an Environmental Impact Assessment was needed in tenns of the 
Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989. The environmental impact assessment 
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showed that part of the site contained dwarf fynbos, which is an extremely rare form 
of flora found only in this area of the Cape Flats coastal zone. The site also revealed 
archaeological middens and remains of a historical fishing village. The development 
of the site had to be planned around these natural phenomenon. An agreement was 
reached with the developer of the park and the Local Authority Parks Branch that the 
developer would cordon off and manage the dwarf fynbos area. However, the take up 
on Capricorn has been slow due to various factors and most of the site is empty. The 
developers have not been managing the fynbos colony and it is in imminent danger. 
The management of the fynbos reserve was one of the conditions of the rezoning. 
However, the zoning rights have already been conferred, the title has been transferred 
and the Municipality has little recourse other than with a civil court. 
The discovery of the archaeological middens was governed by the National 
Monuments Act (28 of 1969.) 
In terms of this act, Section 12 (a) No person shall destroy, damage, excavate, alter, 
remove from its original site or export from the republic: 
d) any implement, ornament, or structure known or commonly believed to have used 
or erected by people in paragraphs (b) or (c); or 
e) the anthropological or archaeological contents of graves, caves and rockshelters, 
middens, shell mounds, or other sites used by such people; or 
j) any historical site, archaeological or palaeontological finds, material or object 
except under the authority of an in accordance with a permit issued under this section. 
A permit was obtained by the developers in terms of this act. However, in terms of the 
new Draft Heritage Bill 34b (1998) 
Section 31 ( 1) of the act states that a planning authority must at the time of revision of a 
town and regional planning scheme, or the compilation or revision of a spatial plan, or at 
the initiative of the provincial heritage resources authority where in the opinion of the 
provincial heritage resources authority the need exists, investigate the need for the 
designation of heritage areas to protect any place of environmental or cultural interest. 
31 (7) A local authority must provide for the protection of a heritage area through the 
provisions of its town planning scheme or by laws under this act. 
54) A local authority may with the approval of the Provincial heritage resources authority 
make by laws (a) regulating the admission of the public to any place protected under this 
act to which the public is allowed access and which is under its control and the fees 
payable for such admission. 
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3( 1) national estate includes: 
a) Places or buildings, structures and equipment of cultural significance, 
b) Places to which oral traditions are attached or which are associated with living 
heritage, historical settlements and townscapes, 
c) Landscapes and Natural features of cultural significance, 
d) Geological sites of cultural and scientific significance, 
e) Archaeological and palaeontological sites of cultural or historical significance. 
Included in the growth management plan for Mufzenberg Pelican Park will be 
guidelines for any future discovery of archaeological importance. 
4.8 Muizenberg- Alienation Of State Land 
Muizenberg was once an enormously popular coastal resort town with large 
recreational infrastructure In the past two decades it has seen a steady decline in 
popularity as a holiday destination with subsequent decline in property values and 
infrastructure. Current infrastructure includes a pavilion, conference hall, meeting 
rooms and a restaurant, waterslide, boat pond, children's playground and putt- putt 
coursei and large stretches of wide beach, which are safe for swimming and also 
utilized for surfing and other water sports. There are large areas of Municipal land, 
which have development potential. This land is currently zoned Public Open Space 
and mostly runs between Muizenberg and Capricorn. To develop on this land the 
Municipality will most likely form a partnership with a private developer . The land 
will have to be rezoned for whatever purpose in terms of the Land Use Planning 
Ordinance 15 of 1985 . 
The municipality may also include the land between the current pavilion and the 
potential recreational node that is proposed at Capricorn. There is a large amount of 
land falling just above the high water mark of the coastal area that has development 
potential. 
This land does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Seashore Act 21 of 1935 directly 
but development on this land , may affect the h'irfr.s~o~ever in terms of this act, the 
Minister may, on such conditions as he may deem expedient, let any portion of the 
sea-shore and the sea of which the State President is by section two declared to be the 
owner, for any of the following purposes: 
(a) The erection of bathing boxes or tents; 
(b) the erection of beach shelters; 
( c) the erection of tearooms and refreshment places; 
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( d) the training of horses, the holding of races (including motor car 
and motor cycle races) and the provision of places for recreation, 
amusements or displays; 
( e) the provision of landing sites for aircraft and the establishment of 
aerodromes; 
(f) the construction or improvement of wharves, piers,jetties and 
landing stages; 
(g) the construction of breakwaters, sea walls, promenades, 
embankments, esplanades, buildings or other structures; 
(h) the construction of bathing pools and enclosures; 
(i) the erection of whaling stations or fish-canning or other factories; 
G) to legalize any encroachments; 
(k) the carrying out of any work of public utility; 
(1) the laying of drainage or sewerage systems; 
(m) the laying of water pipes or cables; 
(n) the erection of boathouses; 
( o) the carrying out of any work which in the opinion of the Minister 
serves a necessary or useful purpose; 
These may well be invoked if a large recreational facility is developed that makes use 
of the safe beaches and beautiful coastline. 
There is some land that ta d belongs to SPOORNET along the coastal zone . The 
possibility remains for the possible alienation of this land for private use. In order to 
ensure that this land is as far as possible retained for the enjoyment of the general 
public it is recommended that public private partnerships be formed. Where the state 
does not lose complete control of the land , but rather becomes involved in its 
development . 
This will ensure that the seashore remains res publicae so that future generations can 
use beaches and other coastal resorts. This will comply with the act in such letting 
either is in the interests of the general publisor will not seriously affect the general 
public's enjoyment of the seashore and the sea. 
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4.9 Sandvlei catchment area and Marina Da Gama 
Zandvlei is fairly typical of the recreational waters of the South Western Cape 
Province. Located adjacent to Muizenberg on the shores of False Bay. The vlei, 
originally an inlet, has developed as a result of human manipulation of the original 
estuarine system. Zandvlei is a popular recreational waterbody. Boardsailing, 
braaing, picnicking and walking through the area are some of the recreational uses 
associated with the vlei. Most of Zandvlei is zoned as public open space and is owned 
by the South Peninsula Municipality. The northern tip of the area has been proclaimed 
as a bird sanctuary and is classified as a Local Authority Nature Reserve in terms of 
the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1900. Extensive modification of the lake 
has taken place by the construction of a marina, dredging, bank stabilisation, water 
level regulation and the modification of the mouth and outlet channel as a result of 
- urbanisation. 
Marina Da Gama was established on the banks of Sandvlei in the late seventies. It 
consists of a medium density development set along a number of canals feeding of the 
vlei system. It is a fairly wealthy suburb, but has experienced environmental problems 
as a result of its proximity to the vlei. These include the increased presence of water 
hyacinth clogging up the vlei and making boating and other water based recreational 
activities difficult~ the outfall into the sea from the vlei causes a pollution discharge 
into False Bay because of pollutants going into the vlei as a result of urbanisation; . 
inadequate pondweed standing stock and tubeworm as well as low ambient salinities 
as salt water is prevented from entering the vlei through the man made inlet. This has 
resulted in an impoverished fish population and marine nursery function. 
Should a higher level of ambient salinity not be restored, the vlei could experience 
noxious blue - green algae blooms, which will further impair the already disturbed 
sensitivity of the ecosystem. (Figure 4) 
Due to the often negative influences of development on a lake region, the vlei system 
is under constant management and care. This is currently undertaken by the South 
Peninsula Municipality. There was an option, however, for the management of the 
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Signage warning of dangerous blue-green algal blooms is up at all times of the year although 
the algae is periodic. 
Lake Areas Development Act 39 of 1975 
In terms of this act, the Minister can: 
Declare any land comprising or adjoining a natural lake or a river or any part thereof 
which is within the immediate vicinity of a tidal lagoon or a tidal river, to be a lake 
area under a name to be assigned to it in that notice. 
The minister can also declare a lake Areas Development Board whose powers include 
the ability to: 
a) subdivide, layout, plan or develop such state land 
b) sell , let hypothecate or otherwise encumber such state land or any part thereof or 
exchange it for private land within any lake area, whether before or after development. 
d) enter into any contracts with the state including the SAR and harbors 
Administration, a local authority or any other body or persons for the performance of 
any act which the board is empowered to perform. 
As the Sandvlei catchment area needs constant management and monitoring , the 
CMC Catchment Management Committee decided to undertake it as a special project 
in terms of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
National Water Act (36 of 1998) 
The Water Act makes provisions for the establishment of Catchment management 
strategies for all important water catchment areas : 
A catchment management strategy must-
(a) take into account the class of water resources and resource quality objectives 
contemplated in Chapter 3, the requirements of the Reserve and, where applicable, 
international obligations; 
(b) not be in conflict with the national water resource strategy; 
(c) set out the strategies, objectives, plans, guidelines and procedures of the 
catchment management agency for the protection, use, development, conservation, 
management and control of water resources within its water management area; 
(d) take into account the geology, demography, land use, climate, vegetation and 
waterworks within its water management area; 
(e) contain water allocation plans which are subject to section 23, and which must set 
out principles for allocating water, taking into account the factors mentioned in section 
27 (l); 
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(f) take account of any relevant national or regional plans prepared in terms of any other 
law, including any development plan adopted in terms of the Water Services Act, 1997 
(Act 108 of 1997); 
5 SPATIAL PLANS GUIDING DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA 
There are numerous structure plans, guide plans and strategic development 
frameworks that guide development in this area . These are sometimes conflicting and 
often have specific agendas. In terms of the new Western Cape Planning and 
Development Act (7 of 1999). All future plans will have to fit in with the principles 
outlined in the Spatial Development Framework. However at the moment there are a 
· bewildering amount of plans and often their role as guides to development can 
overlook certain aspects of an area such as the environment. The following plans give 
an indication of different levels of planning that has taken place in the study area. 
(Figure 5) 
5 .1 Metropolitan plans 
Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (April 1998) This is a Metropolitan-
wide plan that was initiated by the Cape Metropolitan Council to guide development 
as a whole in the Metropolitan area. 
Principles of the MSDf include the management of all urban resources to ensure 
sustainability in utilisation .Among the CMR' s most important resources are scenic 
landscapes, natural areas, cultural, historical precincts, water, mineral deposits and 
agricultural horticultural land. These must be protected and conserved and enhanced 
as appropriate. 
The urban edge demarcation in the plan denotes areas such as wetlands, aquifers, high 
water table areas, large dams, coastal zones, vleis and river corridors as elements that 
should be excluded from urban development. Water planning and management 
incorporates many issues such a the protection and supply of water resources, flood 
protection and water quality. The MSDF addresses these issues only insofar as they 
are affected by the location of the built environment. E.g. flooding can result from 
inappropriate development therefore land use policies have a vital role to play in 
overall water planing. 
Policy 42 
The CMC and WDC will look to local planning authorities to generally promote and 
support initiative which seek to conserve or restore or enhance the natural elements of 
river/vlei corridors, coastal margins and other waterside areas or which encourage 
appropriate water based and waterside recreation. 
The Metropolitan Spatial development Framework is a statutory document much like a structure plan. It 
neither confers nor takes away rights but guides development. 
The second level of plan is one that is provided at sub regional level. 
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5.2 Regional plans 
SOUTHERN PENINSULA SUB REGIONAL PLAN (SEPTEMBER 1988) 
The study area covers the rural area of the mountain chain and part of the coastal region and makes the 
following recommendations: 
• No development should occur below the I :50 year floodline, on the foredune, or below the high water 
mark. 
• Coastal developments should be contained to nodes to prevent urban sprawl and to maintain the 
pristine nature of the natural environment. 
Conservation Worthy Areas 
The sub regional plan divides the natural areas into: 
• Primary Natural Areas - these areas have a high priority conservation status and conservation Related 
Areas~which have limited development potential. 
At one level beneath a sub regional plan but still on a sub regional basis the Metropolitan South East 
Plan differs from the sub-regional plan in that it looks at more detailed urban design of the area. 
False Bay Coastal Policy Statement 
(City Of Cape Town-'90 
This plan was also formulated at a regional scale and covers more than the defined study area. 
Principles of the plan include the fact that: 
• False Bay is a valuable recreation and tourism resource 
• Recreation pressure is evident and expected to increase 
The plan describes some principles to be followed in the planning of this area. These include the 
following recommendations: 
Development is to be focused at coastal nodes such as Strandfontein and Muizenberg. 
Physical access to the coast is to be optimized 
Metropolitan South East Plan ( CMC : 1990) 
The purpose of the plan was to provide an institutional and spatial framework for future development of 
this area South East of the Cape Metropolitan Area. 
Aims of the plan: 
• Achieve spatial and social integration 
• Enhance and conserve natural assets 
• Create multi-functional activity centers 
• Provide good linkages and access 
• Create conditions for effective services delivery 
Relevant areas covered 
• Strandfontein, Pelican Park, False Bay coastline 
Context of this plan 
• Embrace the principles and objectives of the RDP, tries to meet the challenges facing society 
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• Factors relating to lower levels of income accessibility, and environmental quality 
• Differences in local economic, social, and environmental 
• Heavy inconsistencies in income 
Geo-physical and social environment 
• Bounded by False Bay coastline 
• Coastal dunes to the south 
• Characterized by sandy plains 
• Wide spread unemployment with concomitant social ills 
Phillipi horticultural area 
• Pockets of industrial and commercial activity along Lansdowne and Strandfontein roads. 
• Major impact on the viability of fanning operations (theft and insecurity), area is exposed to passing 
traffic 
History and metropolitan role 
• False bay considered an undeveloped coastline 
• Baden Powell drive important for access (also a scenic route, potential tourist experience) 
• Distance from nearby Muizenberg caused pressure for development of resorts, (Strandfontein, Mnandi, 
Monwabisi) 
Problems 
• Catchment areas of rivers discharging into the bay. 
Decline of the natural environment along the coast 
At the local level some more detailed plans have been formulated such as The Rondevlei Nature 
Reserve Management Plan : 
5.3 Local Plans 
Rondevlei Nature Reserve Management Plan(WCRSC-October 87) 
The objectives are summarised as follows: 
• Conserve and protect the integrated eco-system : FLORAL COMMUNITIES 
indigenous fauna population 
especially birds) 
• 
manipulation and management of habitats 
The reserve will therefore provide 
The reserve is divided into two zones: 
- Zone 1 
Special conservation Area therefore : 
- limited development 
- walking trails 
- access roads 
- tracks and paths 
- Zone 2 
Public Utilization Area therefore : 
natural features and habitats 
extension of knowledge 
public experience opportunities 
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According to Boelaert-Suominen and Cullinan(l 994)9 , "in the coastal zone one 
frequently finds intense and diverse human activity coinciding with ecosystems which 
are highly productive , biologically diverse, vulnerable and often unique. These areas 
have a high economic, social and environmental value. " 
~The management and regulatory planning regime found in a highly dynamic natural 
coastal system do not take into account the integrated nature of natural systems and 
different sectors of activity on the coast are regulated separately. This sectoral 
approach is ineffective in providing efficient protection of the coastline.'' <!I 
Authority for land use planning and zoning rests with the local authorities. In most 
overseas examples of zoning on the coast, intervention by a central authority has been 
necessary to accommodate new principles and priorities. 
Where laws on urbanization are administered locally, they may not guarantee long 
term protection of the coast, since they are subject to the will of local politicians. 
Constraints on development set by the national Government may not be well received 
in local communities as local authorities tend to favor uses on the coast that generate 
income locally. 
9 Legal and Institutional Aspects of Integrated Coastal Area Management in National legislation : 
Boalert- Suominen .S and Cullinan C: Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations: 
Rome: December: 1994.Page 2 
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IS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SUFFICIENTLY DYNAMIC TO COPE WITH 
MOVING BOUNDARIES IN THE COASTAL ZONE? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.* 
Prepared for: Professor J. Glazewski 
Prepared by: Nicholas Smith (SMTNIC006) 
31 May 1999 
Introduction 
This essay examines various aspects of our law relevant to the movement of boundaries 
in the coastal zone. Principally, it considers the question of what these boundaries are 
and how they are defined from a private and a public law perspective. In the context of 
public law I aim to highlight present difficulties with ascertaining which organs of state 
administer the coastal zone and where and how their jurisdiction is determined. 
The examination referred to above involves an analysis of the reception into our law of 
Roman law and Roman Dutch legal principles that governed the boundaries of the sea 
and the sea-shore and that have been introduced in South African law. I also examine the 
infusion of certain English law precepts, and the eventual codification of Roman Dutch 
common law principles in the Sea-Shore Act. 1 
In order to ascertain how South African legal principles relating to the coastal zone have 
evolved and to properly investigate the part-codified, part common law approach in our 
jurisprudence, I have undertaken a chronological examination of relevant case law, 
distilling those principles that plot the development in our law. Some of the common law 
principles have been carefully refashioned by South African judges to better apply to the 
particular natural features of this country. Other principles were adopted in our law 
without a similar precautionary approach and have accordingly been revisited in later 
case law, where their application has been re-assessed. 
The concluding aim of this paper is to consider briefly the degree to which the present 
definitions regulating boundaries in the coastal zone will continue to be appropriate in the 
light of changing policies and a shift in mindset regarding integrated coastal zone 
management.2 The- Coastal Management Policy Programme has recently produced a 
Draft White Paper for sustainable coastal development in South Africa (the policy).3 This 
is the most recent development in a process that will hopefully culminate in the 
enactment of a coastal management statute that will meet the needs and concerns 
identified during the extensive participation process that preceded the publication of the 
Draft White Paper. 
It is my submission that the process of drafting a coastal management statute must 
involve a critical analysis of traditional legal definitions as presently used in the coastal 
zone. Particularly as regards public law, the new statute should embody a departure from 
the rigid "administrative line" approach to coastal zone management that has 
characterised our law in the past. This approach must in particular address these 
administrative line demarcations in as far as they create difficulties with enforcement in, 
1 Act21 of 1935. 
2 Presently embodied in the coastal Policy Green Paper (September 1998). A White Paper will be prepared 
before the 1999 national elections but policy approval and the legislative process that will culminate in a 
new statute will only begin after the elections (per B. Glavovic). 
3 Dated March 1999. 
* I am indebted to Professor Jan Glazewski for his advice and encouragement in assisting with the draft of 
this paper. Any errors or omissions in the paper are mine alone. 
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and administration of, different areas in the coastal zone by the host of different public 
authorities charged with protecting the (as presently defined) discrete parts of it. 
While it is accepted that clear and consistent principles must be applied to ensure 
certainty from a private and a public law perspective as to where specific areas within the 
coastal zone "begin" and "end" (and particularly to determine for the sake of certainty 
and consistency, the boundary between the sea-shore and privately owned land), the 
coastal zone must be protected holistically from an environmental perspective. This 
cannot be done by utilising a whole range of different public authorities whose 
jurisdiction is imposed without regard for the dynamism of the zone as a whole. 
It is therefore instructive that for the purpose of the policy, coastal boundaries are seen to 
extend "as far landwards, and as far seawards, as is necessary for effective coastal 
management". 4 
The position in Roman and Roman Dutch law 
The public character of the sea and the sea-shore originates in Roman law where this area 
was classified as res omnium communes. This meant that it was owned by no one and . 
was incapable of being privately owned. In Roman Dutch law the area was classified as 
res publica, meaning that the feudal lords owned it, not in a private capacity but rather in 
their capacity as custodians for the people. 5 
The principle that the sea and sea-shore are open to the public has been eroded over 
history. As evidenced by the case law discussed below, there are occasions where the 
. public has been denied access to the sea-shore by landowners whose land abuts the high-
water mark. These landowners excluded people from crossing their land to reach the sea 
'and sea-:shore by asserting private property rights. In order to- consider the question 
whether South African environmental laws are sufficiently dynamic to cope with moving 
boundaries it is appropriate to start by investigating the case law that has evolved the 
principles for determining where boundaries in the coastal zone actually are. 
The case law relating to moving boundaries. 
I. Horne v S(,:.uben6 
This Privy Council decision was an appeal against a judgment of the Cape of Good Hope 
Supreme Court, declaring the boundaries of respondents' farm. The respondents 
(plaintiffs in the court a quo) had succeeded in an action in the Supreme Court in 1900, in 
which they had asked the court to declare Q..ertain boundaries on their property as 
surveyed by a surveyor whom they had consulted. These boundaries were in substitution 
for boundaries that had previously demarcated the farm when they purchased it. The 
4 Page 13 of the policy. 
5 Towards a Coastal Zone Management Act for South Africa" fon Glazewski South African Journal of 
. Environmental Law and Policy at page 11. 
6 1902 AC 454 (l 9SC3 l 7). 
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controversy related to two parts only of the boundary declared by respondents' surveyors. 
Only one of these is of interest from the perspective of formulating principles for the 
determination of boundaries in the coastal zone. 
The facts were that respondents were "in right of the original grant on perpetual quitrent, 
made in 1843" over the disputed property. 7 Prior to 1843 the farm had been held on loan 
lease, and the grant of quitrent was made under a system established by the Proclamation 
of 6 August 1813 entitled "Conversion of Loan Places to Perpetual Quitrent". The 
property (2520 morgen in extent) as described in the grant, extended "west to the sea-
shore ....... and north to the Steenbras river, as will further appear by the diagram framed 
by the surveyor". Respondents surveyed the farm on acquisition and thereafter made 
application to the Surveyor-General for an amended title and diagram in accordance with 
the diagram, which embodied their surveyor's survey (the 1899 survey). 
The matter came to the Court a quo by summons, respondents claiming firstly, an order 
declaring the boundary in accordance with the 1899 survey and secondly, an order for an 
amended title showing the boundary accordingly. The Supreme Court decided the matter 
in the respondents (as plaintiffs) favour. 
The Surveyor-General had two objections to accepting the 1899 survey and the court a 
quo 's decision was appealed to the Privy Council by his office. The first of the two 
disputed points related to the whole of the western boundary (the one that ran "west to the 
sea-shore"). The 1899 survey drew a line at the high-water mark, or rather, as that mark 
was at the top of some rocks on the sea-shore and not nearer the sea than the high-water 
mark. There was therefore no claim to the foreshore by the respondents. The Privy 
Council's view was that on the face of it, the respondents' claim was in exact accordance 
with the words of the grant extending "west to the sea-shore".8 
Before dealing with the points of controversy between the parties, the Privy Council 
referred to "one matter which bears equally upon both (parties) and tells in favour of the 
respondents", on the facts. 9 The Privy Council observed that if the 1899 survey was 
accepted by it, then far from exceeding the extent of the land granted, respondents would 
have considerably less. 10 If, however, the appellants' line was accepted (and the 
appellant contended in the first instance that the applicable line was to be found on the 
diagram referred to in the title under which the land was granted in 1843 (the 1843 line), 
then the farm would only be reduced by approximately 25 morgen. For purposes of 
analysing the judgment "considerably less" must mean considerably less than 25 morgen. 
There is no suggestion, therefore, that the respondents were trying to claim that the 
property was any larger in extent, or that the respondents would gain a large tract of land 
from the state, if successful. 
7 Page 456. 
8 Page 319. 
9 Page 318 
10 Ibid. 
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In examining the appellants' contention regarding the 1843 line, the Privy Council 
observed that the "question is thus raised what is the degree of authority of (the) diagram 
in relation to the text of the grant in which it is mentioned". The words in the grant that 
introduced the diagram are " .... as will further appear by the diagram framed by the 
surveyor". As a matter of construction, the Privy Council held that this is merely an 
appeal to the diagram for further elucidation of the text and not a subordination of the text 
to the diagram. If in a matter not requiring elucidation the diagram is repugnant to the 
text this merely shows that the diagram is not exact and affords only a rough delineation 
of the farm. This is, according to the Privy Council, "abundantly proved by other 
circumstances" in this matter. 11 
The Privy Council cites one of these other circumstances as an example. It pertains to 
that portion of the farm bounded by the Steenbras River. The boundary is said in the title 
to be that river. Geographically, the course of the river is perfectly unmistakable. The 
diagram however ignored the river's course and made the northern boundary a straight 
line inland from a rock on the sea-shore considerably to the south of the river (which is 
clearly marked in the diagram). In the face of facts like these, the Privy Council 
remarked, it would be impossible to override the clear verbal description of the sea-shore 
merely out of respect to the diagram which, as regards the northern boundary, clearly 
fails to depict a certain and clear expression in the title. It does so by substituting a 
wholly arbitrary line for a reference on the diagram to a clearly marked natural feature 
referred to in the title. 
The Privy Council accordingly decided that the objections of the Surveyor-General on the 
western boundary failed, and that the court a quo was correct in deciding the boundary in 
the respondents' favour. 
The principle that can be distilled from Horne 's case is that when consulting the deed of 
grant, the degree of authority of a diagram in relation to the text of the grant must give 
way to that text in cases of conflict. On a matter of construction, the Privy Council found 
in this case that the diagram was repugnant to the text and therefore the description of the 
boundaries stipulated in the text of the grant prevailed. 
2. Pharo v Stephan 12 
The plaintiff in the court a quo (respondent on appeal) was the owner of a piece of land at 
Paternoster, on the Cape west coast. His land was described in a diagram attached to his 
grant as being "bounded seaward by the Atlantic Ocean". The wording in the grant itself 
was a description of a piece of land "represented and described in the diagram hereunto 
annexed". The defendant (appellant) was a fisherman in Paternoster. 
The respondent's allegation in the court a quo was that the boundary of his land extended 
down to the foreshore, to the high-water mark of medium tides. · He alleged that on 
11 Page 320. 
12 1917AD1. 
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various specified dates, appellant had brought fishing boats up onto his land and had thus 
committed trespass. He claimed one hundred pounds in damages and an interdict 
restraining Pharo from trespassing in the future. 
Pharo, as defendant, had pleaded that the seaward boundary of Stephan's land was the 
line reached by the Atlantic's highest tides. He admitted that on one occasion he had 
drawn his boats up on the plaintiffs land (that is, above the line reached by the highest 
Atlantic tides) but only in order to save them from destruction by the sea, and further, that 
this caused no damage to the plaintiff. In the alternative, Pharo pleaded that should the 
court find that his boats were on occasion drawn up onto the plaintiffs land and not on 
the sea-shore, for a period of thirty years the public had freely and uninterruptedly and as 
of right drawn up boats on the land as far as the limit reached by the Atlantic's highest 
tides, and by immemorial user (evolved from the Roman law principle of vestustas), a 
public servitude of placing boats on the land up to that limit had been established. 
The court a quo (per Buchanan J) held that the South African courts had adopted the 
ordinary average tide of the sea as the high-water mark. It held further that Stephan had 
established his right to the land claimed by him and proved trespass and Pharo's defence 
therefore failed. Buchanan J also refused Pharo's plea based on vestustas. Buchanan J 
held further that had Pharo' s trespass been confined to the occasion admitted by him, no 
damages would have been awarded but that under the circumstances, Stephan should be 
awarded damages of ten pounds and granted an interdict restraining the fisherman from 
trespassing on his property (in other words, from going beyond the ordinary line of high 
tide). 
The important question of law on appeal related to the limit of the sea-shore. It was 
common cause between the parties that "bounded seaward by the Atlantic Ocean" is 
tantamount to saying that the land is bounded by the sea-shore. The limit of the sea-shore 
therefore had to be determined. The Appellate Division pointed out that the Cape courts 
had in a number of cases laid down that the sea-shore extends as far as the high-water 
mark. 13 But in none of the reported cases had the question in issue before the Appellate 
Division (what is to be taken as the high-water mark) been raised. 
The Appellate Division found that there was no authority for Buchanan J's statement that 
South African courts had adopted the ordinary average high tide as the limit of the high-
water mark. The court then embarked on a comparative historical foray to establish first 
principles. The court found that the boundary of the shore is the line of the maximus 
fluctus and nothing short of that. A point of difficulty was the exact meaning of 
''jluctus ". The Court had to decide whether maximus fluctus was to be understood as 
meaning the highest tide in ordinary weather, or whether it meant the greatest flow of the 
sea during the most stormy season of the year. 
13 Anderson 8 SC 296. 
Struben v Colonial Government 17 SC 242. 
Colonial Government v Town Council of Cape Town 1902 SC 96. 
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As the court points out, Roman Dutch jurists do not offer much assistance. 14 As a general 
rule, they seemed to adopt the definitions in the Corpus Juris Civilis without comment. 
This led Innes CJ to surmise that the question was not as important in the law of Holland 
because of the construction and maintenance of dykes that held back the high tides. 
The Court concluded that by the use of "maximus fluctus" in Roman Dutch law the 
Roman law authorities' definitions were adopted by Roman Dutch jurists. By maximus 
fluctus (hybernus) the latter understood the high-water mark to mean the furthest line 
reached by the sea during ordinary winter storms, excluding an exceptional or abnormal 
flood. 
On the facts, the court held that there were no grounds for interfering with that part of the 
court a quo 's judgment that related to the trespass (because Pharo went well above the 
high water mark on occasion). However, the court found that the terms of the interdict 
granted a quo had to be altered to conform to the Appellate Division's decision as to the 
limit of the sea-shore. 
This case therefore adopted the position in Roman Dutch law in regard to the limit of the 
sea-shore. 
3. Surveyor-General (Cape) v Estate de Villier~ 15 
In this matter the facts concerned a grant of land issued in 1818. The title deed described 
the land granted as extending "Zuidoos tot het zeekust". A diagram of the land granted 
showed the south-east boundary as a straight line running between two beacons. 
Between that straight line and the edge of the sea was a narrow but clearly defined area. 
On these facts, as Innes CJ puts it, 16 " ...... the question at once arises whether the "hard 
line" (as he calls the line between the beacons) or the edge of the sea was the south-
eastern boundary of the property. 
Innes CJ confirmed the rule established in Horne's case that the grant sets out the 
transaction; the diagram is an elucidating picture that must yield in cases of conflict to the 
clear language of the deed. He concludes that in 1818 therefore and until 1918 the 
property extended to the farthest line of the sea in ordinary winter storms (that is, he 
defined the extent of the sea-shore by following the principles established in Pharo 's 
case). The land between that point and the low water mark constituted shore or strand. 
In analysing the historical position, Innes CJ found that in Roman law the sea-shore was 
regarded as res communis and its use (like the use of the sea itself) was public iure 
gentium. The shore could however be occupied in a sense in which the sea could not be. 
This doctrine was modified over time in Western Europe and the sea-shore came to be 
seen as res publica, which vested in the princeps. This was, according to Innes CJ, 
14-Page 7. 
15 1923 AD 588. 
16 Page 592. 
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"certainly the position under Roman Dutch law."17 In Innes' view, the dominion of the 
beach therefore vested, at the date of the judgement, in the Crown. He ~oes on to say that 
"it does not follow that the rights of the public have been extinguished" 8 but he concedes 
that the extent of these rights is a matter upon which the authorities are not entirely 
harmonious. Innes CJ then fudged the issue somewhat. He said the following: 
" .... an enquiry into the legal limits of the Crown's user of the foreshore and of the rights of the 
public thereover would not be an easy enquiry. Nor is it convenient to undertake it in connection with 
proceedings to which neither the Crown nor a member of the public, as such, is a party. For the purposes of 
this case it is fortunately unnecessary to do so. I shall assume for the present what was apparently 
recognised by the grant and was certainly not questioned during argument, namely, that the public have 
certain rights over the beach for purposes of bathing and recreation without attempting to define their 
extent."19 
The court then held that the condition in the grant that the strand should remain open to 
the public merely entitled the public to demand reasonable access across the land granted, 
and to the strand. This is fundamental erosion of the position in Roman law, where 
protection of access rights to the sea and sea-shore was extended to the public without 
conditions regarding that access. 
In my opinion, this view fails properly to take account of the rights of public access that 
were enshrined in Roman law. 
The issues of ownership of the sea and sea-shore and the determination of the high-water 
mark have been codified in our law, in the Sea-Shore Act. When enacted in 1935, the 
Sea-Shore Act vested ownership of the sea and sea-shore in the Governor General as 
representative of the reigning monarch of England (South Africa was a British Dominion 
under the 1931 Statute of Westminster at that time). Today and by virtue of sectiot'9..of 
that Act, ownership of the sea and sea-shore vests in the State President. The high-water 
mark is defined in section 1 of the Act. In the context of public access, it should be 
remembered that a problematic shortcoming in the Sea-Shore Act is its failure to provide 
for a satisfactory form of public access rights to the sea-shore from above the high-water 
mark. 
4. Union Government, Minister of Lands and Another v Lovemore 20 
The issue on appeal in this matter was whether the seaward boundary of the farm Sea 
View was the sea-shore, or whether the boundary was to be taken as the hard lines shown 
on the diagram attached to the grant of the land. The Appellate Division reaffirmed the 
principles laid down in De Villiers' case that the grant sets out the transaction and that the 
diagram merely elucidates the grant. No matter how useful the diagram, in cases of 
conflict it must yield to the clear language of the deed.21 
17 At page 593, quoting Voet and Groenwegen. 
18 Page 593. 
19 Page 595. 
20 l930AD 13. 
21 Page 19. 
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The court accordingly held that the words "situate on the sea-shore" were clear and 
unambiguous, and that the seaward boundary was the sea-shore and not the hard lines as 
shown on the diagram. 
5 v · TT • G 22 . J.\..anm v vmon overnment 
In this matter, the plaintiff claimed a declaration of rights as to the true extent of a portion 
of land that he owned on the Bluff in Durban. An inaccurate survey prepared in 1851 
(the 1851 grant) had been re-examined at the behest of the government, after which a new 
grant had been issued in 1854 (the 1854 grant). The surveyor had in the case of the 
surveys that resulted in these grants being issued, been directed to demarcate and 
maintain a Government Reserve of 150 feet from the high water mark. The stated area of 
the piece of land that was the subject matter of the dispute differed in the respective 
grants. In the 1851 grant the property was described as being bounded "north by a 
Government Reserve" and in the 1854 grant, as "bounded northward by the Bay". 
In 1893 and upon subdivision of the land, it was discovered that the boundaries indicated 
in the 1851 and the 1854 grants did not enclose the area stated. In consequence of this 
and after a re-survey, the boundaries of the land were extended into the Government 
Reserve and beacons were erected showing the new boundaries (the 1893 survey). It was 
the terms of this re-survey that resulted in litigation between the parties. 
The crisp issue in dispute in the action was the determination of the exact location of the 
northern boundary of Lot 21. 
The plaintiff's claim was that the property in dispute extended towards the bay up to the 
limits of the Government Reserve 150 feet in length, measured from high-water mark. 
The northern boundary of the lot was therefore on the plaintiffs contention, a line drawn 
150 feet above the high-water mark. Defendant claimed that the northern boundary was 
the line as measured between two beacons (that were stated to be from 994 to over 1000 
feet above the high-water mark). 
The court was faced with four issues. They were: 
1. Whether the 1851 or the 1854 grant was valid; 
2. what the correct construction of the valid grant was; 
3. whether the disputed land was originally granted as, or subsequently became, 
ager limitatus; and 
4. whether the existing beacons planted after the 1893 survey had since that date 
been so recognised that they should be accepted as correctly defining the northern 
boundary of the land. 
22 1933 NLR 68. 
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Feetham JP delivered the judgment. He said the following, having summarised the four 
issues that faced the court: 
"If, as the result of the answers given to these four questions, the decision should be in favour of 
the plaintiffs main contention that the northern boundary of the Lot is a line drawn 150 feet south 
of the high-water mark, then, in order to determine the actual position of the boundary line, it will 
become necessary to deal with the further question of the exact location of the high-water mark. "23 
After a lengthy technical foray into the facts relating to the different surveys undertaken, 
Feetham JP came to the conclusion that on the facts proved, the attack on the validity of 
the cancellation of the 1851 grant and the subsequent argument by the defendant on the 
validity of the 1854 grant failed, and that the 1854 grant was only valid grant of Lot 21. 
As regards the second question (and the construction to be put on the grant regarding the 
location of the northern boundary) Feetham JP held that on the face of it, the words of the 
grant "(b )ounded northward by the Bay" are clear and mean that the northern boundary of 
the Lot is the high water-mark of the Bay of Natal. He confirms that the words 
introducing the diagram are the same as those used in the grants considered in Horne 's 
case (supra) and Estate de Villiers (supra). Accordingly, the rule as to the relationship 
between the text and diagram stated and followed in those cases applies. He went on to 
say however, that in the case before him, the plaintiffs (who relied upon the validity of 
the 1854 grant), did not lay claim to the entire area to which a literal interpretation of the 
words "bounded northward by the Bay" would entitle them. They alleged in their 
replication that the words were not to be literally interpreted, but were to be given a 
special meaning in this case. This relates to the secondary meaning of the expression. 
The plaintiffs contended in support of their argument, that expressions like "bounded by 
the Bay" and "bounded by the Indian Ocean" were expressions in common use at that 
time "to denote that the boundary of the land thus expressed should begin at the inland 
boundary of the so-called Admiralty Reserve." 
In support of their contention that these expressions and similar expressions were in 1854 
expressions in common use in documents of title for the purpose of conveying a different 
meaning (that is, meaning "bounded by a reserve 150 feet in width extending to high-
water mark") the plaintiffs produced evidence of the existence in Natal of the long 
established State practice of retaining an Admiralty Reserve. Feetham JP concludes that: 
"It appears ....... that by 1857 the practice of retaining a 150 foot reserve on the sea coast above 
high-water mark was so well established that the surveyor general could refer to such a reserve as 
"the ordinary reserve", and speak of the width of 150 ft as "the usual width". 24 
I would submit that (in Kwazulu-Natal at least) a further interpretation has been added to 
the rule established in Horne 's case that in cases of conflict, the text of the grant hold 
sway. Proof of a secondary or special meaning that has existed through common usage 
will trump the clear wording of a grant in these circumstances. 
2
3. Page 184. 
24 Page 228. 
Feetham JP concludes then, that the plaintiffs contention that the northern boundary of 
Lot 21 was a line drawn 150 feet to the south of the high-water mark of the Bay, was 
correct. The conclusions that Feetham JP reaches on the question of the grant and its 
interpretation "necessarily imply rejection of the ager limitatus contention, advanced for 
the defendant and referred to in the third of the four questions stated at the outset of this 
judgment, so that as far as that contention purports to be based on the terms of the grant 
and is not bound up with a claim for rectification. "25 
On the third question, as to the meaning of the term ager limitatus, Feetham JP had the 
following to say. He examined the principles laid down in van Niekerk's case,26 where 
the question for decision was whether a property described as bounded by a river was to 
be presumed to extend to the middle of the riverbed. He quotes Solomon JA, who gave 
the judgment in that case as saying the following: 
"Originally 'agri limitati' in Roman law meant lands belonging to the State by right of conquest 
and granted or sold in plots. The term was extended, however, to include any piece of land 
granted by measure and actually demarcated on the ground, and it is in that sense that it is used in 
Roman Dutch law. But lands which are bounded by natural objects such as rivers, were called not 
'agri limitati' but 'agri arcifinii'. 27 
Aft~r stating that the distinction was chiefly important in respect of an addition to land 
caused by alluvion, which attaches to agri arcifinii but not agri limitati and after quoting 
a passage on the subject from Voet, Judge Solomon went on as follows: 
"Here the distinction is clearly brought out between agros limitatos, that is lands actually defined 
on the ground, and those having a natural boundary, such as a river. In the former case it is easy to 
understand that the owners would be strictly limited to the land so bounded, whether by 
embankments or posts or beacons, and that in no circumstances could those limits be exceeded; 
whereas in the case of agri arcifinii there is no such rigid exclusion. In the former case therefore, 
there was no room for the application of the presumption that land bounded by a river extended ad 
medium fl/um aquae ... 28 
In Feetham JP's view the extract that is quoted above made it clear that while in its 
stricter and original sense the term ager limitatus only applies to land which is actually 
demarcated on the ground, it may also perhaps apply to any land granted by 
measurement. He concludes that where the measurement was the dominant feature of the 
grant, the grantee should be kept strictly to the extent mentioned. This would by 
implication exclude a grantee from claiming an increase in land caused by alluvion or 
accretion. 
In respect of the position of the high-water mark, Feetham JP poses an interesting 
question. Historically, land on the Bluff was reclaimed by means of dykes and a 
succession of small banks in order to protect gardens in the area from the effects of an 
encroaching tide. The judge therefore poses the question as to where the high-water 
25 Page 231. 
26 1917 AD 359. 
27 Page 231. 
28 Pages 231 - 232. 
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mark would now be if the land had been left in its original state and no land reclamation 
work had taken place. Feetham JP quotes the rule laid down in Pharo 's case regarding 
the extent of the high-water mark and then tries to relate it to the facts of Karim 's case by 
adding a peculiar interpretation to the rule. He states as follows: 
"For the purpose of fixing high-water mark in the area now in question it is necessary, therefore, 
(l) to ascertain what is the greatest rise of the sea in the Bay above the level of low water at 
ordinary spring tides ('the datum level') under the conditions stated in the above definition, i.e. in 
ordinary seasonal storms, and (2) to fix the line which would be reached in this area by a tide 
rising to such heights if the original levels of the ground had remained unaltered."29 
Feetham JP's view was that he had to rely on data as to the rise of tide furnished by 
observation records over the past years and make due allowance for alterations in the 
original levels resulting from the erection of banks and other artificial works. He seemed 
to have no particular feeling for the dynamism of the coastal zone, and was attempting to 
peg it at a point which it would be physically impossible for the high-water mark to reach 
at the date that he was considering these issues and writing his judgement. Having 
embarked on this perilous course, Feetham JP soon abandoned it. He concluded as 
follows: 
"As it does not appear to me that we have sufficient evidence before us to enable us to fix 
definitely the line of high-water mark and the inner boundary of the l 50 feet reserve, the matter 
must, failing agreement between the parties, be made the subject of a reference under sections 2 l 
and 22 of the Arbitration Act." 30 · 
It would appear that if one carefully interprets this portion of the judgement, there is 
some authority for the proposition that if one can on the facts reasonably establish a high-
water mark that was significantly further inland than it presently is, then one may 
possibly (in Kwazulu-Natal at least) be able to found a claim for accession. 
A brief foray into the principles of accession 
Obtaining ownership by accessio can take a number of forms, depending on the nature of 
the materials (moveable or immoveable) and the circumstances in which they were 
joined. The principles which are relevant in the context of riparian land are those relating 
to alluvia, which in Roman law meant the gradual natural accretion of sediment deposited 
by a river against a riparian property. 
29 Page 248. 
30 Page 250. 
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Any claim in our law to accession or alluvion is also qualified by another rule that 
originated in Roman law. Accession in Roman law was only possible if land was ager 
non limitatus (that is, bounded by a natural boundary). The distinction between an ager 
limitatus and an ager non limitatus was this. In the case of an ager limitatus its boundary 
was fixed by a surveyor drawing an artificial straight line between beacons. In such a 
case, no further area could be added by alluvio or otherwise. In the case of an ager non 
limitatus, the boundary was a natural feature and the area of the property was accordingly 
not fixed. Accessio could occur on such a property. 
In Roman law all navigable rivers belonged to the state and were inalienable. By 
implication all non-navigable rivers were alienable. South Africa has very few navigable 
rivers and therefore the Roman law rule does not dovetail easily with the environmental 
reality. As a result the distinction between agros limitati and agros non limitati has been 
further shaped in South African law, and tidal rivers in this country are regarded as 
navigable rivers. Non-tidal rivers are treated with reference to the principles applicable to 
non-navigable rivers. This requires a brief examination of the cases in our law that lay 
down principles for land ownership on tidal rivers. 
6. Durban City Council and Others v Minister of Agriculture & Another 31 
In this matter, a dispute had developed between the landowner and the State over the 
boundaries of riverside plots that flanked the Umgeni River. The owners contended that 
all the plots were agri non limitati and that each plot extended as a result to the river, and 
what is more, to the center of its bed (based on the principle established by Innes CJ in 
van Niekerk 's case. 32 The state contended that all of the plots were agri limitati and 
bounded on the riverside not by the river itself, but by artificial limits. In the alternative, 
the state contended that if any plot was an ager non limitatus which ran to the river, that 
property extended no further than the inner bank, ending there. In either case, it 
concluded, no plot encroached onto the riverbed. The State viewed the Umgeni River as 
tidal where it flowed past the plots and consequently its bed there as part of "the sea" (for 
the purpose of the Sea-Shore Act, "the sea" includes "the bed of any tidal river"). The 
State is proclaimed owner of the "the sea" in section 2 of that Act, except for any portion 
thereof which was lawfully alienated before the date of commencement of the Act. 
The court held that the extent of the two plots in question depended on the interpretation 
of the deeds that established them and their boundaries; in cases of conflict the 
description in the text of the grant, when clear and unambiguous, must prevail over the 
diagram attached to the grant. 33 
The court held further that there was a presumption that an ager non limitatus which was 
bounded by an unnavigable river was presumed to extend to the center of its bed and such 
presumption was rebuttal. 
31 1982 (2) SA 361 (D). 
32 Van Niekerk & Union Government v Cata 1917 AD 359 There, Innes CJ held that property bounded by a 
river was always understood (in the absence of express contrary provision) to extend ad medium ji/um 
jluminis. 
33 The Court quotes Horne's case, Estate de Villiers & Lovemore 's case as authority for this proposition. 
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Didcott J did not have to decide on whether the Umgeni River was tidal, because the state 
abandoned its contention in that regard. 34 
Interestingly, Didcott J referred to an issue that he did not have to decide on the facts of 
the case. It relates to the effect, on an ager non limitatus, of a deviation in the course of 
the river by which it was bounded. The crisp question is whether that boundary shifted 
with the river and ran wherever that did from time to time, or whether the boundary was 
immobile, always remaining where it had been drawn in the beginning, where the river 
had flowed on the day the boundary was fixed. In support for the contention that the 
former position is the correct one, Didcott J quotes Grotius with approval.35 Grotius' 
contention was that: 
"In land defined by a river, its natural boundary, if the river changes its course gradually it 
changes also the boundary of the territory; and whatever the river adds to one side belongs to him 
to whose land it is added."36 
Didcott J points out that the corollary, the subtraction of land on the other side, has 
implications that may be disturbing. If the principle is applied to subtraction it stands to 
reason that the following consequence might occur. If the channel moves far enough to 
cross the plot located there and settles down beyond it (taking a position on or outside the 
opposite boundary) then the plot itself vanishes altogether, the land of which it once 
consisted being swallowed whole by the adjoining property. As Didcott J puts it: 
"Perhaps that is the law. I do not know. The question was not argued. It did not need to be. The 
order I was asked to and did make traced the disputed boundaries along the middle of the Umgeni 
River's present bank, not the one lying somewhat to the north which the evidence suggested was 
occupied in 1846." 
Other existing legal controls in the coastal zone and the way forward 
Statutory obligations are imposed on landowners of properties in the coastal zone when 
they wish to undertake specified activities on those properties that have been deemed to 
have an impact or a potential impact on that environment. These laws have the effect of 
ensuring that potential human activity must be authorised by the public authority with 
jurisdiction under those laws, before the activity can be carried out. 
The most important -of these obligations is contained in two sets of Regulations 
promulgated under the Environment Conservation Act, 73 of 1989. The first are the 
Regulations promulgated under section 21 of the Environment Conservation Act which 
provide for environmental impact assessments in regard to certain scheduled activities 
("the EIA Regulations"). 37 One of these scheduled activities relates to the reclamation of 
land below the high water mark. The scheduled activity is more fully described as the 
34 Page 376E. 
35 Page 376G. 
36 De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 2.3 .16.2 
37 On 5 September 1997 in GG 18261. 
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"construction or upgrading of . . . . . . .. all structures below the high-water mark of the 
sea".38 
The EIA Regulations impose a range of obligations on persons who wish to undertake 
scheduled activities. In the first instance, regard should be had to the definition section of 
the regulations. The "relevant authority" which is tasked with deciding on whether or not 
to permit a scheduled activity differs from province to province. 
In order to undertake a scheduled activity, an applicant must retain an independent 
consultant who is required to comply with the obligations imposed by regulation 3 of the 
EIA regulations. These include the following: 
An applicant must ensure that the consultant, while complying with the EIA 
Regulations, has the ability to manage the public participation process 
contemplated in the EIA Regulations and also that the consultant has expertise in 
the area of environmental concern being dealt with in the specific application. 
An applicant must ensure that the consultant provides to the relevant authority 
access to, and opportunity for review of, all procedures, underlying data, reports 
and interviews with interested parties, whether or not that information is reflected 
in reports required by the EIA Regulations or not. 
Of particular importance ·in regard to the independent consultant's obligations, is the 
requirement that a proper public participation process be followed, in ensuring that all 
interested and effected parties who have or may have an interest in the scheduled activity, 
are given the opportunity to be heard properly in regard to the undertaking of the 
scheduled activity. 
Once the scoping report has been finalised, it must be submitted to the relevant authority, 
which is required to decide whether the scoping report adequately addresses all issues of 
environmental importance, whereupon that authority can apply its mind and make a 
decision as to whether or not to allow the scheduled activity to proceed. In the event that 
the authority is of the opinion that it requires further information, it can require the 
applicant to embark on the next phase of the environmental impact assessment, which 
will culminate in the production of an environmental impact report. 
Other Regulations that will have an impact on particular properties in the coastal zone 
were promulgated under the Environment Conservation Act on 27 November 1998. 
They are titled "Identification of activities which may have a detrimental effect on the 
environment; Outeniqua sensitive coastal area extension" (''the Outeniqua 
Regulations").39 The Outeniqua Regulations affect properties along the Garden Route, in 
locations like Sedgefield and the Knysna lagoon. Properties that fall to be governed by 
these regulations are listed in a Schedule to thr Outeniqua Regulations. 
38 Schedule l(e) to the EIA Regulations. 
39 These Regulations were promulgated in GG 19493. 
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The promulgation notice to the Outeniqua Regulations specifically provides that the 
Notice under which they are promulgated shall not apply to any activity referred to in 
schedule 1 to the EIA regulations. On the face of it, this means that the EIA regulations 
(insofar as they provide a procedure for specified activities anywhere in the Republic) 
and the Outeniqua Regulations will both apply to certain properties in the coastal zone. 
The public authority with jurisdiction in re~ect of the Outeniqua Regulations is the 
National Parks Board (the Parks Board). 0 On my reading of the Lake Areas 
Development Act, 39 of 1975 and the Regulations made under that Act on 13 December 
1985,41 it cannot be said that the Parks Board is the sole public authority with jurisdiction 
over the Knysna Lagoon, with the result that separate applications to it and CNC may 
have to be made when an activity that falls within the parameters of the Schedules to both 
Regulations is envisaged. 
The procedure for compliance with the Outeniqua Regulations involves submitting the 
application to the local authority.42 This is a peremptory requirement. In addition the 
applicant is required to prepare an environmental impact report, which must accompany 
the application. The required content of the environmental impact report is stipulated in 
regulation 5. The environmental impact report must also be submitted to the parks Board. 
The Parks Board is then obliged to consider the application. Its powers, once the 
application has been considered, are set out in Regulation 6. The Outeniqua Regulations 
also prescribe a procedure for issuing a record of decision and an appeal procedure. 
In some areas of the South African coastal zone, it can therefore be said that 
environmental concerns are accorded appropriate statutory recognition. However, the fact 
that different authorities with different roles, powers and duties may have to be 
approached for permission regarding an activity that may fall under both sets of 
regulations discussed highlights the fragmentary and piecemeal approach that 
characterises protection of the coastal zone in this country. 
A short comparative analysis: the way forward 
The idea of revisiting first principles in domestic law that have become diluted by judicial 
interpretation (like reduced public access to the sea and sea-shore) is not a new one. 
Other countries can provide guidance in this regard. Spain is one of the best of these 
examples. 
Spain enacted a statute in 1988 called the Shores Act.43 In the preamble t~ the Shores 
Act, reference is made to the innovative nature of the new law. It specifically records that 
" the innovation ...... consists in the restoration to their full purity of principles deeply 
40 Schedule 3 to the Outeniqua Regulations. 
41 In GG 10036 dated 13 December 1985. 
42 Regulation 3. 
43 Act 22 of 1988. 
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rooted in our historical law which had been weakened in the course of their 
1. • ,,44 app 1cat10n. 
Regarding ownership rights the Shores Act contains, in addition to a definition of the sea-
shore that recognises the ecological uniqueness and fragility of this part of the coastal 
zone, "a return to our original traditions contained in Roman law and medieval law"45 in 
reaffirming that the sea and its shore are public property. This approach synthesises with 
Spain's constitutional dispensation and the provisions of article 339.1 of the Spanish 
Civil Code. 
Particularly novel and interesting is the section of the Shores Act devoted to the 
protection of coastal property. That section sets forth a series of limitations upon riparian 
ownership rights, which serve as a minimum regulation, and are capable of being 
supplemented by regional government legislation. The most striking of these is contained 
in Chapter 2 of the Act ( entitled "Easements"), which provides for a protection easement 
over a zone of 100 metres from the landward limit of the sea-shore. In addition and 
wherever necessary to secure the effectiveness of the easement and based on the 
particular features of a stretch of coastline, the width of this zone can be enlarged. This 
can be undertaken by central government after consultation with the regional government 
and town council having jurisdiction, up to a maximum of another 100 metres. Certain 
activities are prohibited in the protection easement zone. These activities include erecting 
buildings for residential purposes and activities involving the destruction of deposits of 
sand, stones and gravel. 
Conclusion 
A plethora of conflicts and potential conflicts arise in regard to human activities in and 
our use of the coastal zone. This is clear from the analysis of the relevant case law. 
Many of these disputes are caused by the constantly changing nature of the physical 
interface between land and sea. The coastal zone is also particularly susceptible to 
moving boundaries caused by accretion or decretion. These occurrences are caused by 
natural events (like seasonal changes) and artificial ones (like hardening of the 
environment upstream ofland adjacent to tidal rivers or lagoons). 
All of this begs the question whether present coastal zone legal principles (part common 
law, part codified) regulate these dynamic events properly and fairly, or whether the 
applicable law needs to be reviewed in the light of our increased recognition of the 
dynamic nature of the coastal zone. Not only the nature of the sea-shore but also new 
problems that face it to an increasing extent (like decretion) must be properly addressed. 
44 Introductory memorandum page 2. 
45 Explanatory memorandum, ibid. 
17 
The primary reason for a dedicated coastal zone legal management regime is that "these 
areas have characteristics which necessitate a different approach from that applied inland 
and that they are particularly valuable and vulnerable to degradation".46 
In analysing the need for a new coastal zone management statute for South Africa, 
Glazewski has the following to say about defining boundaries in terms of a new Act:47 
"Acknowledging that the coastal zone is a dynamic ecological interface between land and sea and 
that the high-water mark is an inappropriate line to sever the legal-administrative aspects of the 
two areas, the question remains what should the landward and seaward boundaries of the area be? 
An examination of the treatment of this question by other coastal states reveals no particular way 
but a variety of approaches". 
After reviewing comparative approaches Glazewski suggests a combined approach. This 
approach mergers "a purely arbitrary administrative liq.e"48 with important ecological 
criteria. The ecological approach recommends extending the landward boundary into the 
hinterland to include areas which influence or are influenced by the sea or coastline from 
an ecological perspective. Acknowledging ecological criteria would take partial 
cognisance of the ecological approach. 
The policy embodied in the Draft White Paper recognises the concerns raised in this 
paper and proposes among other things, that a new statute must preserve the philosophy 
of the public status and State custodianship of the sea and sea-shore. Importantly, the 
policy also makes the crucial point that a new Act must make provision "to ensure rublic 
access to the sea and sea-shore, while respecting private property rights".4 The 
suggestion made in the White Paper is that consideration could be given to extending the 
principles of public ownership or State custodianship to appropriate areas above the high-
water mark. The White Paper does not define precisely what criteria are to be employed 
to establish appropriateness. 
My conclusion is that specific and controversial issues relating to moving boundaries in 
the coastal zone, like accretion and decretion, must be examined as part of the process of 
reviewing existing laws, policies and principles that inform coastal zone management. 
This examination should also be undertaken in the light of the genesis of a new 
democratic and constitutional dispensation in South Africa. 
The Draft White Paper has referred to difficulties that have arisen in the past regarding 
the definition of the coast50 and it also recognises the need for a legislative approach that 
synthesises with South Africa's Constitution. In addition, it highlights the need to 
designate national and provincial lead agencies for coastal management, the development 
of co-ordinating mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration and the 
46 Legal and Institutional Aspects of Integrated Coastal Area Management in National Legislation F AO 
(1994) authors Sonja Boelaert - Suominen and Cormac Cullinan. 
47 Towards a Coastal Zone Management Act for South Africa" Jan Glazewski South African Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy at page I . 
48 Glazewski op cit page 19. 
49 Page·89 of the policy. 
50 Page 132. 
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involvement of non-governmental actors as ways of addressing the present inadequate 
approach to administering coastal management. 
It is hoped that the issues raised in the policy contained in the Draft White Paper will be 
formulated into a coherent legislative policy that addresses present difficulties, as 
analysed in this essay. The uniqueness (and often, the still pristine nature) of our coastline 
deserves proper protection. One way to ensure this is by viewing traditional approaches 
afresh and trying to synthesise the need for clear delineation of the coast's boundaries 
with private owners' rights and the rights of the public to reasonable coastal access. All 
of this must be achieved against the backdrop of recognising the ecological criteria that 
distinguish the coastal zone from other environments, and make it as special and unique 
as it is. 
FISHING FOR ACCESS RIGHTS 
A REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND RECENT JUDGEMENTS RELATING TO 
THE ALLOCATION OF FISHING RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
D J Darley Waddilove 
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1 . Introduction 
As we approach the end of the century it is worth looking back and reflecting 
on the manner in which people's relationship with the sea and its resources 
have changed. Vessels have fished increasingly far from shore, using 
technology which has been constantly upgraded and techniques which have 
improved catch returns. This has resulted in the exploitation of certain 
species, some to the point where fishing of those species is no longer 
commercially sustainable (eg. North Atlantic salmon, and Orange Roughy 
between Australia and New Zealand) and the targeting of new species, such 
as has recently occurred with the Patagonian Toothfish. As a consequence 
there have been efforts, both internationally and by specific stat~-egulate 
the pressures being placed on these resources. __..-
The efforts to regulate fishing include the restriction on the catching of certain 
species either by way of complete bans or through the regulation of the times 
that species may be caught, the method of capture and the mass that may be 
caught generally or by a specific person. The efforts have also led to the 
creation of various fishing zones. One of the most significant zones is the 
exclusive economic zone, extending seaward 200 nautical miles from the 
coastline, in which area the coastal state has the exclusive right to exploit the 
marine resources. 
Catch limits 
Within the area of its jurisdiction, South Africa has sought to control the 
catching of the different species which are targeted for commercial 
exploitation. In the case of each of the most heavily targeted species, a "total 
allowable catch" (TAC) has been determined. The TAC is the maximum mass 
of that species that may be caught in a particular season by all commercial 
fishers. 
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Within the TAC individual fishers have been allowed, in the past, to catch on 
a "catch as catch can" basis. In such an event, although there is a limit on 
the total combined mass which may be caught, there is no restriction on the 
how much of that total combined mass may be caught by an individual fisher. 
Once the combined mass has been caught no further catching by individuals 
may take place. Such a regime was applied in South Africa in the 1960's to 
West Coast Rock Lobster. It continues to be applied to horse mackerel where 
an annual precautionary upper limit is in operation. This regime can be 
criticised as it may result in 'a race for the resource', an associated increase 
in individual effort and harvesting at its highest early in the season. In order 
to avoid the problems associated with such an 'open' system and to regulate 
the harvests of individual fishers, in South Africa quotas within the TAC are 
allocated to the individual fishers. 
Individual quotas 
Individual quotas may be expressed as a specific mass, as was the case until 
recently in New Zealand. This method of allocation has been criticised for not 
making allowance for seasonal fluctuations'in the resource which may result 
in unsustainable levels of exploitatio'V° overcome these problems, in New 
Zealand this regime was replaced by a system; similar to that which prevails 
in South Africa for quota controlled s~eye{ where the individual quotas are 
expressed as a percentage of the TAVHowever, in New Zealand, in order to 
effect the conversion to percentage quotas it was necessary for the State to 
acquire the rights of the individual fixed~mass quota holders by purchasing 
them back and then reallocating them as quotas expressed as a percentage 
of the TAC. Whether or not compensation would be payable for a reduction 
of a percentage quota (ie by reducing the pro rata portion of the TAC which 
an individual holds) depends on the nature of the rights accompanying the 
grant of the quota, a matter which is more fully dealt with below. 
\ 
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2. Historical framework 
The specific legislation regulating the allocation of access rights in South 
Africa has changed over time. In addition, in the past ten years there have 
been various attempts to revise the basis upon which fishing rights have been 
granted. 
The first comprehensive legislation to manage marine living resources was the 
Sea Fisheries Act of 1 940 which was repealed by the Sea Fisheries Act No 58 
of 1973. These acts provided for the minister responsible for fishery 
management, to allocate access rights, including quotas. 
Following on widespread dissatisfaction about the way in which quotas were 
being granted by the responsible minister, various commissions of enquiry 
were established, the most significant being the Du Plessis commission in 
1971, the Treurnicht commission in 1980 and the Diemont commission in 
I 
1986. The Diemont Commission of Inquiry into the Allocation of Quotas for / 
the E~~f~tj;;;,t<o"l"Living Marine Resources resulted in the promulgation of the. 
Sea Fishery Act, No 12 of 1988 ("the Sea Fishery Act"). 
The Sea Fishery Act repealed the Sea Fisheries Act No 58 of 1973, as 
amended, and the Fishing Industry Development Act No 86 of 1978, in so far 
as it had not been repealed by a previous act. As a measure to 'depoliticize' 
the granting of access rights, the Sea Fishery Act provided for the 
establishment of an independent statutory board, the Quota Board, to inter 
alia allocate access rights to quota controlled species. 
In 1 ~9.3_guid.e"ltnes were adopted which set out certain objectives to be 
pursued by the Quota Board in the allocation of quotas. These were the 
sustained growth of the industry, stability in the industry, access to the 
industry for a broader spectrum of the population, the creation of formal job 
opportunities and the promotion and development of communities which are 
mainly dependent on the fishing industry' (my emphasis). 
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In 1994, and pursuant to the Constitutional transition in South Africa, the 
Minister of Environment Affairs and Tourism, being the Minister responsible 
for fishery management, established a multiple stakeholder task team, called 
the Fisheries Policy Development Committee {FPDC), to advise him on the 
restructuring of the South African fishing industry. In its report to the Minister 
the FPDC recognised the need for access to marine living resource to be fair 
and equitable. 
Subsequently, in 1998 a white paper on marine living resources was published 
by the Minister. In the White Paper it is recorded that access to South African 
fisheries resources in the past has not been fair and equitable resulting in 
numerous problems which, in certain circumstances, threaten the 
sustainability of the resource. As a result the need is identified to achieve the 




a fairer system of allocation of access to rights to harvest South 
African's living marine resources; 
a system which ensures greater access to the resource by those 
who have been denied access previously; 
a reduction in the current levels of pressure on the resources, 
which in some cases threaten the very sustainability of a 
resource" 
The White Paper was followed, shortly thereafter, by a bill which was 
submitted to Parliament. After certain revisions Parliament adopted the Marine 
Living Resources Act, No 18 of 1998 {"the Marine Living Resources Act") 
which was promulgated on 27 May 1 998 but was implemented with effect 
from 1 September 1998. The Marine Living Resources Act repeals the Sea 
Fishery Act, with the exception of certain specific sections. It has as its object 
'to provide for the conservation of the marine ecosystem, the long-term 
sustainable utilisation of marine living resources and the orderly access to 
exploitation, utilisation and protection of certain marine living resources: and 
for these purposes to provide for the exercise of control over marine living 
resources in a fair and equitable manner to the benefit of all the citizens of 
South Africa'{my emphasis). 
5 
These legislative and ministerial initiatives have been accompanied by 
attempts in the last five years to allocate quotas to new participants in the 
fishery. These attempts have led to a spate of litigation by existing 
participants who have turned to the courts to protect their interests. With the 
exception of the last, all of these cases have related to allocations made by 
the Quota Board in terms of the Sea Fishery Act. 
3. The Sea Fishery Act 
There are various provisions of the Sea Fishery Act which regulate the 
allocation of fishing rights. The Sea Fishery Act generally makes provision for 
the granting of rights of exploitation. These are granted by either the Minister 
(in terms of section 25 of the Act and regulation 6(4) of the regulations made 
in terms of section 45 of the Act and which are contained in Government 
Gqzette No 18357 of 1 November 1997) or, in respect of new entrants to 
quota controlled species, by a Quota Board established in terms of section 1 5 
of the Act. The Act further makes provision for the Quota Board to grant 
quotas to individuals holding rights of exploitation for a particular quota 
controlled species. 
3.1 Rights of exploitation 
A "right of exploitation" is defined in the definitions section of the Sea Fishery 
Act as: 
"a right to utilize living marine resources or aquatic plant for 
commercial purposes on the authority of a permit". 
Although "commercial purposes" are not defined in the Sea Fishery Act this 
right would not appear to relate to utilization for personal consumption or 
possibly for recreational purposes. However, the distinction between 
recreational and commercial purposes may become blurred particularly when 
dealing with charter fish7commercial value of recreational fishing has 
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been well illustrated by the Ministerial investigation in the Victoria, Australia 
into the desirability of allowing inshore trawling to continue in the bays and 
inlets of that state due to its possible negative impacts on recreational fishing. 
Implicit in the definition of a right of exploitation is the fact that the right is 
exercised pursuant to the granting of a permit authorising the utilization. In 
terms of section 25(3)(a), a right is held for a specific period and, in terms of 
section 25(3)(b), it may only be alienated with the approval of the relevant 
authority. In terms of section 25(3)(c) a right of exploitation may be 
suspended or terminated by the Minister pursuant to the conviction of the 
holder of an offence in terms of the Act. 
It may be possible, in terms of the Sea Fishery Act, to obtain a right of 
exploitation in one of two ways. Firstly, section 25(1) of the Act, by the use 
of the word "shall", compels the Minister, pursuant to an application, to grant 
a right of exploitation to a person who, at the date of commencement of the 
Act, "had access to the sea or any branch of the fishing industry or had such 
access in the industry of collecting aquatic plants or shells". However, the 
section provides further that "such grant shall be made on the basis of such 
person's historical performance in the said industry". This suggests that the 
extent of the grant may, within a particular branch of the fishing industry, 
differ from one "exploiter" (as defined in the Sea Fishery Act) to another. 
Secondly, in terms of section 25(2) of the Sea Fishery Act, new entrants to 
a branch of the fishing industry, whether it be regulated by quotas or not, are 
required to apply for a right of exploitation. It then lies within the discretion 
of either the Quota Board, in respect of quota controlled species, or the 
Minister to grant or refuse such an application. 
Guidelines 
The Sea Fishery Act provides for "guidelines" to be formulated for the 
granting of access rights, whether in the form or rights of exploitation or 
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quotas. It is submitted that the wording of the Act in regard to the guidelines V 
is poor. The only mention of these guidelines is contained in section 18(1) 
where it is recorded that the functions of the Quota Board are to: 
"(a) recommend to the Minister for his approval guide-lines for the 
determination of quotas and the granting of rights of 
exploitation; 
(b) allocate quotas on application to persons in the different 
branches of the fishing industry, subject to [foreign fishing rights 
and the determination of the total allowable catch], on the 
conditions determined by the board and in accordance with the 
approved guide-lines; 
(c) grant rights of exploitation in terms of section 25 and in 
accordance with the approved guide-lines." 
No further indication is given in the Sea Fishery Act of the format of the guide-
lines or the procedure to be followed for their adoption. y- t.ri ,,,;J_ ~ ~ 
q f' H. ;_ rl i A ,l'-,i!.. t, C-_ b- C) V..,, _,v-, ..., 
However, the nature of a right of exploitation and of the related guidelines 
received the recent attention of the High Court in a series of cases relating to 
the allocation of abalone quotas for the 1996/7 season. 
Overberg Commercial Divers Association and Others v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 
In the matter of Overberg Commercial Divers Association and Others v The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CPD Case No 
16659/96) the Applicants sought an order interdicting certain new entrants, 
to whom the Quota Board had granted rights of exploitation to utilise 79.5 
tons of abalone for commercial purposes, from exercising the rights of 
exploitation pending a review of the grants. The First Applicant's members, 
who were the further applicants to the application, were all persons who, at 
the commencement of the Sea Fishery Act, had access to the sea in that 
branch of the industry. When the Sea Fishery Act came into force in 1990 
they applied for and were granted rights of exploitation in terms of section 
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25(1 ). 
The Applicants contended that the Quota Board could only grant rights of 
exploitation to new entrants once guidelines for the granting of such rights 
had been approved in terms of section 18(1) of the Sea Fishery Act. The court 
considered the provisions of section 18(1) and found that the legislation did 
not confer on the Quota Board an unfettered discretion to grant rights of 
exploitation and that "its power to grant such rights could only be exercised 
in accordance with guidelines which it had recommended to the Minister and 
which he had approved"[p4]. / 
In that matter the Quota Board conceded that no guidelines had been 
approved. In the circumstances, the court found that the decision of the 
Quota Board to grant rights of exploitation to new entrants was, on the face 
of it, invalid. 
The parties in the Overberg Commercial Divers Association & Others-case 
subsequently settled the review aspect of that litigation on the basis that the 
decision of the Quota Board was set aside by agreement and the agreement 
was made an order of court. 
Gillion v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 
In the matter of Gillion v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
18 Others, (CPD Case No 5186/97) the Applicant sought a mandamus 
compelling the Chief Director of Sea Fisheries to issue to him a permit to catch 
his pro rata share of 79.5 tons of abalone for the 1996/7 season (being the 
same 79.5 tons which was the subject matter of the Overberg Commercial 
Divers Association-case). It was the Applicants' contention that they were, 
as a matter of right, entitled to such a pro rata share. Certain of the 
Respondents contended, in turn, that by virtue of the provisions of section 
25(2)(b) of the Sea Fishery Act the Quota Board could consider fresh 
applications for rights of exploitation by "new entrants". 
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It appears to have been common cause between the parties that, in the light 
of the decision of the court in the Overberg Commercial Divers Association-
case, the Applicant could obtain a mandamus if no guidelines existed. 
Although the Quota Board initially indicated in correspondence to the 
Applicant that there were no guidelines and made a similar concession in the 
Overberg Commercial Divers Association case, in its replying affidavit it was 
recorded that on 16 June 1992 the then Minister of Environmental Affairs, Mr 
Louis Pienaar, had approved guidelines as contemplated in section 18(1 )(a) of 
the Sea Fishery Act, that stated the following: 
'"n ontginningsreg in enige vertakking van die bedryf word vir 'n 
bepaalde tydperk en op spesifieke voorwaardes toegeken aan 'n 
persoon wat by hernuwing of wat nuut tot die bedryf toetree en wat 
op die voorgeskrewe wyse daarom aansoek doen en aan wie 'n kwota 
daarvoor toegeken is". 
In argument the Applicant contended that this guideline was too vague to be 
construed as being "guidelines" as contemplated in section 18 of the Sea 
Fishery Act, particularly as it offerred no criteria or factors to be considered 
when granting rights of exploitation. In his judgement Louw AJ considered the 
relationship between a right of exploitation and a quota and found that "in 
order to be entitled to dive and catch abalone, a person needs to have both 
a quota allocated to him and a right of exploitation" [p7]. In the 
circumstances the court found that it was necessary to read the sets of 
guidelines relating to rights of exploitation together with the set of guidelines 
relating to quotas, and to reconcile them. It found that if the guidelines are 
read to supplement each other the guidelines relating to rights of exploitation 
are not too vague. In dismissing the application the court found that, even if 
the 1992 guideline relating to rights of exploitation was invalid, there was 
nothing to preclude the Minister from determining new guidelines prior to 
making the allocation. 
The stance adopted by the court in providing that it was still open for the 
Minister to determine new guidelines and, on that basis, indicating that it was 
10 
not prepared to effect the allocation itself, differs from the far more robust 
approach adopted by Foxcroft J in two separate judgements which are dealt 
with more fully below. In both these matters, the first being Gillion and 3 
Others v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 23 Others (CPD Case Nos. 
12875/97 and 13113/97) and the second, Tuna Marine (Pty) Ltd v The 
Chairman of the Quota Board and 23 Others (CPD Case No 6854/97), the 
court, albeit for slightly different, although not completely unrelated, reasons 
was prepared to effect an allocation. 
It is further worth noting that in terms of recent practice, rights of exploitation 
are granted for a period of ten years. Although section 18(3)(a) provides for 
rights of exploitation to be granted for a specified period, the Act gives no 
indication of how the period is to be determined. 
3.2 Total.Allowable Catch 
The Sea Fishery Act provides, in section 19, that the Minister shall: 
"from time to time, after consultation with the advisory committee, 
determine, on the conditions that he may deem fit, the maximum mass 
of fish of a particular species which is available for allocation of quotas 
by the board". 
Where a branch of the fishery has not developed to the extent where a total 
allowable catch is determinable, as with horse mackerel in South Africa, mass 
is allocated by the Minister as "experimental" catching rights. A similar regime 
has been adopted with Patagonian Toothfish . 
. In the Gillion case it was recorded (at p3) that it was common cause that the 
full TAC must be allocated in each season. That being the case, it is 
necessary to determine the_ ~ortion of the total mass available for exploitation / · 
~ad.e_aY-a1labl.e.for_q.uota_p_urp.ose.s.,_, 
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The "total allowable catch" is not defined in the Sea Fishery Act. However, 
it is apparent that the mass available for allocation as quotas must be 
determined by the Minister after consultation with the Sea Fishery Advisory 
Committee which is established in terms of section 7 of the Act. The practice 
of the advisory committee, which has generally been endorsed by the 
Minister, has been to recommend that the mass available for quotas in terms 
of section 1 9 is the nett mass remaining after provision has been made for 
recreational fishing, poaching, foreign fishing and any experimental catching, 
such has occurred with hake caught by the long-line method. 
The thrust of the recordal in the Gillion-case would appear to be to compel the 
Minister to make the full TAC immediately available to the Quota Board. It is 
not open to him to hold a part of it back to be dealt with at a later stage. 
3.3 Individual quotas 
Allocation of quotas in the different branches of the industry is effected by the 
either the Minister in regard to foreign states wishing to fish in the exclusive 
economic zone [s18(3)] or, by the Quota Board, established by the Minister 
in terms of s 1 6 of the Act, in accordance with approved guidelines 
[s18(1 )(b)]. 
Guidelines 
As with rights of exploitation, the Quota Board may recommend to the 
Minister for his approval guidelines for determining quotas. On 10 March 1993 
the erstwhile Minister of Home Affairs and of Environment Affairs approved 
a set of guidelines in terms of section 18(1 )(a) of the Sea Fishery Act ("the 
1993 guidelines"). The 1993 guidelines contain a number of clauses which 
are numbered A, 8, C, C, E, F and G. As these guidelines form the subject of 
most of the recent judgements it is worth noting their contents: 
Clause A sets out certain basic qualification requirements for quota 
holders and provides as follows: 
"A 1 . An allocation shall be made to a juristic or natural person 
only, who is 
(a) a South African citizen which includes a registered 
South African company, a partnership, trust, 
closed corporation or a co-operative in which 
South African citizens have at least a 50% 
interest; 
(b) in possession of a productive asset such as a boat 
or processing plant or a meaningful interest 
therein, or is able to prove that he is capable of 
acquiring it within a reasonable period of time but 
within a period of two years. 
A2. A fishery community trust instituted in accordance with 
the requirements of the Department and/or which meets 
such requirements, is exempted from the provisions of 
A.1(b). 
Clause B sets out the factors to be taken into account in determining 
the quantum of individual allocations; 
Clause C deals with the situation where there is an increase in the TAC 
and provides that: 
"Should the total mass of fish available for allocation be 
increased, the Board may in its discretion and subject to specific 
conditions -
(a) increase the allocation to existing quota holders with due 
regard to existing Quota Board undertakings; and/or 
(b) accommodate new entrants as provided for in paragraph 
E." 
Clause D deals with the factors relevant to the re-allocation of quotas 
to existing quota holders and reads as follows: 
"D1. Quota allocations are made in accordance with the quota 
holder's established share in the relative sector. 
D2. No person who was in possession of a quota during the 
previous year will be subjected to the suspension, 
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withdrawal or reduction of his quota, unless -
(a) there is a reduction in the total mass of fish 
available for allocation, in which case reductions 
will be made pro rate, but with due regard to 
existing Quota Board undertakings to quota holders 
in the fishing industry and the economic viability of 
the small quota holder; 
(b) the Board is convinced that the quota holder, 
without justification, failed to utilize his entire 
quota during the previous season to meet any of 
the requirements laid down by the Board; 
(c) the Board acts in accordance with section 20 of 
[the Sea Fishery] Act; 
(d) in the Board's opinion any of the factors mentioned 
in paragraph B.2 justifies a reduction in his quota; 
(e) a redistribution as mentioned in paragraph G 
occurs. 
D3. When the Quota Board intends to act in accordance with 
paragraphs D2(b) and D2(d), the quota holder will be 
afforded an opportunity of stating his case before such 
suspension or reduction of his quota is effected." 
Clause E deals with the allocation of quotas to new entrants in industry 
sectors which are already subject to quota control. 
Clause F sets out the considerations which may apply when the Quota 
Board allocates quotas in an industry sector which has not previously 
been subjected to quota control. 
Clause G, which deals with redistribution of quotas, provides as 
follows: 
"Should the Board be of the opinion that a redistribution of 
quotas is desirable in a sector of the industry, the Board may 
effect a redistribution of quotas after conducting an investigation 
which includes consultations with the relative industry sector". 
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4. The objectives for which quotas are allocated. 
The 1993 guidelines set out certain objectives to be pursued by the Quota 
Board in the allocation of quotas being 'the sustained growth of the industry, 
stability in the industry, access to the industry for a broader spectrum of the 
population, the creation of formal job opportunities and the promotion and 
development of communities which are mainly dependent on the fishing 
industry'. 
Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union v The Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Four Others 
The objectives of the guidelines came under the consideration of the court in 
the matter of Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union v The Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Four Other (CPD Case No 14344/94). On 28 
September 1995 Josman AJ issued a judgement in which he considered the 
allocation of quotas to fishermen's trusts. The Applicant, a registered trade 
union representing fishermen engaged in trawling and line fishing, brought an 
application against the Minister and four others, including the Quota Board, in 
which it sought an order declaring that the allocation by the Quota Board of 
951 tons of hake to The Cape Town Harbour Fishermen's Trust was unlawful 
either because the trust did not fall within the meaning of "persons" as 
referred to in section 18(1 )(b) of the Act or because the Quota Board did not 
have the power to make the allocation in question to the Trust and in doing 
so it was acting ultra vires [p2]. 
The judge considered the purpose of the allocation to the Trust in question. 
In a judgement which, with respect, appears at times confused in its logic 
although perhaps correct in its outcome, Josman AJ notes, at p22, that a 
discretionary trust, which vested control in the trustees rather than the 
intended beneficiaries, would generally be an undesirable vehicle for conferring 
benefits on a community of fishermen and concluded that, in the light of cases 
dealing with the legal nature of a trust, there was nothing in the Sea Fishery 
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Act to suggest that the legislature intended to include a trust as a "person" 
to whom a quota could be allocated. Without it being expressly stated, they 
clear result of such a finding is that the provisions of the guidelines, insofar 
as the deal with trusts, are ultra vires. 
Having reached the conclusion set out above, the judge then proceeds to 
consider the alternative argument of whether "the Board acted ... without 
reference either to the purposes of the act or the Board's own powers in 
establishing the guidelines". The judge considered Clause A(1) of the 
guidelines which provides for an allocation to be made to a juristic or natural 
person only and Clause A(1 )(b) which provides for investment or the potential 
of investment in a vessel or productive asset. He finds that this guideline is 
"consistent with the notion that the person to whom the quota right is 
allocated will exploit the quota right himself". He then concludes that the 
exclusion of the community trust from the requirement of investing in a vessel 
or processing plant: 
"has iaid the basis for the quota allocation to be disposed of by the 
trustees for a sum of money to be shared amongst the recipients who 
are, or supposed to be members of impoverished fishing communities. 
Instead of being given the right to fish they are being given handouts. 
In my opinion the Quota Board exceeded the powers conferred upon it 
by the Act in so doing"(at p23). 
Although the apparent objective of the judge of ensuring that the recipients 
of quotas should derive a direct benefit from the allocation and should be 
directly involved in the catching or processing of the quota, through their 
interest in a productive asset, is laudable, it may be that the finding on the 
alternative argument is not sustainable in law. Certainly, in the case of 
registered companies, particularly public companies, the situation often arises 
where the beneficiaries are not involved in the exploitation of the quota itself. 
There is nothing in the Sea Fishery Act itself to suggest that this should not 
be the case. However, the need to ensure that the benefits of the resource 
should accrue to those directly dependent on it for a livelihood has informed 
the recent legislative reforms set out above and which are dealt with more 
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fully below. 
West Coast Fishermen's Co-operative v The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and four others 
The finding in the Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union case that an allocation 
for welfare purposes to a person not directly involved in the exploitation of the 
resource is ultra vires is at odds with the decision of the Brand Jin the matter 
of West Coast Fishermen's Co-operative v The Government of the Republic 
of South Africa and four others (CPD Case No 8156/97 reported as 1998 (2) 
SA 224 (CPD)). 
In the West Coast Fishermen's Co-operative matter the Applicant was "not an 
ordinary commercial entity. It was established in 1990 with the object of 
acquiring a fishing quota so as to be in a position to provide pension and 
medical benefits for all pelagic fishermen and their families on the West Coast 
of the Western Cape". In 1993, after previous failed attempts, the Applicant 
successfully applied for an anchovy quota which allocation was then renewed 
annually thereafter. At the beginning of 1997, as a result of dramatic decline 
in catch returns, the Minister determined that the total allowable catch for 
anchovy in the ensuing season would be nil. As a result the Applicant did not 
receive an anchovy quota. In order to limit the resultant hardship the 
Applicant, who had also applied for a pilchard quota, was granted a pilchard 
quota of 1000 tons by the Quota Board. The Quota Board, after hearing 
appeals in terms of section 22 of the Act, had subsequently reduced the 
allocation to Applicant to 415.5 tons. The court granted the Applicant an 
order reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Quota Board to reduce 
the allocation of 415.5 tons on the basis that such decision was ultra vires. 
In coming to his decision Brand J considered the nature of any grant made by 
the Quota Board prior to the finalisation of the appeal procedure, set out in 
section 22 of the Sea Fishery Act, and concluded that, having made an initial 
allocation, the Quota Board was not at liberty to reduce it without advising the 
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beneficiary that it was considering doing so and calling them to a hearing. (It 
should be noted that in a judgement delivered shortly thereafter in the matter 
of Coast Trading Co (Ptyl Ltd and 7 Others v the Chairman of the Quota Board 
and 36 Others (CPD Case No 9671 /97) Blignaut AJ has occasion to consider 
the judgement in the West Coast Fishermen's Co-operative case and, in regard 
to this conclusion, at p.18, points out that 'this decision raises a number of 
practical difficulties in regard to the manner in which these provisions should 
be applied in practice'). 
Although the court in the West Coast Fishermen's Co-operative case did not 
consider whether or not the Quota Board had exceeded its powers, in the 
initial allocation, by providing "handouts", in the form of pension and medical 
aid benefits, the effect of this judgement is to sanction an objective which the 
court in the Trawler and Line Fishermen's Union case found to be unlawful. 
5. The legal nature of a quota 
In the light of the various efforts to effect some form of redistribution in the 
industry it is important to consider the nature of the rights that a quota affords 
the holder. This is particularly relevant in relation to the question of whether 
an individual whose quota (or pro rata share of the TAC) stands to be reduced 
is entitled to be afforded the protection granted by section 25 of the 
Constitution. In particular, it is relevant to the issue of whether such person 
would be entitled to compensation pursuant to a reduction. 
In New Zealand individuals whose quotas are reduced in circumstances 
justifying such reduction are entitled to compensation (see in this regard 
Davies, N 'Fisheries Management - a New Zealand Perspective' 1992 (12) SA 
Journal of Marine Science 1069). In Australia, industry participants speak of 
a 'quasi-property' right. 
In the Overberg Commercial Divers Association case Farlam J considered the 
nature of the right afforded to the Applicants as a result of them having 
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previously been allocated a right of exploitation in terms of section 25 of the 
1988 Act. It was contended on behalf of certain of the new entrants who 
were respondents to the application that at best the Applicants had a spes 
that the mass that had been granted to the new entrants would, in the event 
of the grant being set aside by the court, be granted to them. The court did 
not rule on whether or not the Applicants were the holders of a spes or 
stronger rights, but found that a spes was capable of protection. Certainly, 
where guidelines for the granting of a right of exploitation or quotas exist the 
holders of existing 'rights' would have a legitimate expection that their rights 
would not be limited from one season to the next other than in accordance 
with the provisions of the guidelines. 
In terms of section 24 of the Sea Fishery Act a quota, or a part of a quota, is 
transferable in accordance with guidelines 'adopted by the Minister after 
consultation with the Competition Board and announced in a manner that he 
may deem fit' (s24(1 )). The Minister has approved guidelines for the transfer 
of quotas (a copy of which has been made available to the writer by the 
department but from which it is not clear when they were adopted). 
The approved guidelines for transfer provide inter alia that: 
"1 .4 A quota can be transferred only after it has been held for a 
minimum period of three years: Provided that in the event of (a) 
the winding up of a partnership or juristic person or the 
sequestration of an individual's estate before the expiry of such 
period or an individual quota holder leaving the industry before 
the expity of such period, the quota shall revert to the State, 
without compensation for reallocation, or (b) the death of an 
individual quota holder, the quota may be transferred to the legal 
heir if he or she is the surviving spouse or related to the 
deceased within at least the second degree of consanguinity and 
is willing and able to exploit the quota. 
1.5 For the purposes of these guidelines any change in the 
constitution of a partnership or the change in the controlling 
interest in a juristic person shall constitute circumstances 
requiring an application for the transfer of a quota. 
1 . 7 The rules governing competition in the Republic could, in their 
own right, have a bearing on the reallocation of quotas." 
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If the approach of the court in the Gillion-case is to be extended to the 
guidelines for transfer then these guidelines should be read as supplementary 
to the guidelines relating to rights of exploitation and allocation of quotas. In 
that event, the guidelines for transfer would appear to provide additional 
circumstances in which a quota may be withdrawn or reduced. 
Section 24(4) provides that the Quota Board may (my emphasis) approve an 
application for the transfer of a quota, or a part of it, if the proposed transfer 
complies with the guidelines. From the aforegoing it is apparent that the 
rights are not freely transferable. Transfer is subject to the provisions of the 
guidelines and the discretion of the Quota Board. They also do not fall within 
the estate of the holder. The guidelines on allocation of quotas make 
provision for the reduction or redistribution of quotas. Section 20 of the Sea 
.Fishery Act also provides for the suspension, cancellation and reduction of 
quotas . 
• 
In the light of all of the aforegoing it is apparent that quota holders in South 
Africa do not have an absolute right which accrues to them in perpetuity. The 
rights can therefore be reduced without compensation being payable. 
However, it is further apparent that persons holding quotas in terms of the 
Sea Fishery Act have a legitimate expectation that their grants will be 
renewed annually, a fact recognised by the court in a series of judgements 
dealing with the reduction of existing quotas. 
6. The reduction of existing quotas. 
Most recent judgements have dealt with the reduction of rights of existing 
participants. In certain instances where the Applicants have succeeded in 
reviewing the decision to reduce their rights the court has been prepared to 
effect what it regards to be the correct allocation. In others it has not, 
preferring instead to refer the matter back to Quota Board for reconsideration. 
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Marine Products Ltd and Anor v The Chairman of the Quota Board and 9 
Others, St Helena Bay Fishing Industries Ltd and Oceana Fishing Group Ltd 
v The Chairman of the Quota Board 
In the matter of Marine Products Ltd and Anor v The Chairman of the Quota 
Board and 9 Others (CPD Case No 8773/97) the Applicants, who were 
existing participants, sought an order setting aside the allocation by the Quota 
Board of pilchard quotas for the 1997 season to new entrants and further 
directing that the allocation be effected on the same basis of allocation applied 
in respect of the previous season (ie pro rata to the participants of the 
previous season). They sought this order on the basis that the allocation to 
new entrants had only been made possible by the Quota Board reducing their 
quotas and that this reduction had been effected in violation of the guidelines. 
The allocation by the Quota Board of pilchard quotas for the 1 997 season was 
also the subject matter of the dispute in St Helena Bay Fishing Industries Ltd 
and Oceana Fishing Group Ltd v The Chairman of the Quota Board (CPD Case 
No 14867 /97). However, it differed from the Marine Products-case in that the 
Applicants, in addition to seeking an order setting aside the allocation for the 
1997 season, sought an order directing that the allocation be effected on the 
basis applicable prior to 1992. 
In November 1992 the Quota Board had announced that it would not allocate 
pilchards for the forthcoming season on the same basis as the previous 
season. As a result the quotas of existing participants stood to be reduced. 
This led to Oceana instituting a review application. The application was 
settled as a result of a compromise agreement concluded between the then 
members of the pelagic industry (the 1992 agreement). In terms of the 
agreement certain of the existing participants in the pilchard sector accepted 
a reduction in their ·quotas in exchange for the allocation to them of anchovy 
quotas. The agreement was sanctioned by the Quota Board which thereafter 
dealt with the existing participants in the pilchard and anchovy sectors on the 
basis of the agreement. 
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Despite the applicants in the St Helena Bay Fishing Industries-case being 
instrumental in achieving the 1992 agreement, and exchanging part of their 
then pilchard quota for anchovy quota, as a result of the subsequent demise 
of the anchovy resource, the agreement no longer suited them. Therefore 
they were now seeking to have the agreement set aside. In order to avoid the 
consequences of the agreement, they contended that it was a nullity as the 
relevant legislation did not make provision for such a 'swap' arrangement. 
The Marine Products-case and the St Helena Bay Fishing Industries-case were 
heard together on the same day, as the facts in the one matter were similar 
to those in the other. In effect the Applicants to the latter case were opposed 
to the relief being sought by the Applicants in the former. They required a 
more far reaching order, to whit an order that the allocations for 1997 be 
effected pro rata on the basis of the 1992 allocations as opposed to the 1996 
allocations. 
The Court dismissed the argument that the 'swap' arrangement should be set 
aside. In doing so, Foxcroft J applied the maxim "nemo ex suo delicto 
melioriem suam condicionem facere potest". However, it is worth noting that 
an industry-wide agreement such as the pilchard/anchovy swap could have 
been lawfully implemented by the parties and the Quota Board utilising the 
provisions of section 24 of the Sea Fishery Act which relates to the transfer 
of quotas. 
It was further contended by the Applicant's in the St Helena Bay Fishing 
Industries-case that the reduction in the Applicants' pilchard quotas had been 
effected in a procedurally incorrect manner and that the Quota Board had 
failed to observe the requirements of natural justice when it gave effect to the 
earlier compromise. On the basis of the delay-rule set out in the Wolgroeier's 
case and the considerable prejudice that would be occasioned to the new 
entrants over the intervening period, this was dismissed. 
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The Court accepted the concession by the Quota Board that it's decision 
should be set aside and thereafter granted the Applicants in the Marine 
Products-case the relief they sought whilst dismissing the relief sought in the 
St Helena Bay Fishing Industries-case to the extent that it was inconsistent 
therewith. 
Coast Trading Co (Pty) ltd and 7 Others v The Chairman of the Quota Board 
and 36 Others 
In the matter of Coast Trading Co (Pty) Ltd and 7 Others v the Chairman of 
the Quota Board and 36 Others (CPD Case No 9671 /97) the Applicants 
sought an order reviewing and setting aside decisions of the Quota Board 
relating to the allocation of West Coast Rock Lobster quotas for the 1996/97 
season. The Quota Board made a provisional allocation of 1475 tons on 7 
November 1996. This represented a reduction of 63 tons on the previous 
years TAC of 1 520 tons. The allocation was effected, in terms of a Schedule, 
to four different categories being to new entrants, new entrants of the 
previous year who received an increase, existing participants who received an 
increase and to existing participants on a pro rata basis who received a 
decrease. A further 200 tons was subsequently referred by the Minister to 
the Quota Board for allocation. The Quota Board decided to allocate 63 tons 
of this further mass to the existing participants who had received a pro rata 
decrease and the balance of 137 tons to all participants, including the new 
entrants. 
The court, in the person of Blignaut AJ, found that it was not necessary to set 
aside an entire allocation for the season as the various allocations to individual 
applicants could be regarded as separate decisions each capable of being 
separately reviewed [p16]. The court found further that an investigation 
which ,includes proper consultations with the relative industry sector was a 
prerequisite for the making of reduced or revised allocations [p 1 7] and that a 
10 minute address to the Quota Board at public meetings did not constitute 
proper consultation and cannot serve to validate a subsequent reduction and 
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reallocation in terms of Guideline G [p17). In addition it was necessary for the 
Quota Board to inform existing participants beforehand of the possible 
application of Guideline G. 
Tuna Marine (Pty) Ltd v The Chairman of the Quota Board and 23 others 
In Tuna Marine (Pty) Ltd v The Chairman of the Quota Board and 23 others 
(6854/97) the court was asked to review and set aside allocations of abalone 
quotas for the 1996/7 season which were effected on the basis of 95% to the 
existing quota holders, 50 % of the balance to new entrants and the other 
50% of the balance to the new entrants of the previous year. In an ex 
tempore judgement on 18 June 1997 Foxcroft J found that this basis of 
allocation was at odds with the guidelines in that, in terms of the guidelines, 
a person can only have his quota reduced pursuant to a "wholesale" 
redistribution. The court then considered the provisions of the guidelines 
relating to redistribution and concluded, at p.6, that "it is something which 
should be done in a proper manner after proper notice to all possible interested 
parties". 
The court found that an inquiry that the Quota Board intended to hold within 
a few days of the finalisation of the court case would not constitute sufficient 
inquiry for the purposes of a redistribution as intended in the guidelines. 
Gillion and 3 Others v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 23 Others, 
Atlantic Fishing Enterprises (Edms) Bpk v The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 
In Gillion and 3 Others v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 23 Others 
(CPD Case No 12875/97) the Applicants sought an order interdicting the 
Quota Board from applying certain amendments to the existing guidelines 
pending an order reviewing and setting aside the amendments. The issues in 
that application impacted on another application, Atlantic Fishing Enterprises 
(Edms) Bok v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism & Others 
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(CPD Case No 13113/97). As a result the two applications were heard 
together. 
On 14 August 1997 the Minister had approved new guidelines for the 
allocation of quotas. The most significant of the guidelines for purposes of the 
judgement was the amendment of Guideline G by the deletion of the words 
"after conducting an investigation which includes consultations with the 
relative industry sector" so that the guideline, in its revised form, reads as 
follows: 
"The Board may effect a redistribution of quotas if it is of the opinion 
that such a redistribution is desirable in a sector of the industry". 
On 11 July 1997, the Overberg Commercial Abel one Divers Association, of 
which the Applicant was the president, had written to the Minister requesting 
an opportunity to make representations regarding the proposed amendment 
of the existing guidelines. A month later the Association received a letter from 
the Quota Board recording that, in the light of the proposed abolition of the 
Quota Board, lengthy consultations about the proposed guidelines was 
undesirable and that, in any event, the proposed guidelines would not impact 
on any person's interest. 
In an acerbic judgement Foxcroft J noted that, in the Tuna Marine matter, the 
guidelines had presented the Quota Board with a problem as a result of which 
the Quota Board had not followed them. Subsequent to that judgement, 
through the amendment of the guidelines, the Quota Board was endeavouring 
to achieve a situation where it was not necessary for it to consult with 
members of the industry in order to effect a wholesale redistribution. The 
court found that 'the applicants were obviously interested parties, they had 
rights in terms of the guidelines as they stood. They had the right not to have 
their quota reduced, certainly until they had been given an opportunity to be 
heard in the matter and their rights were ridden over roughshod' (at p9). When 
the Quota Board had decided to amend the guidelines it was then obliged to 
entertain representations from any person who wished to be heard which it 
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had not done. 
From these cases it is apparent that the efforts of the Quota Board to effect 
some form of transformation were being constantly frustrated by the Quota 
Board's failure to do so within the framework of its own guidelines. In this 
regard it is worth considering the further comments of Foxcroft J in the Tuna 
Marine matter where, having reviewed and set aside the decision of the Quota 
Board relating to the allocation of abalone for the 1996/7 season, he refused 
to refer the matter back to Quota Board for a decision and, instead, 
substituted it with a decision of Court. One of the reasons for doing so was 
that the Applicant had already suffered unjustifiable prejudice from the fact 
that "Applicant and other people cannot fish but have to spend their time 
arguing in law courts and before the Quota Board, not just in this case, but in 
many other cases in the last years. This is not the way to bring about a fair 
distribution in the fishing industry. If the law is to be changed then it has to 
be done in Parliament and not in this way"[at 7]. 
In the light of those comments it is worth considering briefly the changed 
regime that has now been introduced by the Marine Living Resources Act. 
7. The Marine Living Resources Act 
The Marine Living Resources Act abolishes the Quota Board and, in what 
could be seen as a step back to the situation that prevailed prior to the 
promulgation of the Sea Fishery Act, provides for allocations to be effected 
by the Minister who shall determine the rights to be granted to any person in 
terms of section 18(1 ). Section 18(1) provides that: 
"No person shall undertake commercial fishing or subsistence fishing, 
engage in mariculture or operate a fish processing establishment unless 
a right to undertake or engage in such activity or to operate such 
establishment has been granted to such person by the Minister." 
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The Act separately recognises "recreational" fishing as a category affording 
certain limited rights {s20). 
The purpose for which rights are granted. 
The Marine Living Resources Act introduces various "objectives and 
principles" which are applicable to any organ of state exercising any power in 
terms of that Act. Included amongst them are the "need to restructure the 
fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity within 
all branches of the fishing industry" {s2{j)). 
The Act provides further in section 18(5) that: 
"In granting any right referred to in subsection (1 ), the Minister shall, 
in order to achieve the objectives contemplated in section 2, have 
particular regard to the need to permit new entrants, particularly those 
from historically disadvantaged sectors of society" (my emphasis). 
It is apparent from the aforegoing that the Minister is obliged to utilise quotas 
to achieve certain socio-political goals. However, it may well be that the 
considerations of the court Trawler and Line Fishermen's case will continue 
to apply. 
Total Allowable Catch 
As with the Sea Fishery Act, the Marine Living Resources Act sets out 
mechanisms for managing catch sizes. Whereas the Sea Fishery Act talks of 
"the maximum mass of fish of a particular species which is available for 
allocation of quotas" the Marine Living Resources Act provides for allocation 
based on a "total allowable catch" and a "total applied effort". The former is 
defined as: 
"the maximum quantity of fish of individual species or groups of 
species made available annually, or during such other period of time as 
(. 
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may be prescribed, for combined recreational, subsistence, commercial 
and foreign fishing." 
The latter as: 
"the maximum number of fishing vessels, the type, size and engine 
power thereof or the fishing method applied thereby for which fishing 
vessel licences or permits may be issued for individual species or 
groups of species, or the maximum number of persons on board a 
fishing vessel for which fishing licences or permits may be issued to 
fish individual species or groups of species". 
In terms of section 14 of the Marine Living Resources Act the Minister shall 
inter alia determine the total allowable catch and the total applied effort and 
shall determine the portions of these to be allocated in any year to 
subsistence, recreational, local commercial and foreign fishing. 
The nature of the rights 
All rights granted by the Minister in terms of section 18(1) of the Marine 
Living Resources Act are valid for a period which the Minister shall determine 
but which shall not exceed 1 5 years after which the rights automatically 
revert to the state (s18(5)). The Act contemplates that the rights will be 
leased by the State to the holders (s22). Commercial rights may be 
transferrable with the consent of the Minister (s21 (2)). 
Fisheries Transformation Council 
The Marine Living Resources Act, in section 29, establishes a new institution, 
the Fisheries Transformation Council which has as its objective "to facilitate 
the achievement of fair and equitable access to the rights referred to in 
section 18 ". The Minister may allocate rights to the Council which shall then 
proceed to lease them, according to criteria determined by the Minister, to 
"persons from historically disadvantaged sectors of society and to small and 
medium sized enterprises" (s31 (2)). 
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Implementation 
The Marine Living Resources Act was promulgated in GG No 18930 of 27 
May 1998 and was implemented with effect from 1 September 1998 (GG 
19148 of 21 August 1998). Acting within the framework of the Act the 
Minister then established the various institutions referred to in the Act, 
including the Fisheries Transformation Council, and thereafter proceeded to 
consider applications for the granting of access rights to certain sectors of the 
fishery for the 1999 season. However, this soon gave rise to further litigation. 
Langklip See Produkte (Pty) Ltd and 59 others v The Honourable Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 161 others. 
The promulgation of the Marine Living Resources Act should have heralded the 
end of the period of uncertainty that prevailed under the Sea Fishery Act. 
However, on 23 April 1999 in the Cape Provincial Division in Case No 986/99 
Davis J delivered a judgement in the matter of Lanqklip See Produkte (Pty) Ltd 
and 59 others v the Honourable Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and 161 others. In that matter the Applicant sought an order reviewing and 
setting aside proceedings of the Minister relating to the allocation of West 
Coast rock lobster for the 1998/9 season, declaring that in terms of section 
85 of the Marine Living Resources Act the Minister was compelled to exercise 
the powers and follow the procedures of the Quota Board and granting certain 
related relief. 
The Mininster had reduced the allocation of West Coast rock lobster to 
existing quota holders by 25%. This mass was allocated to 40 new entrants 
approved by the Minister and 567 tons was allocated to 166 applicants by the 
Fisheries Transformation Council in terms of the provisions of section 31 of 
the Marine Living Resources Act. 
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After considering various rules of interpretation the Court, in the Langklip See 
Produkte case, found that the clear purpose of section 85 of the Marine Living 
Resources Act was to compel the Minister to apply the Sea Fishery Act for a 
period of six months after the commencement of the Marine Living Resources 
Act, and, in making the allocations of West Coast rock lobster for the 1 998/9 
season, to exercise the powers and follow the procedures of the Quota Board, 
including the provisions of the guidelines. 
However, unlike the court in the Tuna Marine case, and despite counsel for 
the Minister conceding that it may do so, the court was not prepared to 
dispose of the applications for quotas in the manner that the Minister would 
have done had he exercised the powers assumed from the Quota Board. In 
refusing to replace the decision of the Minister acting qua Quota Board with 
its own decision, the court referred specifically to Guideline D3 which provides 
for the reduction of quotas. In its order the court directed that the available 
mass be allocated "in accordance with the provisions of guideline D2 to all 
persons who were allocated and in possession of a lobster quota for 1997 /8 
fishing season ("existing entrants"). 
8. Conclusion 
In guideline D2 provision is made for a reduction of quota pursuant to "a 
redistribution as contemplated in Guideline G". It is not clear from the Langklip 
See Produkte case whether the judge was contemplating the Minister possibly 
utilising these powers. However, the effect of the judge refusing to impose 
a decision resulted in the participants in the various quota controlled sectors 
of the South African fishery concluding sector-wide agreements, similar to 
that dealt with by the Court in the St Helena Bay Fisheries case. The result 
has been the introduction of new entrants by agreement, albeit reluctantly 
given. 
This clearly begs the question of whether or not the process of restructuring 




that of the Quota Board in the matters of Tuna Marine and Killion and Others. 
There were a wide range of other grounds of review raised in the Langklip See 
Produkte case which dealt with the various powers of the Minister and the 
Fisheries Transformation Council acting in terms of the Marine Living 
Resources Act. In the light of the Court's interpretation of section 85 of the 
Marine Living Resources Act it was not necessary to deal with these. 
However, they do afford one an insight into some of the possible legal 
challenges that may be made in the future as the Minister seeks to implement 
that Act and fishes around for ways in which to achieve the socio-political 
objectives of redistribution that have been so clearly identified. 
Cape Town 
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